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The economic impact of large influxes of population is a complex topic. This research 
contributes to this field by examining one of the most significant, but least researched, 
examples of postwar migration – the repatriation of more than six million (including 
three million civilians and demobilised soldiers each) to Japan after the Second World 
War. One pervasive image of Japanese civilian repatriates is that of the immigrant 
farmer of Manchuria who settled as a part of Japan’s Manchurian policies and had 
difficult repatriation experiences under the hostility of local people. However, many 
returned from other regions as well, including Korea and Sakhalin, and repatriates 
consisted of not only farmers but also colonial government officials, employees of 
public and private corporations, and small business owners, amongst others. This 
paper specifically focuses on civilian repatriates in selected prefectures (Ibaraki, 
Hiroshima, Kanagawa and Osaka) in 1956 and their occupational changes during the 
time of economic transition.  
Whilst it is evident that for many repatriates the postwar transition was not 
entirely smooth, the data presented in this research suggests that in contrast to 
prevailing notions, repatriates’ postwar resettlement was facilitated by a) employment 
in family farming and the tertiary sector, b) employment at government agencies or c) 
the transferability of repatriates’ skills in industry and retail and services. The 
information from the 1956 government survey into repatriates’ postwar lives shows 
that approximately 60 per cent of repatriates fell in these categories, while the other 
40 per cent found employment in new areas or became unemployed. As a result, 
despite the scale of the repatriation, the settlement was broadly successful. It can be 
argued that this type of transition helped to bring political and economic stability, 
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Note on translation 
Japanese words and names are romanised in accordance with the modified Hepburn 
system. Long vowels are indicated by the use of macrons which are omitted in the case 
of names of well-known places, such as Tokyo. Romanised Japanese names are written 
in line with the English practice of given name preceding surname.  
 
Abbreviation and English names of Japanese words and Japanese 
organisations 
English names and titles are followed by the Japanese original. English translations 
have been taken from government documents, corporate records, newspapers and 
academic papers. Where there are no existing translations, the author has translated 
them into English. 
 
Abbreviation 
BCOF: The British Commonwealth Occupation Force 
BCFK: The British Commonwealth Forces Korea  
JNR: The Japan National Railways 
MHW: The Ministry of Health and Welfare 
NTT: The Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation 
PRC: People’s Republic of China 
SMR: The South Manchuria Railway Company (Minami Manshū Tetsudō) 






English names of government agencies, companies and other 
organisations 
 
Agricultural cooperatives: Nōgyōkyōdō Kumiai  
The Central China Railway: Kachū Kōtsū 
The Chinese Eastern Railway: Tōshin Tetsudō 
The Korean Railway:  Chōsen Tetsudō  
National Cooperative of Reclamation Farmers: Kaitaku Jikōkai 
The North China Railway: Kahoku Kōtsū 
The Repatriation Relief Bureau: Hikiage Engokyoku 
The Research Department of the South Manchuria Railway Company: Chōsabu 
Manchuria Electric Company: Manshū Dengyō 
A Support Association for Repatriate Railway Workers: Tairiku Tetsudō Jūjiin 
Engokai 
 Chapter 1  
Occupational transitions of Japanese civilian repatriates 
In this thesis, I have researched how three million Japanese civilian repatriates re-
entered the ravaged postwar Japanese economy. Observing diplomatic instability in 
Northeast Asia, in which Japan is one of the central actors, I started searching for the 
origin of the problems, including the region’s ‘history problem’. I also became 
interested in the question as to how Japan made the transition from the wartime to 
postwar economy. As the research focus for my PhD programme, I chose the topic of 
the resettlement of three million civilian repatriates who had returned from Japan’s 
overseas territories and their postwar job experiences in order to examine how these 
people made a transition during this time of changes.  
In Japan’s modern history after the Meiji Restoration, the country saw itself as 
a vulnerable new country being surrounded by threats from major global powers in 
Europe, as well as from China and Russia. The government’s leaders believed that 
overseas expansion was necessary for national security and sustainable development, 
as well as to achieve a respectable status in the international community. Japan 
colonised Taiwan in 1895 and annexed Korea in 1910. In the 1930s, Japan’s aggression 
further accelerated, and the country established Manchukuo in 1932. By the time the 
Second World War ended, there were more than 3 million Japanese civilians living in 
these territories, not to mention the 3 million soldiers. 
The Second World War in Asia ended in August 1945 with Japan’s defeat. By 
this time, approximately 2.5 million Japanese people had died.1 Tens of millions of 
                                               
1 John Dower, Cultures of War: Pearl Harbor: Hiroshima: 9-11: Iraq (New York: W. W. Norton & 
Company, 2011), 404, 90-91. Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa 
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people lost their lives in other countries in Asia. In Japan’s mainland, one quarter of 
non-military assets of the country were lost in the war. Industrial production had 
declined to approximately 10 per cent compared of the beginning of the war. Material 
shortages were rampant, and the Japanese people were facing starvation.2  
With its defeat, Japan’s overseas territories were lost, investment and assets 
were lost, and millions of individuals had to return to Japan. Japan was occupied by 
the Allied Powers and was forced to define itself in terms of national borders and 
foreign relations, in addition to domestic political, economic and social systems. 
Although the changes were not always as dramatic as had been feared, these were the 
challenges the Japanese government and its leaders perceived in the immediate 
postwar period.  
Among more than 6.29 million Japanese soldiers and overseas residents,3 the 
Japanese government initially planned to permanently settle the country’s overseas 
residents in their wartime regions of residence, not only because of material, food and 
housing shortages but also to the fact that Japan had lost many ships and the remaining 
ones were under the control of the Occupation Authorities. However, from the end of 
August 1945, diplomatic reports on attacks on Japanese civilians by the Soviet military 
forces and local residents started to arrive to Japan, and the government gradually 
                                               
Times to the Present, 2nd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 225. It should be noted 
that the Japanese government often states that approximately 3.1 million Japanese people died 
in the war. For example, see a statement published by the Ministry of Health Labour and 
Welfare, "Zenkoku Senbotsusha Tsuitōshiki Ni Tsuite," (Tokyo2002). 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/tuitou/dai2/siryo2_2.html. Accessed on 10 January 2017. 
2 Economic Stabilisation Board, "Annual Economic Report," (Tokyo: The Economic Stabilisation 
Board, 2000). http://www5.cao.go.jp/j-j/wp/wp-je00/wp-je00-0020j.html. Accessed on 25 
March 2016. 
3 Ministry of Health and Welfare, Engo 50 Nenshi, ed. Shakai Engo Kyoku (Tokyo: Gyōsei, 1997), 
730. The figure of 6.29 million repatriates (including both civilians and demobilised soldiers) only 
includes those who were repatriated and reported to the regional repatriation centres, usually at 
ports where they had arrived via official repatriation ships. However, some people returned by 
privately hired fishing boats, and repatriates who did not report to the Repatriation Relief Agency 
are not included in this figure.  
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switched the policy from the permanent settlement of Japanese residents in foreign 
territories to their early repatriation. 4  The result was one of the largest postwar 
migrations of the 20th century (second only to Germany’s 12 million returning 
expellees and refugees, also following the Second World War). The scale of the 
economic challenge these repatriates represent – to absorb three million civilians into 
a ravaged economy within just a few years of defeat – was enormous, and given the 
rapid growth which was to follow, the transition merits deeper analysis. 
This is easier said than done, however. Despite great shortages and 
unemployment, over time, the repatriation was broadly successful. And yet the factors 
underpinning this important achievement remain relatively unexamined by historians.  
This was perhaps part of the fact that research on the economic transition of the end 
of the Japanese empire has been overshadowed by other salient events: Japan’s defeat, 
the devastated domestic economic situation, the Allies’ occupation and social reforms, 
the outbreak of civil wars in China and Korea and the subsequent Cold War in 
Northeast Asia.5 In the field of Japanese economic history scholars have tried to 
pinpoint the factors behind the country’s rapid postwar economic growth after the 
1950s, but analysis of its postwar economic settlement, including the repatriation 
problem, has been less well explored. Moreover, the repatriation does not figure large 
in Japan’s collective consciousness. Awareness among the general public is limited to 
personal stories of their family members, relatives or neighbours, or a handful of other 
people’s life stories learned through television programmes or popular literature. 
These personal, individual stories make for a piecemeal account of the whole, and do 
                                               
4 Kiyofumi Katō, "Dainihon Teikoku No Hōkai to Zanryū Nihonjin Mondai," in Dainihon Teikoku No 
Hōkai to Hikiage Fukuin (Tokyo: Keiō University Press, 2012), 14-25. 
5 Lori Watt, When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan, Harvard 
East Asian Monographs (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009), 12. 
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not lend themselves easily to thinking about the repatriates collectively, or their wider 
impact. The result is that the majority of these three million civilians had vanished 
somewhere from the memories of the Japanese people.  
Beyond the personalised nature of people’s accounts, the wider repatriate 
story has also likely been overlooked for a number of other reasons: firstly, returnees 
comprised only one part of all displaced war victims in Japan — the many millions 
who found themselves without homes or employment in the years following 1945 
included not just the repatriates, but also former military industry workers and all those 
who lost their houses in air raids. In this sense, it has perhaps been difficult to separate 
the problem of the repatriates from that of other war victims. Secondly, many 
repatriates had to build new lives in Japan having reached what may well have been 
the lowest point of their lives. In some cases, their desperate activities involved deceits 
and betrayal in commercial trade or unlawful occupation of land, which some 
repatriates justified as a means to survive.6 Some people also experienced family 
problems such as divorce caused by unexpected personal conflicts during the 
repatriation. It would therefore have been natural for many of them to decide not to 
openly speak about their experiences during this period. Thirdly, the rapid economic 
growth after the mid-1950s made it relatively easy for the Japanese economy to absorb 
returnees, which to some extent might have mitigated the repatriation problem. 
In postwar Japan, interpretation of the repatriation also became a politically 
sensitive issue; in the immediate postwar period both civilian repatriates and former 
soldiers were viewed sceptically by the Japanese general public, who saw them as 
                                               
6 Yoshiaki Ogikubo and Hideyuki Negishi, Gifu Apareru Sanchi No Keisei (Tokyo: Seibundō, 2003), 
41 and 59. Asobu Yanagisawa, Nihonjin No Shokuminchi Taiken, Dairen Nihonjin Shōkō Gyōsha No 
Rekishi (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1999), 320-21. 
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agents of the country’s military expansion.7 For the majority of the Japanese people, 
these returnees were associated with the disgrace of the nation, an unwanted reminder 
of Japan's status as an imperial aggressor.8 Some returnees challenged this view by 
publishing their personal memoirs about their difficult journey home as early in the 
late 1940s, and as war memories faded, especially after the 1980s, the rest of the 
Japanese population seems to have started to recognise returnees’ difficult experiences. 
The generalised 'civilian repatriate' came to symbolise victims of the war, a trope 
which has sometimes been used by the Japanese who have tended to see their country 
as a victim in the Second World War, specifically in debates regarding Japan’s war 
responsibility. Recent images of the civilian returnees have tended to give particular, 
and perhaps excessive, prominence to the former migrant farmers returned from 
Manchuria, who were victims of violent attacks by Russian soldiers and of revenge 
attacks by Chinese and Korean civilians during the repatriation. This modern political 
skew on what few texts exist on the subject further removes us from the reality of the 
repatriate experience. For all these reasons, despite its immense scale, the analysis of 
repatriation has been insufficient, especially these individuals’ wartime and postwar 
economic activities.  
In addition to seeking to fill this gap, this research on the returnees could also 
reveal a forgotten aspect of the postwar Japanese economy. Laura Hein states in her 
chapter ‘Growth Versus Success’ in the volume Postwar Japan as History:  
Japan appears to offer a model for economic success without suffering, 
contention or even much effort… It [the focus on economic growth] has 
obscured all those aspects of Japanese economic history that have not 
directly contributed to Japanese success… It has imparted false prescience 
to the Japanese, persistently giving the impression that successes were 
                                               
7 John W. Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II (New York: W.W. Norton 
& Co., 1999), 58-61. 
8 Watt, When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan, 86-87. 
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anticipated and planned.9  
 
In contrast to such general views on Japan’s growth, the reality is that many Japanese 
people including repatriates struggled to re-establish themselves through an endless 
process of trial-and-error.  
There is certainly a wealth of stories detailing the returnees’ desperate but 
creative (as well as failed) attempts to survive. For example, a record published by the 
Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) of Japan in 1950 includes a story of repatriate 
railroad engineers in Hokkaido, who had worked for the North China Railway 
(Kahoku Kōtsū). They first worked together as day labourers but failed to make a 
living. They then formed a group to receive orders for emergency repair works from 
the Japan National Railways (JNR), where they had worked before leaving for China. 
Because they no longer had equipment of their own, the repatriate engineers had no 
choice but to wait until JNR factory employees went home at 5pm, whereupon they 
would borrow the necessary tools and work all night through to 8am. They eventually 
established a successful small business to become a sub-contractor of JNR and other 
railway companies.10  
According to various memoirs and the secondary literature, including John 
Dower’s Embracing Defeat, 11 many Japanese people were engaged in black market 
trades by obtaining food items from farming villages or securing daily commodities 
through personal connections. Many desperate repatriates (as well as other war-
affected people) utilised all sorts of contacts and possessions, surviving through illegal 
                                               
9  Laura E. Hein, "Growth Versus Success," in Postwar Japan as History, ed. Andrew Gordon 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 99-100. 
10 Repatriation Relief Bureau, Hikiage Engo No Kiroku (Tokyo: Repatriation Relief Bureau, 1950), 
90-92.  
11 Dower, Embracing Defeat: Japan in the Wake of World War II, 140. 
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trade, theft and deceit. They moved around on crowded trains, filthy and noisy, often 
getting on and off through windows. All this offers quite a different picture from an 
orderly and prosperous 21st century Japan.  
This thesis focuses on the integration of only the three million civilian 
repatriates into the postwar economy, and no other groups – the transition of 
demobilised soldiers is a subject which merits greater academic analysis, but such are 
the differences between their experiences and those of the repatriated civilians that I 
have chosen not to tackle that issue within this project.12  
In the research process, a range of questions need to be addressed, but the core 
ones that I seek to answer are the following two main questions:  
1. What was the profile and what were the economic experiences of the repatriates? 
· What sort of jobs did the three million civilian repatriates have in Japan’s 
overseas territories up until August 1945? 
· Where and in which sectors did the repatriates settle in postwar Japan? 
2. What are the implications of the answers to the above questions for our 
understanding of the process of the settlement of repatriates? 
 
In Chapter 1, this thesis reviews the overall trends of the Japanese repatriation 
and examines existing literature and its limitations. Chapter 2 surveys this thesis’s 
primary source materials, including the Japanese government’s survey into repatriates’ 
postwar lives conducted in 1956, and methodology which involves an analysis of 
statistical data. Chapter 3 examines Japanese repatriates’ postwar lives at the national 
level. Chapter 4 presents the main analysis of this thesis at prefectural levels by using 
                                               
12 It must be acknowledged that it is sometimes difficult to clearly distinguish between civilian 
repatriates and demobilised soldiers, given the fact that some people were drafted in July 1945 
or even in August 1945. 
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a Japanese government’s survey into repatriates’ postwar lives. In order to take a closer 
look at repatriates’ postwar transitions, Chapter 5 discusses one of the major groups of 
civilian repatriates – former employees of the South Manchuria Railway Company 
(SMR), the largest wartime public corporation in the Japanese empire. This thesis 
concludes in Chapter 6 by discussing implications obtained from the previous analyses.    
August 2015 saw the 70th anniversary of the end of the Second World War, an 
occasion marked by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzō Abe with a commemorative 
statement. With an eye on the perpetuated problem of history in Northeast Asia, Abe 
spoke widely on the legacy of war and Japan’s imperialist past. The repatriation also 
figured, with Abe stating that ‘more than six million Japanese repatriates managed to 
come home safely after the war from various parts of the Asia-Pacific and became the 
driving force behind Japan’s postwar reconstruction’.13 The statement was notable for 
recognising the support of other countries in the repatriation process.14 It is also 
noteworthy in that rather than casting the repatriates as embodying the country’s 
victimisation, an image so prevalent in popular literature, it presents them as 
individuals who contributed to the country’s rapid economic growth. However, Abe’s 
interpretation was a simplified version of the repatriation problem and the reality was 
more complicated. 
The post Second World War repatriation took place more than sixty years ago, 
but many areas are still open for further research. This economic focus on repatriation, 
I would argue, is especially relevant because it was this immediate postwar period, 
which shaped Japan’s overall postwar economic, political, social and diplomatic 
                                               
13 Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, "Statement by Prime Minister Shinzō Abe," (Tokyo: 
Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 2015).  
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201508/0814statement.html. Accessed on 28 
February 2016.   
14 Abe’s acknowledgement of the support for repatriates from people of other nationalities was 
clearer in the original Japanese text than in the English translation. 
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trajectory. By looking at the returnees, this research aims to broaden and enhance our 
understanding of Japanese postwar history.  
 
Overview of the repatriation 
The Japanese people started migrating only after the 1880s, first to Hawaii. 
However, it was after Japan colonised Taiwan in 1895 and annexed Korea in 1910 the 
number of emigrants started to increase. 15  It is difficult to know the number of 
Japanese people living outside of Japan between the 1880s and 1945 and their 
whereabouts because reliable and consistent statistics are not available.16 The Japanese 
government estimated that at the end of the war, more than six million Japanese 
citizens were residing overseas; this number consisted of approximately 3.1 million 
military personnel and 3.2 million civilians.  Figure 1-1 shows the number of Japanese 
civilian repatriates by place of origin of repatriation, drawn from the information 









                                               
15 Yasuo Wakatsuki, Sengo Hikiage No Kiroku (Tokyo: Jiji Tsūshinsha, 1995), 16-17. 
16 Wakatsuki estimated the number of Japanese who lived outside of Japan between 1881 and 
1942. (Wakatsuki, Sengo Hikiagesha no Kiroku, 16-17). The table is reproduced in Appendix. 
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Figure 1-1: Returnees by place of origin of repatriation17  
The figures in parentheses are the percentage of total civilian repatriates, and the actual 
number of returnees from each region. 
 
 
The ministry defines ‘a repatriate’ as a person who was living outside of Japan 
on 9th August 1945 and then returned to Japan.18 The postwar repatriation process 
took many years, as shown in Figure 1-2. Between the end of the war in August 1945 
                                               
17 Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Hikiage to Engo Sanjūnen No Ayumi " (Tokyo: Ministry of 
Health and Welfare, 1977), 690. 
18 The definition of a repatriate can be found in the instruction printed on the back of each survey 
form of the 1956 national survey (Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsa) conducted by the Ministry of Health and 
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and the end of 1946, approximately 5.1 million people (81 per cent of the total figure 
of 6.29 million including both civilians and demobilised soldiers) arrived in Japan. By 
the end of 1950, approximately 99 per cent had returned. If we look at the regional 
origins of the repatriation, those areas controlled by Chiang Kai-shek’s Guomindang 
government (Taiwan and China excluding Manchuria and Dalian) deported Japanese 
nationals relatively smoothly, sending back 97.6 per cent of the Japanese population 
by the end of 1946. In contrast, the repatriation from the regions controlled by the 
Soviet Army (Manchuria, Dalian, North Korea and the Soviet Union including the 
Kuril Islands) took much longer. By the end of 1946, only 56.4 per cent of the Japanese 
in these regions had been repatriated, and the figure was still only 83.0 per cent by the 
end of 1947. In these regions, approximately 600,000 soldiers and civilians were sent 
to Siberia, Central Asia and Mongolia to be used as physical labourers in coal mines, 
agriculture and road and railway construction up until 1956.19 China and Taiwan also 
detained Japanese soldiers and civilians, mostly for their technical skills.20 After their 
repatriation, some of these detainees who had returned from Communist-controlled 
regions had to face discrimination in Japan because the rest of the Japanese population 
were sceptical about the detainees’ possible communist influence. Because it is highly 
likely that the timing as well as the repatriates’ wartime experiences were to have 
affected the patterns of reintegration of particular returnee groups, the profile of the 
                                               
19  Wakatsuki, Sengo Hikiage No Kiroku 128-28, 252-53. Hiroshima Prefectural Government, 
Hiroshimaken Sensaishi (Hiroshima: Hiroshima Prefectural Government, 1988), 502. 
20  Kiyofumi Katō, Mantetsu Zenshi ‘Kokusaku Gaisha No Zenbō', Kōdansha Métier (Tokyo: 
Kōdansha 2006), 192. Daqing Yang, "Resurrecting the Empire? Japanese Technicians in Postwar 
China, 1945-1949," in The Japanese Empire in East Asia and Its Postwar Legacy, ed. Harald Fuess 
(München: Iudicium, 1998), 205. According to Katō, 11,400 Japanese people were employed by 
the Chinese government (Republic of China) and approximately 80,000 were employed by the 
Communist Government in late 1946. (Katō: 192). Yang estimated that 14,032 Japanese were 
working for the Republic of China as of 14 December 1946. (Young: 205). According to Hiroyuki 
Amano of Mantetsukai (the postwar organisation of the South Manchuria Railway), the number 
of Japanese detainees (ryūyosha) in Manchuria working for the Guomindang in December 1946 
was reported to be 9,654, with 21,428 family members. (Amano: 155) 
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repatriates needs to be studied in detail.  
 
Figure 1-2: Number of repatriates returned by year (in thousands) 21 
 
 
Existing literature and its limitations 
Comparative Perspectives: Literature on European War Refugees 
 
Although Japanese repatriation was a major challenge for a defeated country, 
Japan was not the only country that faced the sudden influx of people after the Second 
World War. For example, Germany absorbed more than 12 million expellees and war 
refugees. Some discussion of the literature on European war refugees, therefore, may 
be helpful in allowing us better to understand the range of approaches to analysing the 
                                               
















postwar repatriation and refugee problem, with a view to putting the literature on 
repatriation in Japan into a broader context. The literature on expellees and war 
refugee problems confirms that sudden influxes of population into a number of 
countries, such as West Germany, Finland, Turkey and Italy, led to serious problems 
in terms of housing, employment, and tensions caused by differences in culture or 
religions. Government responded by the provisions of houses and job training, as well 
as often by population transfer within the country, reclamation projects or emigration 
programmes.  
International Migration, 1945-1957 published by the International Labour 
Organization (ILO)22 in 1959 is one of the most comprehensive analyses of World War 
II refugees in Europe. This 60-page report includes detailed information on expellees 
and refugees23 in postwar Europe and the process of their settlement and integration, 
and is based on various unpublished ILO materials and the annual questionnaires sent 
to governments in preparation for the publication of the Year Book of Labour 
Statistics. 24  This report includes limited descriptions of East Germany, Italy and 
several other countries, but the major focus is on West Germany, which absorbed more 
than 12 million expellees and refugees after the Second World War. A chapter on West 
Germany includes refugee-related statistics, a discussion of the nature of refugee 
problems and the government's policies, and an analysis of the progress of integration 
using employment data.  
 Among the various topics included, the one most relevant to an economic 
analysis of the expellee/refugee problems concerns the controversy on whether the 
                                               
22 International Labour Office, International Migration 1945-1957 (Geneva1959). 
23  In this ILO report, the words "refugees" and "expellees" are used interchangeably. Other 
variations are newcomers, resettlers and returnees.   
24 International Labour Office, International Migration 1945-1957, 3. 
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integration policies helped or hindered the country’s economic recovery. The report 
states that initial extra expenditures for expellees and refugees might have been a 
burden for West Germany, but also that these people helped to expand the size of the 
domestic market and became a better supply of skilled labourers who were willing to 
move to where jobs were available. The report also asks the question ‘whether the 
present productivity (1959) could not have been achieved, or whether the country 
would have made a less spectacular economic recovery, had the influx not taken 
place.’25 The report concludes that the refugees had a beneficial effect on the German 
economy by keeping strong pressure on the job market and by lowering wages, which 
allowed businesses to increase investment. Thus, the substantial initial expenses which 
the local population had to tolerate were gradually offset in the form of increasing 
economic benefits.26 This author’s view seems in some respects to be convincing, and 
could apply to Japan’s case. However, the argument is not fully supported by adequate 
evidence, and the report does not provide any statistics on wages. Nor does it attempt 
to assess the degree of impact the labour situation had on wages and corporate 
investment. In addition, it is particularly unfortunate that the author does not fully cite 
information sources, making it more difficult for readers to conduct their own research 
and take the issue forward.  
The Refugees in the World by Joseph Schechtman (1963) 27 seeks to explain 
refugee problems across the world, including those in Germany, Finland, Italy, France, 
the Netherlands and Turkey after the Second World War, in addition to the problems 
in Korea (associated with the Korean War) and China after the Civil War in the late 
1940s. The primary focus of this book lies with the social consequences of refugee 
                                               
25 Ibid., 28. 
26 Ibid., 34. 
27 J. B. Schechtman, The Refugee in the World: Displacement and Integration (1963). 
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problems, but the author also touches on economic aspects. The author uses newspaper 
reports, a publication by the United Nations Refugee Agency and the United States 
Committee of Refugees (an American NPO), reports by the Allied Occupation 
Authorities, as well as secondary source materials mostly published in English. 
 In its chapter on Germany this book supplements the information offered in 
the ILO report by providing more anecdotes about housing, religious conflicts between 
Protestants and Catholics, and the disconnect between the cultures of refugees fleeing 
urban areas and the cultures of local rural populations in receiving communities. The 
German refugee section also includes an account of East Germany, but the author 
seems to have been less successful in comparing and contrasting these two countries, 
possibly due to the limitation of information on East Germany. In West Germany, 
Schechtman argues, one economic sector where refugees found ways to make a living 
is the handicraft industry. He cites a New York Times news article stating that in 1947, 
500 art craft shops in Bavaria established by refugees produced exportable glass 
products, musical instruments, leather goods, wooden buttons, handkerchiefs, and lace, 
all of which had been major sources of exports of Czechoslovakia since the time of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire. 28  Schechtman also mentions the West German 
Government’s successful population transfer programme, which sought to relocate 
surplus refugee labour forces from rural areas to the urban industrial regions where 
they were needed. The author concludes that the expellees had played an outstanding 
role in West Germany’s economic recovery, and includes an endorsement from a 
scholar who argues that “if the cost of technical training possessed by the expellees 
and refugees from East Germany alone were to be counted, Western Germany had 
gained, by their influx, a capital asset of the order of some 22.5 billion Deutsche 
                                               
28 Ibid., 30-31. 
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marks.”29 However, he offers no further explanation to accompany this conclusion, 
aside from the above information on returnees’ businesses, the increasingly favourable 
GNP, and unemployment and balance of payment statistics in the late 1950s.  
Schechtman thus fails to adequately explain the refugees’ contribution in 
postwar West Germany. However, his book offers comparative perspectives on 
refugees’ impact on economies in a range of countries and shows how this impact can 
be determined by the existing conditions of the receiving country. In Turkey, for 
instance, approximately 200,000 expellees arrived from Bulgaria between 1950 and 
1951. With the help of foreign refugee specialists, such as those from the United States 
and the Red Cross, Turkey settled those expellees in less-populated areas in the eastern 
region. The Turkish government supported them by providing land, farming tools, 
seeds, livestock and houses, and while there were initially occasional conflicts 
between expellees and local people, the majority successfully settled down and 
contributed to the growth of agriculture in Turkey.30  In Finland, 250,000 expellees 
from Karelskaya, which had become a Soviet territory, arrived in September 1944. 
This number accounted for approximately ten per cent of the total population of 
Finland and imposed significant pressure on the country. Finland’s reclamation 
projects were unsuccessful because arable land was limited, but the expellees were 
eventually absorbed into the expanding industries. As with Germany, the Finnish 
government introduced a new tax programme in order to help expellees resettle and 
compensate them for their lost assets in Karelskaya, and Schechtman claims that 
Finland became a more egalitarian society as a result of its experiences of accepting 
expellees.31 Finland’s responses contrast with those of Italy, which received 500,000 
                                               
29 Ibid., 40. 
30 Ibid., 57-67. 
31 Ibid., 47-53. 
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returnees from Yugoslavia and former colonies in Africa after the Second World War. 
The Italian government was unable to find effective solutions, instead implementing 
new emigration programmes and sending 1.4 million Italians abroad.32  
Alfred Grosser and Paul Stephenson’s Germany in Our Time (1971) 33 offers a 
nine-page section on the returnees and refugees after the Second World War. Their 
main concern is with West Germany’s achievements in integrating expellees and 
refugees. Grosser and Stephenson state that the public money spent on the integration 
came from a fund established under the Law of the Equalisation of Burdens, which 
was used to finance aid to those affected by the war. The authors claim that West 
Germany was able to become a more diverse and progressive society partly through 
its efforts for the integration of expellees and refugees.34 
 Refugees and Expellees in Post-war Germany by Ian Connor (2007)35 provides 
a more comprehensive discussion of German refugee problems than the earlier 
research works mentioned above. One of the most significant contributions of this 
book is its historiography discussion, in which Connor explains that the release of 
archival source materials in West Germany since the mid-1970s enhanced interest in 
the expellee/refugee problem. The results of more recent studies indicate that the 
integration process was more difficult than had traditionally been acknowledged and 
that the economic position of the refugees in the early 1970s still lagged behind that 
of the local population. Connor also states that while a large number of works on the 
refugees and expellees have been published in German since the 1980s, only a few 
                                               
32 Ibid., 68-72. 
33 Alfred Grosser and Paul Stephenson, Germany in Our Time: A Political History of the Postwar 
Years (London: Pall Mall Press, 1971). 
34 Although this point is not purely economic, it is relevant in its contrast to the experiences of 
Japan, which attempted to integrate and assimilate returnees by minimizing the memory of the 
country’s imperial past and by writing off wartime losses. 




have been translated into English.36 
 In this context, Connor critically highlights the problems associated with 
integration. For example, he too mentions the rise of the handicraft enterprises 
established by refugees, but also emphasises the low wages and unfavourable working 
conditions in the sector. According to Connor, these small firms were also among those 
heavily affected by the recession after the Currency Reform in 1949, due to the lack 
of capital and the shortage of medium and long-term credit.37 Connor, too, admits that 
refugees made a significant contribution to the West German economy in the 1950s 
not only as a source of inexpensive and mobile labour but also as consumers. Moreover, 
the commercial and industrial enterprises they established in the countryside played a 
crucial role in the modernisation of West Germany's rural economy.38 However, he is 
more cautious about emphasising the successful integration of the refugees than 
Schechtman, and critically assesses the integration process. 
 Some scholars have attempted to measure the economic effects of German 
expellees by applying economics methods. In ‘the Employment effects of 
immigration: evidence from the mass arrival on German expellees in post-war 
Germany,’39 Sebastian Braun and Toman Mahmoud examine the employment effects 
of the influx of expellees from Eastern Europe on native West Germans after the 
Second World War. Their results show that expellee inflows substantially reduced 
native employment.40 However, they also argue that as long as the share of expellees 
did not exceed a level of about 15 per cent, even though expellees and natives were 
                                               
36 Ibid., 2-3. 
37 Ibid., 46. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Sebastian Braun and Toman Mahmoud, "The Employment Effects of Immigration: Evidence 
from the Mass Arrival of German Expellees in Postwar Germany " The Journal of Economic History 
74, no. 01 (2014): 69-108. 
40 Ibid., 69. 
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close substitutes on the labour market, the population influxes had no negative effects 
on the native population.41 However, due to the shortages of the production capacity 
in Germany as a result of the destruction in the Allied bombing campaigns, the 
economy’s capacity for employment was limited. This is an interesting research, and 
Japanese repatriates might have had similar economic effects on the domestic labour 
market, specifically in the immediate postwar period. However, it is unfortunate that 
no information on Japanese repatriates’ wages and unemployment rate are available. 
Looking at the existing literature on European war refugees can thus help 
identify several explanatory factors of importance for the postwar settlement of 
returnees and possible approaches for research. Regarding refugee policies, for 
example, many governments responded to the refugee problems through reclamation, 
aid and compensation policies, and domestic and international migration programmes, 
although the degree to which such policies were pursued varied according to the 
country. Although it is not possible to touch on all of these issues, the research in this 
thesis will make reference to them in order to compare Japan’s repatriation problem 
with similar cases in other countries. Common characteristics of the problems in the 
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Table 1-1: Policies to settle expellees and war refugees in selected countries (West and 
East Germany, Italy, Finland and Turkey) 
Problems Policy responses 
Economic effects of 
population influxes 









· Low wages  
· Mobile labour 
forces 
· Social savings via 
influxes of skilled 
population 
· Larger consumer 
market 
· Modernisation of 
rural economy  
· Lower living 
standards of war 
expellees even in 
the 1970s 
 
· Public expenditure 
to absorb refugees 
or expellees 










Literature on post-World War II Japanese repatriation 
 
Although there are a number of books and articles about Japan’s postwar 
returnees, research on Japanese repatriation has been dominated by a micro-history 
approach, focusing on selected groups of repatriates and their personal experiences 
during the journey home following the surrender. Very little research has tried to 
capture the general trend of the Japanese repatriation, and only a small portion of the 
literature has examined the resettlement and reintegration, especially from the view 
point of postwar job experiences of repatriates in the context of the postwar Japanese 
35 
 
economy. This section first introduces three core works on Japanese post-World War 
II repatriation: a survey of the repatriation problem (by Yasuo Wakatsuki),42 a snapshot 
of repatriates’ occupational activities in the 1950 population census (by Kōnosuke 
Odaka),43 and an analysis of repatriates as a neglected group in postwar Japan (by Lori 
Watt).44 
Of these accounts, Sengo Hikiage no Kiroku (Records of the Postwar 
Repatriation) by Yasuo Wakatsuki (1995) 45  is probably the most comprehensive 
analysis of the Japanese civilian repatriation. In this volume, the author tries to fill the 
gap between personal memoirs and official records, using a wide range of source 
materials. This book contains detailed information on Japanese pre-war emigration, a 
profile of the repatriates including occupational data, details of the repatriation 
processes by region, information on returnees’ destinations in Japan, and on the 
government's support programmes. Despite the wide scope of the topic, the author 
manages to integrate various sorts of information to offer a balanced overview of the 
repatriation by analysing a wide range of public records, Japanese military documents, 
scholarly essays on specific regions including Manchuria, personal memoirs, source 
materials on international law, as well as Japanese newspaper articles on the 
repatriation.  
Unlike other essays emphasising the problems caused by the repatriation, 
Wakatsuki points out a number of factors which contributed toward a relatively 
smooth postwar integration in Japan compared to that in Germany: 
· A large number of returnees had been sent overseas by Japanese 
                                               
42 Wakatsuki, Sengo Hikiage No Kiroku  
43 Kōnosuke Odaka, "Hikiagesha to Sensō Chokugo No Rōdō Ryoku," Tokyo Daigaku Shakai Kagaku 
Kenkyū 48(1) (1996). 
44 Watt, When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan. 
45 Wakatsuki, Sengo Hikiage No Kiroku  
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companies or the government and had places to which they could return. 
· The majority of the returnees were merchants, engineers and white-collar 
workers who had transferable skills.  
· The history of Japanese colonial expansion started in the late 19th 
century and many returnees were first generation migrants who were 
familiar with Japanese culture. 
· Discounting those from Manchuria, there were relatively few farmers 
amongst the total repatriates, so that conflicts over farmland in postwar 
Japan were limited.  
· Postwar Japan became slightly more receptive to people who had 
different backgrounds as a result of the defeat and the Allied 
occupation.46  
Like most other research works, Wakatsuki’s analysis does not really include any 
aspect of the economic impact caused by the repatriation. However, these are 
important observations, despite the fact that the author often offers little evidence and 
gives few reasons for how he has come to these conclusions.   
Among academic research papers on the returnees’ postwar occupations is 
Kōnosuke Odaka’s 1996 essay on the Japanese labour force immediately after the 
Second World War. 47  This ten-page essay has numerous statistics relating to the 
demography of repatriates to Japan and the distribution of their occupations after 
resettlement. As his main source materials, Odaka uses the 1950 National Census48 
and the records of repatriation programmes (Hikiage Engo no Kiroku) published by 
                                               
46 Ibid., 278-79. 
47 Odaka, "Hikiagesha to Sensō Chokugo No Rōdō Ryoku," 135-44. 
48 General Administrative Agency of the Cabinet Statistics Bureau of Japan, Population Census of 
1950 (Final Report), vol. 8 (Tokyo: Statistics Bureau of Japan, General Administrative Agency of 
the Cabinet, 1955). 
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the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MHW) in 1950.49 Odaka shows that 6.29 million 
people50 were repatriated between 1945 and 1976, the largest proportion of whom 
(28.7 per cent) entered the primary sector, mostly agriculture. This figure may at first 
seem substantial, but is in fact low considering that those who were in the primary 
sector made up 46.8 per cent of the overall Japanese workforce in 1950.51 Odaka 
hypothesises that those who failed to enter the agricultural sector found jobs in other 
sectors during the period of increasing industrialisation.  
Lori Watt’s When Empire Comes Home (2009) 52  is perhaps the only 
comprehensive research on Japanese repatriates written in English. It is a detailed 
analysis of Japanese postwar repatriation from the view point of the end of the 
Japanese empire in the global context, though the major focus of her work is on social 
aspects of the repatriation, and she does not include an analysis of repatriates’ 
economic activities. In this book, Watt sheds light on the repatriation problem as a 
neglected dimension of Japanese society and explores the discrimination those 
postwar returnees faced. The author argues that peasant repatriates from Manchuria 
should be regarded as one of the most important groups of the returnees in Japan even 
though she acknowledges that they were a minority in terms of their number. Her book 
therefore mainly focuses on farmers. For this reason, Watt’s book does not offer a 
completely balanced picture of the repatriation, which in fact involved various types 
of people other than farmers, including skilled and unskilled labourers, government 
officials, scholars, teachers, bankers, public corporation staff members, corporate 
representatives, merchants, craftsmen, other small business owners and white-collar 
                                               
49 Repatriation Relief Bureau, Hikiage Engo No Kiroku. 
50 This figure is taken from Hikiage to Engo Sanjūnen no Ayumi published by Ministry of Welfare 
and Health in 1977. 
51 Statistics Bureau of Japan, Population Census of 1950 (Final Report), 8, 137.  




The aforementioned three analyses offer a survey of the repatriation problem 
(Wakatsuki), a snapshot of repatriates’ occupational activities in the 1950 survey 
(Odaka), and an analysis of repatriates as a neglected group in the Japanese population 
to examine the characteristics of the Japanese society’s responses to the collapse of 
the Japanese empire (Watt). There are, of course, other works on civilian repatriates, 
and they could be categorised into three groups: a) a book or an essay collection on 
the political and legal framework which affected the repatriation, b) on the trends of 
repatriates’ early postwar lives and the government’s support programmes, and c) 
essays or essay collections on specific repatriate groups, as victims or neglected people. 
These research works offer interesting background information that is of value to this 
thesis, but a literature review confirms that an analysis of repatriates’ postwar job 
experience has not been sufficient in any sense. 
 
a) Research works on the political and legal framework which affected the 
repatriation  
Dainihonteikoku no Hōkai to Hikiage Fukuin (2012)53 is an essay collection focusing 
on the repatriation processes, repatriation policies of the Japanese and U.S. 
governments, as well as activities of non-governmental organisations and individuals 
to support repatriates. For example, Kiyofumi Katō examines the repatriation process 
from the viewpoint of decision making by the Japanese government and the 
Occupation authorities, and the shift of the policies on the Japanese overseas residents 
from permanent settlement in Japan’s former territories to repatriation. Other essays 
                                               




in the volume concern various aspects of repatriation processes, mostly up until 
repatriates arrived in Japan: the demilitarization of the Japanese military, interrogation 
of repatriates in Japan by the Japanese government and the Occupation authorities as 
a source of information on China and the U.S.S.R, the detention of Japanese civilians 
and treatment of Japanese war criminals in China between 1945 and 1956, the 
activities of the Japanese civilian resident organisation which organised the 
repatriation of the Japanese in Seoul and Busan, the repatriation process of 80,000 
military forces from the New Britain Island, and the repatriation of the remains of the 
war dead from the battlefields in the Philippines. 
A book about the repatriation of veterans entitled Fukuin Hikiage no Kenkyū 
by Hiromi Tanaka (2010) 54  mainly examines repatriated soldiers, making use of 
military documents. According to Tanaka, demobilised soldiers were better placed to 
find ways of making a living because most of them had family members in Japan, 
while many civilian repatriates did not have any families or places to settle. Tanaka 
also explains that some veterans started making a living as radio or clock mechanics, 
drivers, electrical engineers and construction specialists using the skills acquired from 






                                               
54 Hiromi Tanaka, Fukuin Hikiage No Kenkyū (Tokyo: Shinjinbutsu Ōraisha, 2010). 
55 Ibid., 225-26. The author also mentions an interesting episode regarding a postwar camp in 
Rabaul in Papua New Guinea, where detained Japanese ex-commanders opened a fully-fledged 
school to teach basic educational subjects and provide vocational training for Japanese soldiers. 
See Page 105. 
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b) Essays on repatriates’ early postwar lives and the government’s support 
programmes 
Research works in this category deal with civilian repatriates’ adjustment efforts in the 
immediate postwar period, and the government’s support programmes. For example, 
a paper on support programmes for civilian repatriates from the perspective of their 
position as part of ‘the poor’, written by Akira Miyoshi in 1959, 56 offers information, 
using both his own survey results and information from the national survey into 
repatriates’ postwar lives conducted by the Ministry of Health and Welfare in 1956, 
which this thesis also uses as a key information source for other prefectures in 
mainland Japan. Unfortunately, however, the author only cites four tables or a figure 
extracted from ‘the results’ of the national survey, including the number of repatriate 
households returned from each country or region, number of years spent overseas by 
August 1945, and the distribution of repatriates’ age upon repatriation. The 
whereabouts of the report of results is currently unknown.57 Miyoshi also mentions 
that in 1952, 2.4 per cent of the Japanese population received public assistance, of 
whom 30-40 per cent (630,000-840,000 people) were repatriates, including civilians 
and demobilized soldiers. If we compare the figures above with the total number of 
repatriates of 6.29 million, published by the Ministry of Health and Welfare,58 this 
number is approximately 10 per cent of the total number of repatriates, which may 
indicate their financial difficulties. Miyoshi also includes analyses of the results of a 
1957 survey of repatriates’ households in two areas in Tokyo.59 This survey sheds light 
on returnees’ lives by asking questions about their reasons for going abroad, the 
                                               
56 Akira Miyoshi, "Hinkonkaisō Toshiteno Hikiagesha No Engo Ni Tsuite " Meiji Gakuin Ronsō 52, 
no. 1 (1959): 9. 
57 In Miyoshi’s essay, he cites ‘the results of the 1956 government survey into repatriates’ postwar 
lives’. However, the whereabouts of ‘the results’ are currently unknown.  
58 Ministry of Health and Welfare, Engo 50 Nenshi, 730. 
59 Miyoshi, "Hinkonkaisō Toshiteno Hikiagesha No Engo Ni Tsuite " 11-15. 
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occupations they were engaged in overseas, the way they found jobs after the 
repatriation, their first and current occupations in Japan, the income they received 
overseas and in Japan, and the time it had taken to earn a sufficient living wage after 
the repatriation.  
Hikiagesha Engo Jigyō no Suii (Historical Changes in Japanese Government 
Relief Programmes for Repatriates) 60 by Kenji Kimura (2005) analyses the Japanese 
government's relief programmes between 1945 and 1967, focusing on Yamaguchi 
prefecture which had sent many Japanese abroad, and received a significant number 
of repatriates from China, Manchuria, Taiwan and Korea. The author pays special 
attention to the loan programme for repatriates and other war-affected people, which 
was called seigyō shikin. Unfortunately, all the original documents, including 
applications, relating to this loan programme seem to have already been discarded by 
the People's Finance Corporation (Kokumin Kin’yū Kōko) which was responsible for 
the loan programme.61  
 
c) Essays or essay collections which mainly focus on one repatriate group 
Other literature has mostly taken approaches of microhistory and concerns specific 
groups, especially those that were marginalised as minorities in postwar Japanese 
society. One example is the essay collection Hikiagesha no Sengo (2013),62which 
includes essays on repatriates’ postwar lives from the view point of sociology. The 
topics of the essays are markets, public housing and reclamation farmland as places 
for repatriates’ settlement; postwar lives of repatriates in accommodation in Ibaraki; 
                                               
60 Kenji Kimura, "Hikiage Engo Jigyō No Suii " Nenpō Nihon Gendaishi 10 (2005 ). 
61  Telephone interview on 13th August 2013 with a staff member of the Japan Finance 
Corporation (Nihon Seisaku Kin’yū Kōko), which was established in 2008, absorbing the National 
Life Finance Corporation (formerly the Japan Finance Corporation). 
62 Takanori Shimamura, ed. Hikiagesha No Sengo (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 2013). 
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postwar lives of repatriates from Sakhalin; and two essays on repatriates from Palau.  
Nihonjin no Shokuminchi Keiken — Dairen Nihonjin Shōkō Gyōsha no 
Rekishi (1999), 63 authored by Asobu Yanagisawa, examines the wartime economic 
activities of Japanese merchants and business owners who had been in Dalian in the 
Kwantung Leased Territory. This book includes a chapter on the repatriation and 
postwar lives of Japanese civilians, wherein the author constructs a list of 76 major 
business people’s occupations both in the wartime and postwar periods using 
information from a magazine published by a Dalian returnee organisation. This list 
indicates that many had first returned to their hometowns and then in a few months re-
migrated to Tokyo. The author categorises the business people into three groups: 
cunning go-getters, pessimists who gave up trying to establish themselves, and other 
types of entrepreneurs who attempted to establish new small but decent businesses. 
Yanagisawa argues that the first two groups behaved in the same way as they had done 
in Dalian, where their business activities had been backed by the presence of the 
Japanese authorities and where they were not necessarily required to respect rules. The 
author argues that successful business people with an imperialistic mind can be 
categorised in the first category (go-getters) and failed ones in the second category 
(pessimists). He hypothesises that their material losses in China and their 
disadvantaged position in Japan created resentment, and that these people attempted 
to recover their losses even by breaking social rules or deceiving others.64 They were 
also active in a movement to get compensation for their losses overseas, which lasted 
from 1946 to 1967. In contrast to the former two groups, the author describes the third 
group as successful small business owners. However, he also acknowledges that even 
                                               
63 Yanagisawa, Nihonjin No Shokuminchi Taiken, Dairen Nihonjin Shōkō Gyōsha No Rekishi. 
64 Ibid., 320. 
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in the third group many had to downsize their new businesses from those in Dalian 
due to the disadvantages that they faced, such as a limited access to funding because 
of their lack of connections.65  
Gifu Apareru Sanchi no Keisei: Shōgenshū (2003)66 focuses on individuals 
who returned from Manchuria to postwar Gifu city, including wartime migrant farmers, 
merchants, students and public servants. The Gifu city authorities agreed to offer a 
piece of land to help 14 individuals in the Gifu station neighbourhood to establish 
small-scale retail businesses. The group gradually absorbed tens more individuals. (It 
is not clear whether the new members were repatriates or not). Among the small 
businesses, one clothing store became quite profitable. In 1947, the merchants in the 
district collectively converted their businesses to second hand clothing stores to 
increase their profits. They soon started producing new clothes as well and expanded 
their sales channels to Tokyo and Osaka. The commercial district continued to develop 
and eventually became one of the major apparel wholesale districts in the region, 
continuing to flourish until the 1990s.67  
However, it is clear that these people did not always respect laws in the early 
postwar period, and there is evidence that they occasionally broke the rules. For 
example, in order to obtain enough construction materials, they cut down trees in a 
national forest where such activities were prohibited, or illegally received aid goods 
from the Ministry of Health and Welfare and resold them. The logic used to justify 
their activities coincides with that which appears in Yanagisawa’s book on the 
                                               
65 Ibid., 327. 
66 Ogikubo and Negishi, Gifu Apareru Sanchi No Keisei. 
67 Ibid., 17-40. 
Yutaka Yamada, "Gifu Tonyagai to Sono Shūhen Ni Okeru Suitai to Saikaihatsuni Kansuru Dōkō," 
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merchants who had returned from Dalian, who insisted that their actions should not be 
prosecuted because they were victims who should be protected by the government. 
However, in order to develop the commercial district over the longer term, this 
unlawful behaviour had to be checked, and one early postwar leader who had initiated 
the successful commercial activities was arrested and prosecuted. 68   
An analysis of Japanese reclamation farmers who went to Manchuria, 
Manshū Bunson Imin no Shōwa Shi by Masako Watanabe (2011) 69  focuses on 
Manchurian peasant immigrants from a village in Ōita, who had migrated as part of 
an attempt to reduce the population of the home village by the village itself. After the 
war, the group returned to their home village, which did not have the capacity to absorb 
their numbers. The focus of this book is the process of the group’s migration and their 
activities in Manchuria, but the last chapter includes a list of the returnees’ postwar 
occupations, which, despite its incompleteness, clearly shows a pattern in which many 
were forced to become coal miners or join postwar national reclamation projects, 
perhaps one typical pattern of the resettlement.  
Two Okinawa-based scholars at the Ryūkyū University have published 
several essays on repatriates who returned to Okinawa prefecture. Their focuses have 
been to capture the historical trends in emigration and repatriation to and from 
Okinawa, and explore the repatriates’ wartime employment in Japan’s former overseas 
territories. As a main source material, these papers have used the Japanese 
government’s survey into repatriates’ postwar lives of 1956,70 which this thesis also 
uses as a key information source for other prefectures in mainland Japan. Hisamitsu 
                                               
68 Ogikubo and Negishi, Gifu Apareru Sanchi No Keisei, 41, 59. 
69 Masako Watanabe, Manshū Bunson Imin No Shōwa Shi (Tokyo: Sairyūsha, 2011).  
70 Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into 
Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)," (1956). 
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Miyauchi created a database from 13,024 survey forms collected from households in 
Okinawa, 71  and has published essays on repatriates from the Trust Territory of the 
Pacific Islands (2008) and the Philippines (2009),72 while Naomi Noiri has published 
three essays on the repatriates from Taiwan, using Miyauchi’s database.73  These 
essays show that the majority of migrants from Okinawa prefecture had migrated to 
the South Pacific, Taiwan and the Philippines to be engaged in jobs in the primary 
sector or in industry, including sugar processing. In addition to her analysis of the 1956 
survey data, Noiri added to her work several life stories of repatriates, which is helpful 
for readers to understand the Okinawa repatriates’ wartime experiences.   
The essays discussed above concern repatriates who had difficult postwar 
experiences, and depict them as victims of the war. However, some other essays focus 
on elite groups and describe them as powerful groups. This type of literature 
emphasises their positive and successful occupational transitions and the continuity of 
their careers.  
In Mantetsu ga Unda Nihongata Keizai Shisutemu, 74  Hideo Kobayashi 
examines the activities of a group of economic bureaucrats, including Nobusuke Kishi, 
                                               
71 Naomi Noiri, "Shokuminchi Taiwan Ni Okeru Okinawa Shusshinsha -- Hikiagesha Zaigai Jijitsu 
Chōsahyō Kara Miete Kurumono," in Teikoku Hōkai to Hito No Idō, ed. Shinzō Araragi (Tokyo: 
Bensei Shuppan, 2011), 160. Noiri states that the Okinawa prefectural government keeps the 
survey forms, while some other scholars say that they are currently missing. 
72 Hisamitsu Miyauchi, "Nanyō Guntō Ni Watatta Okinawaken Shusshin Dansei Setainushi No 
Idōkeitai," in Nihon Teikoku Wo Meguru Jinkō Idō No Kokusai Shakaigaku, ed. Shinzō Araragi 
(Tokyo: Fuji Shuppan, 2008). "Hikiagesha Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō Ni Miru Okinawaken Honseki 
Setainushi No Kyōjū Chiiki (1) the Philippines," Imin Kenkyū 5 (2009). 
73 Noiri, "Shokuminchi Taiwan Ni Okeru Okinawa Shusshinsha -- Hikiagesha Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō 
Kara Miete Kurumono." "Okinawa Hikiagesha No 'Gaichi' Keiken: Shichōsonshi No Taiken Kiroku 
Wo Chūshinni," Imin Kenkyū 9 (2013). 
"Okinawa Ni Okeru Taiwan Hikiagesha No Tokuchō-Hikiagesha Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō to 
Kenshichōsonshi No Taiken Kiroku Wo Chūshinni," in Teikoku Igo No Hito No Idō, ed. Shinzō Araragi 
(Tokyo: Bensei Shuppan, 2013). 




who were involved in the creation and the execution of the economic development 
plan of Manchukuo as well as of the core members of the Research Department 
(Chōsabu) of the South Manchuria Railway Company (SMR). Kobayashi argues that 
these people, both repatriates and those who had already been in Japan by 1945, 
maintained a network in postwar Japan and continued to occupy important positions, 
for example, at the central government agencies, including the Economic Stabilisation 
Board and the Ministry of International Trade and Industry. He specifically points out 
that the former members of the Research Department of the South Manchuria Railway 
Company played major roles in the creation and the execution of the Priority 
Production System. Technology of Empire by Daqing Yang 75  studies Japanese 
telecommunications engineers who had continued to occupy influential positions in 
postwar Japan. These two books authored by Yang and Kobayashi examine elite 
members of Japanese wartime public corporations in Manchuria. But their analyses 
involve only a small number of individuals within those companies, and omit the fact 
that a larger number of ‘ordinary’ staff members were also working at numerous 
wartime public corporations, including the Manchuria Telecom Company. Their 
postwar experiences were normally quite different from those of elite staff members, 
as we will closely examine in Chapter 5 of this thesis. 
Another category of literature concerns Japanese people who were detained 
in China and Taiwan by the Guomindang and the Communists after the war to operate 
railways, factories and infrastructure facilities constructed by the Japanese before 
1945, or disseminate their knowledge and skills to local people.76 For example, a book 
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(Ryūyō sareta Nihonjin) published in 2003 by the Japanese national broadcasting 
company (Nippon Hōsō Kyōkai, usually called NHK) 77  is based on a television 
programme featured former detainees and their lives in postwar China and Taiwan. 
‘Staying On: Japanese Soldiers and Civilians in China, 1945-1949’ by Donald Gillin78 
examines the motives and roles of these Japanese nationals on both the Nationalist and 
Communist sides. In addition, ‘Democracy in Occupied Japan’79 by Mark Caprio and 
Yoneyuki Sugita (2007) analyses the situation of these civilian detainees as well as 
those of some demobilised soldiers who remained with the Taiwanese Army in order 
to voluntarily fight the Communist Chinese.80 Caprio and Sugita argue that these 
people’s activities are important in considering early Japanese efforts to re-establish 
commercial networks with Japan’s former colonies.  
The Japanese government was aware of the importance of the technical 
expertise of repatriated engineers, especially those who had been detained in China 
and Taiwan, and on 14 September 1946, the House of Representatives passed a 
resolution on the “Promotion of Scientific Techniques” encouraging the utilization of 
repatriated technicians.81 Despite this recognition, however, some detainees testified 
that they had to face job discrimination in Japan. NHK's book explains that detained 
engineers who had helped to construct railroads in China or even to establish the 
Chinese Air Forces faced difficulties in finding occupations in postwar Japan due to 
                                               
77 Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai, Ryūyō Sareta Nihonjin (Tokyo: Nihon Hōsō Shuppan Kyōkai, 2003). 
78 Donald G. Gillin, "Staying On: Japanese Soldiers and Civilians in China, 1945-1949," Journal of 
Asian Studies XLII, no. 3 (1983). 
79 Caprio and Sugita, Democracy in Occupied Japan: The U.S. Occupation and Japanese Politics 
and Society. 
80  ibid., 202-04.  
81 Bowen C. Dees, The Allied Occupation and Japan's Economic Miracle: Building the Foundations 
of Japanese Science and Technology, 1945-52 (Richmond, Surrey: Japan Library, 1997), 300. 
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their delayed repatriation and the general public's concerns regarding the detainees’ 
possible Communist inclinations.82  
In the literature on the repatriation, many returnees, not just well-known 
writers but also ‘ordinary repatriates’, published personal memoirs in order to relay 
their often bitter experiences to the rest of the Japanese population. Examples are a 
memoir published by actor Hisaya Morishige on his repatriation and postwar life in 
Japan as a black-market trader before returning to show business;83 postwar politician 
Toshiko Yamaguchi, who had been a popular actress working for the Manchukuo Film 
Association; 84  novelist Hiroyuki Itsuki who returned from Korea at the age of 
fifteen;85 and writer and Russian translator Ichirō Takasugi, who returned from Siberia 
in 1950 after a five-year detention.86 In various short essays on his own repatriation in 
a 1996 book entitled Manshū no Kaze,87 the economist Sakuya Fujiwara, shares his 
observations of other repatriates, including those working in the postwar Japanese 
government, and also reviews various books written by other people on life in 
Manchuria. Fujiwara argues that returnees generally shared the common 
characteristics of broad-mindedness, determination, and a lack of ostentation. 88 
Testimonies of ‘ordinary returnees’ have been collected by museums, as is the case 
with the essay series Heiwa no Ishizue of a memorial museum Heiwa Kinen Tenji 
Shiryōkan in Tokyo.89 These books and essays, written by professional writers or other 
                                               
82 Nihon Hōsō Kyōkai, Ryūyō Sareta Nihonjin, 212-13.  
83 Hisaya Morishige, Morishige Jiden (Tokyo: Chuō Kōron Shinsha, 2003). 
84 Yamaguchi Toshiko and Fujiwara Sakuya, Ri Kō Ran Watashi No Hansei (Tokyo: Shinchōsha, 
1990). 
85 Hiroyuki Itsuki, Tairiku He No Roman to Dōkoku No Minato Hakata (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2006). 
86 Ichirō Takasugi, Ikite Kaerishi Hei No Kioku (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996). 
87 Fujiwara Sakuya, Manshū No Kaze (Tokyo: Shūeisha, 1996). 
88 Ibid., 161. 




artists, make up a small but significant category of the postwar Japanese literature on 
this topic, though their focus lies on repatriation experiences rather than their postwar 
lives. The use of personal memoirs requires careful selection and scrutiny because 
information can be misremembered and memories can change as time goes on, or can 
be biased based on what a returnee has witnessed. This research will therefore use 
personal memoirs mainly as supporting evidence. 
The review of major literature on the Japanese postwar repatriation shows 
that existing research on Japanese repatriation has mainly focused on limited aspects 
of the repatriation, and reveals the lack of studies on major trends of the repatriation. 




























Chapter 2  
Primary source materials and methodology 
After the war, the majority of the repatriates returned to Japan between 1945 and 1950, 
but the repatriation was only one of the problems that the country was facing. After 
their arrival at the Japanese port, the repatriates were absorbed into the confusion of 
the early postwar period: the food, housing and material shortages, dysfunctional 
transport and distribution systems, adjustment of the labour force from wartime to 
postwar industry often resulting in unemployment, and newly-installed political and 
economic systems under the Allied occupation. Accordingly, the number of useful 
primary source materials which have independent information on civilian repatriates 
is limited because they were treated along with other war-affected people who had 
been in Japan itself during the war.  
 Of the various source materials, the most useful statistical resources for 
research on the repatriates are the 1950 Population Census of Japan; the demographic 
statistics of repatriates in each prefecture between 1946 and 1949 published in the 
monthly bulletin of welfare statistic (Kōsei Tōkei Geppō) 1 ; and a Japanese 
Government survey into repatriates’ postwar lives (Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō) 2 
undertaken in 1956. Each of these main sources will be discussed further below. 
 
 
                                               
1 Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Kōsei Tōkei Geppō (Monthly Bulletin of the Welfare Statistics)," 
(Tokyo: Ministry of Health and Welfare, April 1947 to November 1949). 
2 "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)." 
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The 1950 Population Census 
Since 1920, the Japanese government has conducted some kind of population census 
every five years except for 1945. A formal census and a brief census alternate every 
five years. In the war and early postwar period the formal censuses were conducted in 
1940 and 1950, and brief censuses were completed in 1935, 1947 (instead of the one 
scheduled for 1945, which was cancelled due to the end of the war in August 1945) 
and 1955. The results of each census contain demographic statistics including changes 
in population and age structure, employment-related statistics (labour force 
participation, unemployment, occupations and sector of employment) and also 
household surveys (for example total number of households, average number of 
household members, household head’s sector of employment and housing area), to 
name just a few. This research uses the 1950 and 1955 censuses, and Table 2-1 lists 
the items covered in these censuses for purposes of comparison. In addition to a 
general report with national figures, a volume for each prefecture with the same 















Table 2-1: Items surveyed in the population censuses (1947-1955)  
 
1947 Special Census3 
(Rinji chōsa) 
1950 General Census4 1955 Census5 
(Kan’i chōsa) 





· Date of birth and 
age (in Japanese 
style, kazoe 
doshi6) 
· Marital status 
· Nationality or 
birth place 
· Disability 



















· Name of each 
family member 
· Relationship with 
household head 
· Sex 
· Date of birth 
 
 
· Marital status 












· Hours worked 
· Sector 
· Occupation  
· Name of employer 
 
 






· Date of birth 
 
 















· Name of 
employer 




                                               
3 General Administrative Agency of the Cabinet Statistics Bureau of Japan, Population Census of 
1947, vol. 2 (Tokyo1948). 
4 Population Census of 1950 (Final Report), 8, Notes on related regulations 22-23. 
5 Population Census of 1955 (Tokyo: Statistics Bureau of Japan, General Administrative Agency of 
the Cabinet, 1956), 44-72. 
6 In the traditional system, a person was already one year old when s/he was born and add one 
age on the New Year day every year. 
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1947 Special Census 
(continued) 




· Whether or not 
repatriated from 
abroad after the 
war (This result 
has not been 
published in the 
final report). 
· Kind of household 
(ordinary or quasi 
(jun setai) in which 
one person residing 
together with an 
ordinary household 
but keeping a 
separate budget, 
etc.) 
· Kind of living 
quarters  
· Tenure  
· Number of tatami in 
dwelling rooms  
· Whether or not 
repatriated from 
abroad after the 
war 









· Kind of living 
quarters 
· Tenure  
· Number of tatami 
in dwelling rooms  
· Whether or not 
repatriated from 
abroad after the 
war 
 
The 1950 Census7 has a separate chapter on repatriates giving the population 
of repatriates (civilians and demobilised soldiers), their age structure, employment 
situation (active labour force, unemployed and not in the labour force) in Japan and in 
each prefecture. Most importantly, it compares the occupational structure of repatriate 
and non-repatriate workers in each industrial sector, although this information does 
not differentiate between civilians and demobilised soldiers. The research in this thesis 
uses this census information to identify those sectors of occupation into which a large 
number of repatriates entered after the war. The population censuses are probably the 
most reliable statistics on demography and sector of occupation. However, because 
the information was always collected by civilians employed by local governments 
until 2010,8 who were often neighbours of census participants, it would be reasonable 
to assume that participants might have sometimes chosen not to disclose all 
                                               
7 Statistics Bureau of Japan, Population Census of 1950 (Final Report), 8. 
8 "Heisei 22 Nen Kokusei Chōsano Gaiyō," Statistics Bureau. 
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information, for example, whether s/he was a repatriate or demobilised soldier, in 
order to avoid a negative reputation associated with the images of the repatriate or 
demobilised soldier. 
 
Demographic statistics of repatriates in each prefecture 
between 1946 and 1949 
Every month from December 1946 to November 1949, the Ministry of Health and 
Welfare (MHW) reported the number of repatriates (both civilians and former soldiers) 
and the number of their households in the 46 prefectures, with the exception of 
Okinawa prefecture, which was under direct U.S. control until 1972. The results were 
published in the monthly bulletin of welfare statistics entitled Kōsei Tōkei Geppō.9 
These data make it possible to trace the trends of the repatriates’ domestic inter-
prefectural migration, indicating, for example, any concentration that may have 
occurred in urban areas. These data show that a large number of repatriates returned 
to western parts of Japan such as the Kyūshū and Chūgoku regions, which had been 
major sources of migration since the Meiji Period (1868-1912), mostly due to their 
greater proximity to other Asian countries. We also find that repatriates had gradually 
moved to the east, especially to urban areas such as Osaka and Tokyo, by 1949. It is 
unfortunate that these statistics are not available for the months between August 1945 
and November 1946, when approximately 80 per cent of all repatriates returned to 
Japan and seem to have changed residence frequently in search of better places and 
employment. However, these data still give us basic information about the mobility of 
repatriates in the immediate postwar period. 
 
                                               
9 Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Kōsei Tōkei Geppō (Monthly Bulletin of the Welfare Statistics)."  
55 
 
Japanese Government survey into repatriates’ postwar lives 
(Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō) in 1956 
 
In 1956 the Ministry of Health and Welfare conducted a national survey on repatriates’ 
households as part of the preparations for a compensation programme for civilian 
repatriates’ lost assets in former Japanese territories. (The programme was eventually 
executed in 1957 and 1967). The use of this survey is one of the key original 
contributions of this thesis, as it is the first time that it has been possible to undertake 
research that makes full use of this survey in order to understand the civilian repatriates’ 
postwar occupational transitions. It is therefore necessary to provide greater detail on 
the survey and its use, and this is what I will do below. 
For this survey, the ministry defined a repatriate as a Japanese civilian who 
was abroad on 9 August 1945, the day on which the Soviet Union entered the war in 
Manchuria.10  Military personnel were not included in this survey, but the family 
members of military personnel living abroad were regarded as civilian repatriates. For 
all those who qualified as civilian repatriates according to this definition the household 
head, even if he had worked in the military, was required to complete a one-page 
survey. The questions for each family member included name, sex, date of birth, the 
dates of emigration and repatriation, the name of their repatriation ship, the departure 
and arrival ports upon repatriation, and whether or not s/he was receiving public aid 
at the time of the survey. In addition, the household head was required to provide 
information on the length of his/her overseas residence, and four addresses (the 
address in Japan where the family was registered, the foreign address at the end of the 
                                               
10 "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)." The 




war, the first address after repatriation and the one at the time of the survey in 1956). 
The survey also asked about the household head’s wartime and postwar occupations 
and employers, including their longest job abroad; their occupation and employer at 
the end of the war; and their employment in 1956. If a family member had died during 
or after the repatriation, his/her name, sex, the date of death and age was also reported. 























Figure 2-1: The survey form of the Japanese government survey into repatriates’ 
postwar lives (Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō) in 1956 (English translation) 
Name of house head:                                 Address in August 1945 (Overseas): 
Current Address (1956):                            Region: 
Address where a family is registered:      Length of residence overseas: 
First address after repatriation: 
Occupation in 1956: 
Employer in 1956: 
 
House head and 
family members 
     














        
        
        
Family members deceased during or since 
repatriation 
House head’s wartime occupation 
and employer (longest): 






House head’s occupation and 
employer (August 1945): 
     Government pension (for wartime 
public servants) (y/n and amount 
received) 
     
     
















Figure 2-2: Original survey form of the Japanese government survey into repatriates’ 





The survey forms were collected by prefectural governments, sometimes 
through local repatriate organisations. The original forms were kept at the Ministry of 
Health and Welfare and copies have also been held by each prefectural government. It 
has been reported that the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare has digitalised 
survey forms for 2,260,000 individuals.11 In 2012, the Ministry of Health and Welfare 
transferred the forms to the National Archives, which made them available for research 
from April 2013. The National Archives have 1,685 files in its collection.  
Due to the restrictions imposed by Japan’s Personal Information Protection 
Law of 2003, these collections of files are difficult to access. As previously mentioned, 
each survey form contains a personal name and wartime and postwar addresses, 
including the place where a family was registered (honsekichi). An address could, for 
example, indicate a region in which outcast populations have traditionally lived. In 
order to avoid unwanted discrimination, the National Archives has a policy of 
concealing the personal information on repatriates’ family members such as their 
names and date of birth by blacking out the relevant sections on photocopied forms. 
The archive estimates that undertaking this preparation for viewing takes about three 
weeks per file. At this rate, it could take approximately 97 years before a researcher 
could gain access to all the documents contained in the 1,685 files.  
Furthermore, the files are categorised according to the regions where 
repatriates were living in August 1945, and the documents submitted by repatriates 
from South Korea, Taiwan and possibly a portion of Southeast Asia are somehow 
missing from the archives.12  The missing files  probably amount to about 25 per cent 
                                               
11 "Hikiagesha Kunan No Rekishi," Saga Shimbun, 14 April 2016. 
 http://www.saga-s.co.jp/news/saga/10101/299798. Accessed on 1 May 2016. 
12 In this collection in the National Archives, there are several files labelled ‘Southeast Asia,’ but 
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of the total number of survey forms collected in 1956 (repatriates from Taiwan 
comprised 10.1% of the total repatriate population and the figure for South Korea is 
13.1%).13 The figure for Southeast Asia was 3.6 per cent, and this research roughly 
estimates that half of the survey forms for Southeast Asia are missing. The long 
processing time and these missing files make it difficult for a researcher to use this 
collection to study the nation-wide trends of repatriates’ postwar lives by taking 
random samples out of the entire population.  
Apart from the National Archives, however, four prefectural archives (Ibaraki, 
Kanagawa, Hiroshima and Osaka) have made these survey forms available for 
research with some restrictions as discussed below. For other prefectures, the locations 
of the survey forms are currently unknown. It seems likely that many prefectures still 
keep them at responsible departments because they occasionally receive inquiries 
about repatriates from their family members, but this is difficult to establish. Thus, this 
research uses the survey forms obtained by the above four prefectures, while 
acknowledging the problems regarding their representativeness.  
It is clear that Japan’s 47 prefectures have quite different characteristics from 
each other, for example in terms of demography, history, sectoral structure and 
migration trends to former Japanese territories. In making use of data for these four 
prefectures, we must therefore acknowledge their distinct characteristics. At the time 
of the survey in 1956, Kanagawa was already a highly-industrialised prefecture, 
adjacent to Tokyo, with a developing manufacturing zone. Ibaraki was also in the 
Tokyo Metropolitan Area but it was still a rural area where the agricultural sector was 
                                               
the number of documents estimated in these files is much smaller than the number of repatriates 
reported by the Ministry of Health and Welfare. It would be reasonable to believe that part of the 
files for the repatriates from Southeast Asia is missing. 
13 Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Hikiage to Engo Sanjūnen No Ayumi " 690. Please also see the 
map (Figure 1). 
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dominant and people were less mobile. In Hiroshima, urban areas and ports had close 
connections with the military and major industrial corporations, for example, 
Mitsubishi Shipbuilding, while the prefecture also had a large agricultural sector. 
Hiroshima also had sent a significant number of migrants overseas, not only to former 
Japanese territories, but also to the Americas, including Hawaii. Osaka was the 
commercial centre of western Japan, though the prefecture included both agricultural 
and urban areas, especially in the 1950s.  
Regarding the Personal Information Law, these four prefectural archives have 
established different policies. Kanagawa and Hiroshima fortunately do not have any 
restrictions. Both Ibaraki and Osaka prefectures, however, have concerns about 
personal information due to the presence of discriminated minorities in these 
prefectures. At the Ibaraki prefecture archives, when a researcher looks at documents, 
all names and street addresses are hidden with a paper frame. In Osaka, a researcher 
is not allowed to see the original documents at all and is asked to submit a request to 
receive photocopies with personal names and a portion of the postwar street addresses 
blacked out.  
At the prefectural level, below is the comparison of the number of survey forms 
kept at the four prefectural archives and the number of repatriate households in 










Table 2-2: The 1956 repatriate household survey: Number of survey forms collected in 
each prefecture 
 Hiroshima Ibaraki Kanagawa Osaka 
Number of survey forms collected in 
1956 (a) 
9,429 19,333 10,432 25,810 
Number of repatriate households in 
November 1949 (b) 
14,751 39,864 21,689 46,005 
Rough estimated collection rates  
(a) / (b) 
63.9% 45.9% 48.1% 56.1% 
   
In order to correctly estimate the collection rates, the total number of repatriate 
households in each prefecture in 1956 would be required; however, this figure is 
unfortunately not available. If the number of repatriate households in 1949 obtained 
from the monthly statistical report of the Ministry of Health and Welfare14 is used, we 
find that the collection rates in the four prefectures are something between 45.9% 
(Hiroshima) and 63.9% (Ibaraki). At this stage, it is difficult to estimate the collection 
rate more precisely, but it seems appropriate to suggest that a large portion of repatriate 
households, perhaps approximately half of them, participated in this survey. 
Despite the various drawbacks of using only the four prefectures’ documents, 
these data contain comprehensive information especially on repatriates’ occupational 
transitions, which makes them valuable for any research on repatriates’ job 
experiences. So far virtually no other research works have used this information to 
                                               
14 "Kōsei Tōkei Geppō (Monthly Bulletin of the Welfare Statistics)." 
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study repatriates’ postwar job experiences; the only exception is the essays mentioned 
earlier that were published by the two scholars in Okinawa on migration patterns from 
pre-war Okinawa prefecture to the former Japanese territories and migrants’ wartime 
economic activities as discussed in the literature review of this thesis. This thesis is 
therefore the first substantive research to fully utilise this information source in order 
to analyse Japanese civilians’ occupational transitions from the wartime to the postwar 
economy. The relatively low interest in this survey documentation is probably due to 
the fact that forms have only been available in a handful of prefectural archives until 
recently, as well as because of the traditional scholarly focus on the political and social 
aspects of the repatriation problem. The survey results for Okinawa have not been used 
in conjunction with that from the four other prefectures. It appears that unfortunately 
the survey forms completed by Okinawa repatriates went missing after a Ryūkyū 
University researcher returned the documents to an Okinawa repatriate organisation 
representative, and it is unclear whether any copies were made of these data.15 
For this research, which aims to analyse the overall trends in the postwar 
economic experiences of Japanese civilian repatriates, the exclusion of Okinawa from 
this research can also be justified on the grounds of Okinawa’s unique political 
position, economic characteristics and historical migration patterns, which are quite 
different from those of other prefectures. However, the trends in Okinawa people’s 
emigration and their wartime economic activities will be briefly compared with 
analyses of the four prefectures chosen for this research with a view to highlighting 
differences identified in existing research works on Okinawa repatriates, specifically 
in the analysis of Kanagawa prefecture where a large number of Okinawa repatriates, 
                                               
15 This is information from a Japanese scholar working on the Japanese repatriation problem. 
The information was received on 13th July 2013 via personal conversation. Another scholar 
states that the Okinawa prefectural government keeps the survey forms.  
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who had been in the South Pacific, settled after repatriation. Okinawa has been an 
agricultural and fishing prefecture with a significantly low presence of industry and 
was controlled by the United States between 1945 and 1972. The majority of pre-war 
or wartime Okinawan emigrants migrated to Taiwan or to the Southern Pacific16 rather 
than to China or Manchuria, working in the sugar industry or in other primary sectors. 
Okinawans, both repatriates and non-repatriates, who have lived in mainland urban 
areas tended to form relatively closed communities, mostly working as relatively 
unskilled labourers. It would therefore be difficult to include Okinawa in an analysis 
using a limited number of sample prefectures even if the survey forms were available.  
 
Documents from wartime and postwar companies and 
repatriate organisations 
 
In addition to Japanese government records, this research uses the corporate records 
of wartime and postwar companies and documents published by various repatriate 
organisations, which helps fill in some of the details of repatriates’ postwar lives. 
These records are discussed in the following section. 
Documents of the South Manchuria Railway and its postwar organisations 
 
The South Manchuria Railway (SMR) was the largest public corporation in the 
Japanese Empire. The company was established in 1906 to operate a part of the 
Chinese Eastern Railway acquired from Russia as a result of the Portsmouth Treaty in 
1905. As of September 1944, the company employed 398,301 employees including 
138,804 Japanese people, and had been involved in the development of Manchukuo, 
                                               




including city planning in Dalian, Shenyang and several other cities, water and utility 
infrastructure building, the construction of ports, and the operation of schools, 
hospitals and libraries, among other things.17 The majority of the SMR employees 
returned to Japan after 1946. In Tokyo, a postwar organisation, Mantetsukai, was 
formed by the former SMR leaders to help the employees find new employment, to 
coordinate the payment of retirement benefits from the proceeds of the sale of an asset 
in Tokyo (the land on which the headquarters building had been located) and to provide 
former staff members with proof of employment that would enable them to receive 
government pensions. In order to facilitate this role, the Mantetsukai prepared 
individual employee information cards, each of which have the employee’s name, the 
date of entry to the company, work section and salary (that could indicate an 
employees’ approximate rank) at the end of the war. These cards have been kept at the 
Mantetsukai and are available to researchers.18 A sample card is shown below in 
Figure 2-3. The organisation also published quarterly newsletters (from 1954 to 
present) and a list of members (10,945 members in 1976)19 in 1948, 1956, 1961, and 
1966, with names, current addresses and employment information. As explained in the 
following section, the 1956 repatriate survey by the Japanese government contains 
many former SMR employees. In the databases created from the information obtained 
from the national survey into repatriates’ postwar lives for this research, we find that 
in Ibaraki Prefecture 19.0 per cent of the total repatriate population responded that 
they were working for the SMR in August 1945, 8.9 per cent in Hiroshima prefecture 
and 18.9 per cent in Kanagawa prefecture. Using the SMR documents, it has been 
                                               
17 Heisa Kikan Seiri Iinkai, Heisa Kikan to Sono Tokushu Seisan (Tokyo: Zaigai Katsudō Kankei Heisa 
Kikan Tokushu Seisan Jimusho, 1954), 388-89. 
18  Pictures of these cards have also been digitized. Emeritus Professor Takeda of Economics 
Department of Tokyo University kindly shared the data with this author. 
19 Mantetsukai, Zaidan Hōjin Mantetsukai 60 Nen No Ayumi (Tokyo: Mantetsukai, 2006), 50. 
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possible to match the information obtained from the 1956 survey with the SMR 
postwar employment information, and shed light on the occupational transition of 
former SMR employees. The Mantetsukai newsletters and their advertisement sections 
also provide useful information regarding members’ employment and business 
activities, as well as indicating their concerns relating to the compensation programme 
of the Japanese government. 
 
Figure 2-3: A sample information card for an SMR employee 
 
 
Documents of the support association for repatriate railway workers 
(Tairiku Tetsudō Jūjiin Engokai) 
 
In May 1946, the leaders of four wartime foreign railway companies (the SMR, the 
North China Railway, the Central China Railway and the Korean Railway) established 
a support association for repatriate railway workers (Tairiku Tetsudō Jūjiin Engokai) 
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in Tokyo. The documents prepared between March 1947 and the spring of 1955 (the 
exact date is unknown) offer some important insights into the provision of 
employment opportunities in this area.20   
According to a report on the activities of the railway repatriates’ organisation 
dated November 1948, the total number of repatriates returned from the above four 
railway companies was estimated to be approximately 180,000. 21  Some of the 
documents prepared between 1945 and 1948 are kept at the Library of Tokyo 
University, and include memoranda about the lobbying activities, lists of people who 
were offered jobs at the JNR (this is unfortunately not a full list), and documents about 
new business activities coordinated by the organisation to provide repatriate railway 
employees with new jobs. Examples include a retail company, a ballast supply 
company and an electric construction company specialising in railway services. In 
addition to these documents, the organisation also published a list of members in 1949 
and 1970, with their names, postwar addresses and employment information, in a 
similar format to that of the SMR organisation. Due to constraints of time and space, 
a detailed analysis of employees of the North China Railway, the Central China 
Railway and the Korean Railway have not been possible here and remains for the 
future, but the documentation will be used here to support the analysis of ex-SMR 
repatriates. 
Other primary source materials 
 
In addition to the source materials discussed above, documents prepared by Japanese 
government agencies and the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP) 
                                               
20 Tairiku Tetsudō Jūjiin Engokai, "Jigyō Gaiyō Kessan Hōkoku Tsuzuri," (Tokyo1946).  
21 Tairiku Tetsudō Jūjiin Engokai estimated the number of repatriates to be 100,000 from the SMR, 
40,000 from the North China Railway (Kahoku Kōtsū), 6,000 from the Central China Railway 
(Kachū Kōtsū) and 35,000 from the Korean Railway (Chosen Tetsudō). 
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offer useful information. Among these are three volumes of repatriation programme 
records published by the Ministry of Health and Welfare; Hikiage Engo no Kiroku (the 
first volume of the records of the repatriation programmes) published in 1950,22 Zoku 
Hikiage Engo no Kiroku (the second volume) published in 195523 and Zoku Zoku 
Hikiage Engo no Kiroku (the third volume) in 1963.24 These books are the most 
comprehensive public records of the repatriation; they include information on places 
of origins of repatriates; the number of repatriates returning to Japan each year from 
1945 to 1963; the administration of repatriation centres at main ports in Japan; material 
aid programmes for returnees (food, clothing and medical check-ups etc.); housing 
and employment programmes; the allocation of responsibilities and the budgets of 
relevant government agencies; related debates in the National Diet; information on 
returnee organisations, as well as essays and testimonies of repatriates and repatriation 
centre staff members.25  
Apart from these national records, 18 regional repatriation centres at major 
ports (Shimonoseki, Nagoya, Kagoshima, Hakata, Hakodate, Sasebo, Maizuru, 
Yokohama, etc.) also published local records, which are included in the sixteen 
volumes of collections of Information on the Repatriation, Kaigai Hikiage Kankei 
Shiryō Shūsei,26 republished in 2004. The topics included in these volumes are similar 
to those documented in the national records, but they also contain regional specific 
information. However, less attention is paid to returnees’ postwar lives, which became 
the responsibility of the local government.  
                                               
22 Repatriation Relief Bureau, Hikiage Engo No Kiroku.  
23 Ministry of Health and Welfare, Zoku Hikiage Engo No Kiroku (Tokyo: Ministry of Health and 
Welfare, 1955). 
24 Zoku Zoku Hikiage Engo No Kiroku (Tokyo: Ministry of Health and Welfare, 1963). 
25 These volumes have been used by other researchers, but mainly for analyses of social aspects 
of the repatriation problem. 
26 Kaigai Hikiage Kankei Shiryō Shūsei ed. Kiyofumi Katō (Tokyo: Yumani Shobō, 2001).  
69 
 
A thirty-year history of the repatriation programmes, Hikiage to Engo 
Sanjūnen no Ayumi, published by the Ministry of Health and Welfare in 1977 contains 
updated information on the repatriation programmes between 1945 and 1976 with 
confirmed profiles of the repatriates. This book also includes information on war 
criminals, the salaries that were paid to detained and not-yet returned soldiers in 
Siberia and other places, as well as government-sponsored expeditions to recover the 
remains of the war dead in former battlefields, indicating the changing agenda of the 
ministry as time went on. 
A survey of postwar reclamation projects, Sengo Kaitakushi 27 published by 
the national cooperative of reclamation farmers (Zenkoku Kaitakusha Nōgyō Kyōdō 
Kumiai) in 1977 has information on postwar reclamation projects which involved 
numerous displaced returnees and domestic war victims. These projects were 
formulated on the basis of the guidelines for support programmes for repatriates 
(Kaigai Hikiagesha Engo Yōkō), which were decided in a meeting of top bureaucrats 
in April 1946 called to address food shortages and unemployment.28 Although not all 
the projects covered in this book have separate descriptions of the returnees and the 
domestic war victims, this book still offers some valuable background information on 
returnees.  
The Japanese government agencies were not the only bodies to report on the 
status of the country — the occupation authorities also published various reports on 
postwar Japan, some of which include information on the returnees. ‘The Japanese 
Village in Transition’ (1950),29 which was prepared by the Natural Resources Section 
                                               
27  Sengo Kaitakushi Hensan Iinkai, Sengo Kaitakushi (Tokyo: Zenkoku Kaitaku Nōgyō Kumiai 
Rengōkai, 1977). 
28 Ibid., 42. 
29 Arthur Franklin Raper, The Japanese Village in Transition, ed. Natural Resources Section, Report 
(Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers) (Tokyo,1950). 
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of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers (SCAP), is based on field research 
covering seven towns and villages across Japan. Although the main purpose of this 
report was to examine the effects of the 1947 Land Reform on local villages, and 
especially to assess the degree of democratisation (measured by factors such as 
establishments or frequency of grassroots meetings including Parent-Teacher 
Associations), it also contains information on new residents such as returnees and 
evacuees from urban areas and their positions in the community.  
Other SCAP documents such as Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan 
and Korea (Numbers 1-35)30 and Public Health and Welfare in Japan, 1945-1948, 
Annual Summaries, 31  include sections on returnees, which contain repatriation 
statistics and details of various kinds of assistance offered to the returnees, including 
housing and loan programmes and reclamation projects. There are also accounts of 
debates on possible population control. The information is general and overlaps with 
information from the Ministry of Health and Welfare, but is still helpful to understand 





The analysis of repatriates’ postwar job experiences will be conducted at three levels: 
a) national, b) prefectural and c) corporate or organisational levels. For the first two 
levels, the three primary source materials discussed in the previous section will be 
used: the 1950 Population Census of Japan, the demographic statistics of repatriates 
                                               
30 Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Summation of Non-Military Activities in Japan and 
Korea (Tokyo: Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, 1945-1952), Volume 1-35.  
31 Public Health and Welfare Section Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, Public Health 
and Welfare in Japan. 1945-1948, Annual Summaries (1949). 
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at each prefecture between 1946 and 1949, and the Japanese Government survey into 
repatriates’ postwar lives (Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō) of 1956. For the corporate and 
organisational level analysis, this research will focus on the analysis of the South 
Manchuria Railway Company by using documents obtained from the company’s 
postwar organisation, the Mantetsukai.  
 
Analysis at the national level 
Demographic statistics of repatriates at each prefecture between 1946 and 1949 
from the Ministry of Health and Welfare and the 1950 Population Census 
 
The demographic statistics of the Ministry of Health and Welfare reported the 
population of civilian returnees and repatriated soldiers as well as the number of 
households in each prefecture for every month between December 1946 and 
November 1949. This information tells us the general trend in repatriate mobility and 
identifies prefectures that had a large number of repatriates. For the national level 
analysis, the 1950 Population Census will also be used.  
 
Analysis at the prefectural level 
 
Japanese Government survey into repatriates’ postwar lives (Zaigai Jijitsu 
Chōsahyō) in 1956 
 
For the 1956 national survey, due to the limitations in access to the survey forms 
discussed in a previous section, this research focusses on repatriates’ postwar job 
experiences in four prefectures: Hiroshima, Ibaraki, Kanagawa and Osaka. The 
research uses descriptive statistics and tries to explain what factors might have 
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contributed to repatriates’ choices of postwar employment in each prefecture, and shed 
light on relevant factors such as the presence or absence of family in hometowns, the 
possession of useful skills or qualifications, or government employment policies. 
Personal factors including age and the timing of repatriation are also examined to see 
whether they might have affected the choice of postwar employment. The following 
map shows the location of the four prefectures in Japan, and it can be seen that they 
offer some diversity, giving us prefectures in both eastern and western Japan (Ibaraki 
and Kanagawa in the east and Hiroshima and Osaka in the west) and both urban 
(Kanagawa and Osaka) and rural (Ibaraki and Hiroshima) prefectures, though it must 
be noted that Hiroshima had industrialised coastal regions as well.  
 












The number of survey forms kept in each of the four prefectural archives is 
shown in the following table. From the total survey forms, at least 500 for each 
prefecture were randomly selected, making it possible to execute a reasonable 
percentage-based descriptive analysis. The random selection method is discussed later 
in this chapter. 
 
Table 2-3: Number of samples taken for each prefecture: A Japanese government 

































(b) / (a) 5.3% 3.2% 6.1% 100% 100% 2.4% 
 
Due to the limitations in access to the original documents in Osaka Prefecture, 
I selected two (out of 66) municipalities — one city within the Osaka metropolitan 
area in the northern part of the prefecture (Takatsuki City with 325 survey forms) and 
one county in the rural south of the prefecture (Sennan County with 283 survey forms). 
These two municipalities were chosen in order to capture the trends in urban and rural 
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areas and in the northern and southern regions in Osaka prefecture. Takatsuki is a 
residential and commercial city in the suburban zone of Osaka city. As many residents 
commute to Osaka, Takatsuki city would seem to offer a reasonable representation of 
the population in the Osaka metropolitan area. Sennan is a more rural area with a large 
number of agricultural inhabitants, but it is also a county that has traditionally 
specialised in the textile industry since the Muromachi Period (1336–1573). These two 
municipalities are reasonable examples enabling us to capture the characteristics of 
Osaka Prefecture. However, my research has had to treat the survey forms collected 
in Osaka rather differently. This is because these are the only two municipalities in 
Osaka prefecture for which it has been possible to access the survey forms, which 
creates its own representativeness problem. Moreover, the number of survey forms 
from these two municipalities, which are available at the Osaka Archives, was 
somehow smaller than the number recorded in the catalogue. The reason for this 
discrepancy is not known, but we obviously have to consider the possibility that the 
missing survey forms may have included many with important information, for 
example they may include the survey forms of areas which had a large number of 
repatriates.  For this reason, the information obtained from the documents of the two 
municipalities will be used to highlight some of the key characteristics of the 
repatriates in Takatsuki city and Sennan county, but has not been subject to the same 
random sampling.  
Before random samples were chosen for each prefecture, the following types 
of survey forms had to be excluded: 
· Survey forms with job information for different household heads (i.e. one 
household head during the wartime and a new household head in 1956).  
The government required a household head to fill in a form. If a 
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household head was dead by 1956 or unable to participate for some 
reason, a new head or a family member was entitled to fill in the form 
with his/her new postwar employment. This type of survey forms has 
been omitted because employment information for different people is 
not useful if we want to track occupational changes. 
· Forms of those who had worked in the military 
This national survey was conducted for civilian repatriates. If career 
soldiers had family members overseas, however, the family members 
were regarded as civilian repatriates and household heads were 
required to participate in the survey. Survey forms for these families 
were excluded because this research specifically focuses on the 
occupational transitions of civilian repatriates. 
· Forms that do not include other necessary information (wartime and postwar 
employment, date of birth, addresses, dates of migration and repatriation) 
· Forms of those who had already retired by August 1945 
· Survey forms illegible due to bad handwriting 
From the remaining, the aforementioned numbers of forms were selected by 
using random sampling. In order to reasonably execute the analysis, this research 
aimed to take 600 sample forms for each prefecture. For Hiroshima and Kanagawa 
prefecture, this target has been achieved and 621 and 640 survey forms have been 
chosen respectively. This research chose more than 600 forms anticipating 
unforeseeable cases, for reasons such as the selected forms include those which should 
have been omitted for the above mentioned reasons. The original plan was to use 
random sampling again to make the number exactly 600 for each prefecture. However, 
this research decided to include the extra number of forms in order to use a large 
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number of survey forms. For Ibaraki, due to time constraints, only 500 survey forms 
have been collected. Based on the strict interpretation of the 2003 Information 
Protection Law, the prefectural archives in Ibaraki has a policy not to allow a 
researcher to photograph the documents, and s/he has to manually input the data on a 
computer on site. For this reason, the number of forms collected in the Ibaraki 
Archives was compromised to be 500. For Osaka prefecture, due to the previously 
mentioned reasons, the two municipalities of Takatsuki city and Sennan county have 
been selected. For these two municipalities, all survey forms have been photocopied 
by archives staff members and 325 forms for Takatsuki and 283 forms for Sennan have 
been received for this research. For the selection of the sample survey forms, this 
research used the RANDBETEEN function of the Microsoft Excel by inputting the 
number of the total survey forms available for each prefecture and the number of 
sample forms needed. 
From the random samples of each prefecture, the following information for 
each prefecture was taken: 
a) Average age in August 1945 
b) Average number of years spent overseas by August 1945 
c) Average number of months spent overseas between August 1945 and the date 
of repatriation (in order to gauge each person’s repatriation experiences before 
arriving to Japan, for example, detentions in Siberia by the Soviet Union, 
which delayed repatriation). 
d) Percentage figures of those who settled in their hometowns or adjacent areas, 
who lived in some other place within their home prefecture, or who had by 
1956 migrated from other prefectures  
e) Sectoral breakdown of repatriates’ employment 
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f) Employers who hired a large number of repatriates both in the wartime and in 
the postwar period 
g) Percentage figures for those who managed to find employment in the same or 
similar sector (by using technical skills or experiences) as that of their wartime 
occupation 
Then, as shown in the following table, this set of information in each prefecture 
from (a) to (e) and (g) has been compared with that of repatriates in the other 
prefectures. Results of (a), (d) and (e) have been compared with data for Japanese non-
repatriates in each prefecture and with the entire Japanese population (which includes 
repatriates), using the information obtained from the Population Census. Information 
(f) will be used to identify factors that might have helped or slowed repatriates entering 
the postwar Japanese economy. Information from Osaka prefecture will be used to 



























in Japan (1950) / 
Entire population 
including repatriates 
in each prefecture 
(1955) 
Average age (a) 1956 survey 1955 census 
1950 and 1955 
census 
Average number of 
years spent overseas 
until August 1945 (b) 
1956 survey   
Average number of 
months between 
August 1945 and the 
time of repatriation 
(c) 
1956 survey   
% of those settled in 
hometown, different 
place in home 
prefecture or in 
another prefecture 
(d) 
1956 survey 1955 census 




1956 survey 1955 census 







Chapter 3  
Japanese repatriates’ postwar lives 
Japan’s economic situation and changes in repatriation 
policies 
The Japanese ‘postwar’ repatriation started on 9th August, 1945 in Manchuria when the 
Soviet Union entered the war there. The postwar repatriation took many years as indicated 
in Chapter 1. Between the end of the war in August 1945 and the end of 1946, as we have 
seen, approximately 5.1 million people (81 per cent of the total figure of 6.29 million 
including both civilians and demobilised soldiers) arrived into Japan. By the end of 1950, 
approximately 99 per cent had returned. In the early postwar period, Japan’s economic 
situation changed and the focus of the government’s policies towards repatriates also 
shifted from emergency support to policy responses towards repatriates’ demand for 
compensation for their lost wartime assets. This section briefly explains these changes in 
the early postwar period up until 1956 when the Japanese government conducted a 
national survey into repatriates’ postwar lives, which this thesis uses as a core source 
material. This section divides the period 1945-1956 into three sub-periods: 1945-1948 
when the country experienced postwar confusion; 1949-1952, the period after an austerity 
economic policy, the Dodge Line, was introduced and the Japanese economy became 
more market-oriented; and 1952-1956, the period after the Allied occupation ended in 
April 1952, and the Japanese economy started to grow.   
 
1945-1948 
During the first few years in the early postwar period, Japan faced postwar devastation 
and confusion. By the end of the war, approximately 2.5 million Japanese people had died 
in the war. The Economic Stabilisation Board estimated that approximately 25.4 per cent 
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of Japan’s national wealth was lost in the war, including 24.6 per cent of buildings, 34.3 
per cent of production machinery, and 80.6 per cent of ships. 1  Japan experienced 
significant shortages, but the economy’s supply side had lost the capacity to produce 
enough goods. Some companies converted their military production to commercial 
production, but investment levels in the private sector were significantly weak because of 
companies’ financial problems and uncertainty about the future. In terms of food 
production, Japan faced severe harvest failures in 1945. This hit the country hard, as it 
had lost food and other imports from its former territories. 
In the early postwar period, the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers 
introduced policy reforms to disarm and demilitarise Japan. The notable reforms were the 
dissolution of zaibatsu conglomerates, the land reform, the labour reform, the introduction 
of the Anti-Monopoly Law, and the purge of wartime leaders. In addition to these reforms, 
the anticipated confiscation of production facilities, as a means of war reparations to 
Allied countries, created additional uncertainty on the business sector. These changes 
created uncertainty, but also played a role in reshuffling the social order, where some 
Japanese people found new economic opportunities. For example, due to the delay in 
major businesses’ full return to economic activities, SMEs (small and medium-sized 
enterprises) and individual traders, especially in black markets, became important players 
in the economy.  
The Japanese government continued economic control and fiscal intervention, 
including the rationing system for food, clothing and other daily supplies. The 
government’s other major policies included the introduction of postwar reclamation 
projects to increase food production and to settle displaced people, as well as the Priority 
                                               
1 Economic Planning Agency, Taiheiyōsensō Ni Okeru Wagakuni No Higai Sōgōhōkokusho (Tokyo: 
Economic Planning Agency, 1949), 54. 
https://www.digital.archives.go.jp/DAS/meta/listPhoto?BID=F2007021516460707126&ID=&LANG=
default&GID=&NO=&TYPE=PDF&DL_TYPE=pdf&CN=1. Accessed on 25 November 2016. 
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Production System to increase coal and steel production. In the early postwar period, new 
government agencies, such as the Repatriation Agency, were created. As the government 
mostly retained existing employees, the number of public servants increased during this 
period. Existing public agencies, including the Japan National Railways, also absorbed a 
large number of demobilised soldiers as well as repatriate railway staff members. Japan 
also experienced a significant inflation due to material shortages, the government’s 
continuing issuance of yen to pay off outstanding wartime debts to Japanese firms and to 
finance reconstruction projects. The price level increased approximately 70 times 
between 1945 and 1950.2  
Outside of Japan’s mainland, the country’s territory was limited to the islands of 
Honshū, Hokkaido, Kyūshū, Shikoku and surrounding islands. Given the difficult 
economic situation in Japan, the Japanese government initially encouraged Japanese 
overseas residents to stay outside of Japan, fearing the influx of more than six million 
people to Japan could lead to shortages of food, houses and daily goods, as well as 
significant unemployment. However, this policy was changed by January 1946 due to 
massive attacks on Japanese civilians by the U.S.S.R. military and local residents, mostly 
in Manchuria. It is also argued that the American military forces in China hoped to remove 
the Japanese military forces and their influence in the region as soon as possible. Because 
it was not possible to separate demobilised soldiers and civilians, the U.S. assisted the 
repatriation of both groups. 3 The U.S provided approximately 200 ships (tank landing 
ships categorised as LST and liberty ships),4 each of which transported several thousand 
repatriates per journey.5 
                                               
2 Masanao Ito, "Sengo Haipā Infure to Chuō Ginkō," IMES (Institute for Monetary and Economic 
Studies, Bank of Japan) Discussion Paper Series 2002-J-35 (2002): 1. 
 http://www.imes.boj.or.jp/research/papers/japanese/02-J-35.pdf. Accessed on 25 November 2016. 
3 Katō, "Dainihon Teikoku No Hōkai to Zanryū Nihonjin Mondai," 16-25, 37-38. 
4 Repatriation Relief Bureau, Hikiage Engo No Kiroku, 31. 
5 Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers, "Reports of General Macarthur Volume 1 
Supplement," (Washington1966), 155.  This report explains that ‘Vast numbers were moved under 
oriental passenger standards - the carrying capacities of the Liberties and LST's were raised to 3,500 
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The majority of repatriates arrived in Japan by the end of 1946. At the repatriation 
ports, repatriates were quarantined, and provided with clothing, food, and free train tickets 
to their chosen destinations, quite often their hometowns. The amount of money which 
they were allowed to bring with them was limited to 1,000 yen per person, and the 
remaining amount was deposited with local customs offices with a promise to return it to 
the owner later.6 In April 1946, the government decided on a policy to support repatriates’ 
lives in their places of settlement in Japan (Teichakuchi ni okeru Kaigai Hikiagesha Engo 
Yokō), which involved support for housing and job placement.7 After repatriates arrived 
into their hometowns or other places, local governments provided them with daily goods, 
furniture, food, clothing and bedding. A limited number of public housing units or rooms 
in repatriate accommodation were also available. The total fiscal expenditure used to 
support repatriates was estimated to be 79.8 billion yen (222 million USD at the exchange 
rate of one USD = 360 yen).8 Furthermore, local employment bureaus offered job training 
services and job placement services. However, these policies were only partly helpful. 
Repatriates and the popular press normally criticised the ineffectiveness and limited 
nature of public support to repatriates. In 1946, the government introduced the Public 
Assistance Act (Seikatsu Hogo Hō) to provide financial assistance to households in need, 
which also supported repatriates. It was reported that 3.3 per cent of repatriates’ 
households which participated in the 1956 national survey into repatriates’ postwar lives 
responded that they had received financial assistance under this act.9 
                                               
and 1,200 passengers respectively, an increase of 1,000 and 300 each over the maximum number 
established by the U. S. forces during the war for the same type ships’. This information was 
provided by Dr Jonathan Bull of Hokkaido University on 29 January 2017. 
6  Repatriation Relief Bureau, Hikiage Engo No Kiroku, 38-39. Miyoshi, "Hinkonkaisō Toshiteno 
Hikiagesha No Engo Ni Tsuite " 8-9. 
7 Ministry of Health and Welfare, Zoku Zoku Hikiage Engo No Kiroku 82. The customs offices returned 
the money after the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control Act was amended in 1953.  
8 Repatriation Relief Bureau, Hikiage Engo No Kiroku, 93-94. This amount included costs for sea 
transport, the provision of aid materials and other public support in repatriates’ hometowns and 
elsewhere, and the funds for the loan programme (seigyō shikin).  
9 Miyoshi, "Hinkonkaisō Toshiteno Hikiagesha No Engo Ni Tsuite " 9-11. 
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The government also offered loans called seigyō shikin to repatriates and other 
war affected people. Between 1946 and 1959, a total amount of approximately 2.1 billion 
yen (5.8 million USD) was lent. The funds were used to start businesses or farming 
operations. However, the repayment rate was low, with only around 50% of these loans 
being repaid. It has been reported that there was rumour among repatriates that seigyō 
shikin was provided as de facto compensation for repatriates’ overseas lost assets and 
there was no need to repay. 10 In this way, the effectiveness of the loan programme was 
questionable and limited.  
Around 1948, as the Cold War intensified, occupation policy shifted from the 
removal of Japan’s war potential to support for swift economic development. Shortages 
of food, daily necessities and housing had gradually been solved, but inflation was still a 
major problem as monetary expansion continued. By this time, more than 95 per cent of 
repatriates had arrived back in Japan. Many Japanese people had managed to find some 
place to live and some sort of job, though the economic situation was still fluid and people 
frequently changed jobs and address. 
 
1949-1952 
In order to stabilize the Japanese economy, SCAP introduced a “Nine-Point Economic 
Stabilization Program” in December 1948. In March 1949, the Dodge Line, an austerity 
fiscal policy was introduced to check inflation. In this policy, the goals were to balance 
the national budget, to reduce inflation, to reduce the number of public employees, to fix 
                                               
10   Ministry of Health and Welfare, Zoku Zoku Hikiage Engo No Kiroku 108-10; The House of 
Councillors, Dai 010 Kokkai Ōkura Iinkai Dai 8 Gō (Tokyo1951).  
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/sangiin/010/0284/01002160284008a.html.  
Accessed on 10 December 2016. 
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the exchange rate to 360 yen to one U.S. dollar to keep Japanese export prices competitive 
and to reduce the government’s intervention.11 
As a result of the introduction of the Dodge Line, price levels stabilised, but 
increased wages and cutbacks in lending by banks forced a large number of businesses to 
shut down. The Korean War from June 1950 brought special procurement orders from the 
U.S. military to Japan, giving Japan significant dollar income – 25 per cent of its exports 
in 1951, and 35 per cent in 1952. Special procurement demand from the Korean War 
became a major stimulus for the Japanese economy and created large numbers of new 
jobs,12 and, the Japanese economy saw an increase in trade and investment. During this 
period, repatriation from China, Taiwan and the U.S.S.R continued, but the number 
significantly decreased. By the end of 1950, approximately 99 per cent of repatriates had 
arrived in Japan. The government’s repatriation policy continued, but its emphasis 
gradually shifted from emergency relief support to repatriates to appeal to the U.S. and 
other countries for the swift repatriation of detainees in China and the U.S.S.R.  
 
1952-1956 
In April 1952, the occupation ended, with the conclusion of the San Francisco Peace 
Treaty. The Japanese economy’s condition had significantly improved by this time. The 
Economic White Paper of 1953 stated that Japan recorded the fastest increases in 
industrial output and national income in the world. For the first time after the war, those 
two figures exceeded the levels recorded in the period of 1934-1936. Consumption and 
wage levels also recovered and exceeded the pre-war level. 13 The economy continued to 
                                               
11 Office of Historical Studies, "Fiscal and Monetary Policies of Japan in Reconstruction and High-
Growth - 1945 to 1971," (Tokyo: Institute of Fiscal and Monetary Policy in Ministry of Finance, 
2010).https://www.mof.go.jp/english/pri/publication/policy_1945-1971/Part1-Chapter2.pdf. 
Accessed on 10 December 2016. 
12 Ibid., 54. 




expand after the 1950s. In 1956 the Economic White Paper declared that the immediate 
postwar period was over (mohaya sengo de wa nai). The labour market became tight 
around the year of 1952 and companies in the urban areas started recruiting new middle 
school graduates in Tōhoku or Kyūshū regions in northeast and southern Japan. Those 
new workers were called the golden eggs (kinno tamago).14  
 By 1956, 99.9 per cent of the total repatriates (6.29 millions) including both 
civilians and demobilised soldiers had arrived in Japan.15 Policies toward repatriates 
shifted to continuous provision of loans and a limited amount of housing. Repatriates’ 
demand for compensation from the Japanese government for their lost assets in Japan’s 
former territories continued to be a political issue. Some scholars argue that the Liberal 
Democratic Party (LDP) saw the returnees as a potential threat to political stability. 
Fearing the political influence of more than three million civilian repatriates, the LDP 
government agreed to pay a total amount of 46,4 billion yen (129 million USD) in 195716 
and 192.5 billion yen (535 million USD) in 1967.17 
Consequently, as the economic situation improved between 1945 and 1956, 
civilian repatriates’ lives and the government’s responses significantly changed. Although 
                                               
and http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/keizaiwp/wp-je54/wp-je54-010301.html. Accessed on 10 
 December 2016.  
14 Kazutoshi Kase, Shūdan Shūshoku No Jidai (Tokyo: Aoki Shoten, 1997), 65. Kazuo Katase, "The 
Employment En Masse of Junior High School Graduates in Japanese Economic Growth Period," 
Ningen Jōhōgaku Kenkyū 15 (2010): 13. 
http://www.ipc.tohoku-gakuin.ac.jp/ghi/kenkyujyo/kiyou/ronbun/no15/no15_katase.pdf. Accessed 
on 10 December 2016. 
15 Ministry of Health and Welfare, Engo 50 Nenshi, 729. 
16 The law, Hikiagesha Kyūfukintō Shikyū Hō (17th May 1957 Hōritsu Dai 109 Gō), is available at 
http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S32/S32HO109.html. Based on this law, a compensation payment of 
7,000 yen (those who were younger than 18 years old), 15,000 yen (those who were aged between 
18 and 29 years old), 20,000 yen (those who were aged between 30 and 49 years old) and 28,000 yen 
(those who were older than 50 years old) were provided. 
17 The law, Hikiagesha tō ni taisuru Tokubetsu Kōfukin no Shikyū ni Kansuru Hōritsu, is available at 
http://law.e-gov.go.jp/htmldata/S42/S42HO114.html. Based on this law, a compensation payment of 
14,000 yen (those who were younger than 20 years old), 21,000 yen (those who were aged between 
20 and 24 years old), 35,000 yen (those who were aged between 25 and 34 years old), 70,000 yen 
(those who were aged between 35 and 49 years old) and 112,000 yen (those who were older than 
50 years old) were provided. 
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information on the civilian repatriates’ struggle during the first ten years is not available, 
this research fully utilises the 1956 government survey to understand repatriates’ lives in 
the early postwar period. In the next section, I try to capture the general trend of Japanese 




Analysis at the national level  
Searching for new places to live: Inter-prefectural migration patterns 
between December 1946 and November 1949   
The monthly report published by the Ministry of Health and Welfare includes the number 
of repatriates living in each prefecture between December 1946 and November 1949. The 
distribution of the repatriate population was not even across Japan: repatriates were 
concentrated in three types of prefectures: a) those in western Japan which had 
traditionally sent significant number of migrants to other parts of Asia; b) urban 
prefectures including the Tokyo and Osaka metropolitan regions; and c) Hokkaido and 
several other northern prefectures which still had unused land for newcomers and where 
large scale postwar reclamation projects were implemented. The next map shows the top 
ten prefectures in terms of the number of civilian repatriate population in December 1946 
















Figure 3-1: Top 10 prefectures: Number of repatriates in December 194618 










Having been traditional prefectures of origin of migrants, the western regions 
became major early postwar destinations for repatriates. By December 1946, Kyūshū 
Island with seven prefectures (out of 46 prefectures nationwide, excluding Okinawa) had 
absorbed approximately 33.6 per cent of all repatriates. Apart from Kyūshū, Yamaguchi 
and Hiroshima in the western region of mainland Japan also received significant numbers. 
                                               
18 Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Kōsei Tōkei Geppō (Monthly Bulletin of the Welfare Statistics)." 















Other than the western prefectures, Hokkaido had 162,997 returnees (5.4 per cent) and 
Tokyo, received 114,054 repatriates (3.8 per cent). The proportion of repatriates in the 
total prefectural population was particularly high in the west as the next map shows. 
 
Figure 3-2: Top 10 prefectures: Repatriates as a percentage of total prefectural 




A high repatriate population density was observed in western prefectures and in 
Hokkaido. All prefectures in Kyūshū experienced high percentage figures. In this map, 
Tokyo, despite its significant number of repatriates, disappears because repatriates made 
up only 3.2 per cent of the prefectural population in October 1947. Due to housing and 
material shortages as a result of air-raids during the war, Tokyo and major urban areas 
(such as the Yokohama region in Kanagawa, Kyoto city, Osaka city, Kobe city in Hyōgo 
and Fukuoka city) restricted population influx until 1949 under the 1947 Act 221 for the 
control of population inflow into urban areas.20 The Ministry of Health and Welfare data 
                                               
19 Ibid. This map is created for this research, based on the numbers obtained from Kōsei Tōkei Geppō. 
20 The House of Representatives, Hōritsu Dai 221 Gō Tokaichi Tennyū Yokusei Kinkyūsochirei Wo Kaisei 














suggest that the distribution of the repatriate population continued to change. Some 
repatriates settled in their hometowns permanently, while others migrated to other regions 
to find a better place. The next map and table show the prefectures with the largest 
changes in the number of repatriates between December 1946 and November 1949; these 
include urban prefectures both in eastern and western Japan (Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka and 
Hyōgo) and northern prefectures, such as Hokkaido. 
 
Figure 3-3: Prefectures with the largest changes in the number of repatriates between 
December 1946 and November 194921  
 
 
*Prefectures with percentage figures are those which experienced the 12 largest increases in 
repatriate population.  
                                               
21 Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Kōsei Tōkei Geppō (Monthly Bulletin of the Welfare Statistics)." 
This map is created for this research, based on the numbers obtained from Kōsei Tōkei Geppō. 
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Kansai Metropolitan Area 
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In Table 3-1, figures show the repatriate population increase rate between 
December 1946 and November 1949 in each prefecture. For example, in December 1946, 
the three prefectures with the largest repatriate populations were Fukuoka and Kumamoto 
in southern Japan and Hokkaido in northern Japan. By November 1949, the repatriate 
population had grown rapidly in northern Japan, where postwar reclamation projects were 
implemented and land was available for newcomers. Urban centres such as Tokyo and 
Osaka also attracted significant numbers. The number of the repatriate population will be 
compared with those of the entire population (including repatriates) in each prefecture 



















Table 3-1: Repatriate population changes between 1946 and 1949: Top 12 and the 
bottom 3 prefectures22  
 Prefectures Region 
Repatriate 
population 













1 Hokkaido North 162,997 380,136 133.2% 11.1% 




















50,865 63,392 24.6% 1.8% 
8 Hyōgo  
Metropolitan 
(Western) 
76,586 93,784 22.5% 2.7% 
9 Iwate North 28,172 34,173 21.3% 1.0% 
10 Miyazaki West 58,708 70,700 20.4% 2.1% 
11 Akita North 40,847 48,997 20.0% 1.4% 
12 Fukuoka West 231,003 267,203 15.7% 7.8% 
       




27,973 22,406 -19.9% 0.7% 
46 Kumamoto West 230,517 168,745 -26.8% 4.9% 
  *The column showing the changes in repatriate population is shaded in grey. 
 
 
                                               




This table clearly shows that between 1946 and 1949, Hokkaido and several northern 
prefectures, urban metropolitan regions and several western prefectures absorbed 
growing number of repatriates from other prefectures. Further information on these 
regions will be given in the next section.  
 
Hokkaido and northern prefectures as the largest destination of repatriates 
The largest repatriate population increase was observed in Hokkaido, where the figure 
grew by 133.2%, from 162,997 in December 1946 to 380,136 in November 1949. 
Hokkaido, located between Sakhalin and Honshū, the main island of Japan, had been 
developed after the Meiji Restoration in 1868 as a semi-colony where agriculture, fishing, 
forestry and mining were major sectors. Almost all of the Japanese population in 
Hokkaido were newcomers from the mainland, including farmers from the northeast 
region (Tōhoku), as well as agricultural labours and coal miners. Many also re-migrated 
to Sakhalin.23  
After the Second World War, Hokkaido, together with the other six northern 
prefectures (Tōhoku), became focal points for the postwar Japanese economic policies to 
cope with food shortages (through reclamation projects) and energy shortages (through 
the increase in coal production) as part of the Priority Production System to increase coal 
production, which started in 1947. At the end of the war, Japan produced 9 million tons 
of rice and imported another 1.5 million tons from Korea and Taiwan. In 1945, Japan lost 
these imports and the rice production declined to 5.8 million tons (to a level of 56% of 
the previous year) partly due to a harvest failure. The government announced an 
emergency reclamation project plan in November 1945 and opened up military land, other 
state-owned land and forests, and farmland owned by the imperial family, and purchased 
private land across Japan to create new farmland. The initial goal was to create an 
                                               
23 Wakatsuki, Sengo Hikiage No Kiroku 22-25. 
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additional 1.55 million hectares of farmland nationwide, though this was never 
achieved.24 
From Sakhalin, approximately 310,000 civilians were repatriated and roughly 
170,000 settled in Hokkaido, including primary sector workers willing to make a fresh 
start in the agriculture sector.25 They were joined by other people affected by the war in 
mainland Japan, as the next table shows. The total population in Hokkaido, including 
repatriates and non-repatriates, increased by 780,000 between 1945 and 1950.26 Some 
people who had first settled in some other prefecture chose to migrate to Hokkaido, often 
in pursuit of social freedom. One repatriate woman testified, “After returning from 
Manchuria, my husband and I first settled in Nagano prefecture where we had family, 
land and a house. As a farming family, we had enough to eat even when food shortages 
were a big problem. But our life in the hometown was not easy because we were always 
expected to follow traditional rules and social norms. We decided to move to Hokkaido 
where we thought we could live a new life with fewer social constraints’. By 1949, 27,000 
households settled in new farmland in Hokkaido.27  Table 3-2 shows the breakdown of 
the wartime experiences of these settlers, out of whom civilian repatriates made the 










                                               
24 Hokkaido Sengo Kaitakushi Hensan Iinkai, Hokkaido Sengo Kaitakushi (Sapporo: Hokkaido Sengo 
Kaitakushi Hensan Iinkai, 1973), 28-29. 
25 Ibid., 205. 
26 "Sengo 70 Nen Hokkaido (Dai Ichibu) (3) Hikiagesha," Asahi Shimbun Hokkaido Edition, 2 February 
2015. http://www.asahi.com/area/hokkaido/articles/MTW20150702011440001.html. Accessed on 
6 August 2016. 




Table 3-2: Breakdown of 27,000 settlers participating in the postwar reclamation projects 
in Hokkaido28 
Demobilised soldiers 39.4% 
Civilian repatriates 27.0% 
Unemployed people 16.1% 




Among these people, Sakhalin repatriates were perhaps relatively familiar with 
the cold climate and the methods of growing crops in northern regions. However, for 
some others, notably migrants from urban areas, Hokkaido was not a hospitable place. 
The island is in a boreal climate (subarctic) zone, and rice and other crops were difficult 
to grow. Among the above 27,000 households, approximately 40 per cent had abandoned 
reclamation farming by 1949.29 
Although Hokkaido was a natural destination for many repatriates, other northern 
prefectures also received repatriates. Between 1947 and 1949, the repatriate populations 
in Aomori and Iwate increased by 62.0% (from 33,031 to 53,501) and by 21.3 % (28,172 
to 34,173) respectively. Reclamation projects in northern prefectures (including 
Hokkaido) absorbed only a fraction of people, however, and it seems likely that returnees 
found new employment in various sectors.30 For example, coal mines were among major 
employers, especially in the immediate postwar period. But many people were employed 
                                               
28 Ibid., 198. The total does not add up to100.0%, but the figures are reproduced from the original. 
29 Ibid., 33. 
30Sengo Kaitakushi Hensan Iinkai, Sengo Kaitakushi 702. Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Kōsei Tōkei 
Geppō (Monthly Bulletin of the Welfare Statistics)."If we compare the total number of civilian 
repatriate household in Hokkaido of 112,000 in November 1949 (See Monthly Bulletin of the Welfare 
Statistics of the Ministry of Health and Welfare) and the number of households of 36,000, which had 
settled in reclamation farmland by 1949 in Hokkaido (Sengo Kaitakushi 1977: 702), it is clear that 
repatriates who became postwar reclamation farmers were the minority.  
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in a temporary and informal manner, and reliable employment statistics for this period 
have yet to be found. 
 
Repatriates in urban areas 
In addition to northern and western regions, urban city centres also became repatriates’ 
new settlement places. As previously mentioned, this process was not rapid in the 
immediate postwar years due to the restrictions on migration to urban regions and the lack 
of housing, imposed by the aforementioned restriction on migration to urban regions 
(Tokaichi Tennyū Yokusei Kinkyūsochi Rei). In December 1946, Tokyo was the only 
urban prefecture in the top ten destinations of repatriates. (See Figure 3-1). However, 
people still continued to pour into urban areas. Between December 1946 and November 
1949, among the top ten prefectures that experienced a large increase of repatriate 
population, five were urban prefectures: Osaka with a 60.8 per cent increase, Tokyo with 
58.0 per cent, Chiba with 26.1 per cent, Kyoto with 24.6 per cent and Hyōgo with 22.5%.  
Repatriates were not the only group of people that moved to urban areas after the 
war. Towards the end of the war, due to material shortages halting manufacturing 
production and the Allied Powers’ air raids targeting Japanese industrial cities, the trend 
of Japan’s pre-war urbanisation was interrupted and many urban residents were evacuated 
to the countryside. Between October 1940 and November 1945, Tokyo lost more than 
50% of its population, Osaka more than 40%, and Kanagawa approximately 15%. After 
the end of the war, the reverse migration to urban areas slowly started as early as in the 
autumn of 1945 and continued for several years. The following graph shows the changes 
in population in the seven largest and most industrialised prefectures (Tokyo, Kanagawa 
which has Yokohama as the capital, Aichi with Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka, Hyōgo with Kobe, 
and Fukuoka), showing the total population including civilian repatriates. The population 
census in 1955 states that the driving forces of domestic migration between 1945 and 
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1950 were evacuees returning to urban regions, while migration after 1955 was the result 
of renewed urbanisation and population outflow from the countryside to urban cities.31   
 




The 1950 census also shows that the repatriate population was more likely to live 
in urban areas33 than the rest of the population. In 1950, 37.2% of non-repatriate Japanese 
lived in urban areas. The distribution of demobilised soldiers was quite similar (37.1%), 
which indicates that many were still young and returned to their homes. Yet, as the 
                                               
31 General Administrative Agency of the Cabinet Statistics Bureau of Japan, Population Census of 1950 
(Tokyo: Statistics Bureau of Japan, General Administrative Agency of the Cabinet, 1955), 40 and 79. 
https://www.e-
stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/GL08020103.do?_toGL08020103_&tclassID=000001026557&cycleCode=0&re
questSender=search. Accessed on 15 November 2016. 
32 Population Census of 1960, vol. 1 (Tokyo: Bureau of Statistics, 1960), 106-07. 
33 Article 8 of the Local Autonomy Law (Chihō Jichitai Hō) of 1947 defines a city as having to have a 
population larger than 50,000 people, more than 60 per cent of whom, including household members, 
are in the secondary and tertiary industry sectors and more than 60 per cent of whom live in central 





7&H_RYAKU=1&H_CTG=1&H_YOMI_GUN=1&H_CTG_GUN=1. Accessed on 10 July 2016. 






















































following table shows, the equivalent figure for civilian repatriates was as high as 44.5%, 
which indicates that many chose to move to urban areas, often within their home 
prefecture. Although it is difficult to clearly understand the reasons for this trend, it would 
be sensible to assume that for those who did not have a place to which they could return, 
urban areas might be easier places to move to due to the availability of job opportunities 
and the scale of available public or low-cost housing.  
 









Urban areas (labelled 
cities in the census) 
44.5% 37.1% 37.3% 37.5% 
Counties 55.5% 62.9% 62.7% 62.5% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
 
 
Kyūshū and western prefectures 
Although many prefectures in western Japan were the first settlement places for 
repatriates, especially for those who were originally from this region, the population 
increase slowed or even declined in these prefectures. For example, out of the seven 
prefectures in Kyūshū Island, only two prefectures (Miyazaki with 20.4 per cent increase 
and Fukuoka with 15.7 per cent increase) experienced a larger repatriate population 
increase than the nation-wide average increase of 14.2 per cent between December 1946 
and November 1949. Nagasaki and Kumamoto even saw the repatriate population 
decrease by 4.6 per cent and 26.8 per cent respectively, though the reasons for this decline 
is not clear.  
                                               
34 Statistics Bureau of Japan, Population Census of 1950 (Final Report), 8, 139. 
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In the early postwar period, Kyūshū was still a relatively undeveloped region. 
Some repatriates might have chosen to search for new places to live and new jobs. In this 
process, Fukuoka, being the biggest industrialised city in the Kyūshū region and having 
major coal mines, attracted a significant number of repatriates. The pull-factors of 
Miyazaki are currently unknown and further research is required to explain the population 
influx. It is unfortunate that prefectures in Kyūshū as well as Hokkaido are slow to 
disclose public documents about repatriates, possibly due to the fact that a large number 
of people were affected by the repatriation problem and repatriates and their family 
members are still living in the region.35 In the next section, the 1950 Population Census 
will be used to identify the general trends in repatriates’ employment five years after the 
war. 
 
Analysis of the population census of 1950 
 
The Population Census of 195036 includes statistics on repatriates: the total population, 
the age distribution, employment statistics (such as the percentage figures of active labour 
force and unemployed people), the sectoral breakdown of repatriates’ occupation and the 
geographical distribution of their residence, in both cities and counties. This is valuable 
information on repatriates’ postwar lives; however, the repatriate population reported in 
the population census is much smaller than the figures reported by the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare in its previously mentioned monthly statistics 37  and the reports on the 
repatriation programme (Hikiage Engo no Kiroku).38 As shown in the following table, the 
                                               
35 Although many repatriates have already passed away, some of their children and other family 
members are still living in the same place. It is possible that local governments are reluctant to 
disclose documents, including the 1956 national survey into repatriates’ postwar lives, which contain 
all the family members’ personal information.  
36 Statistics Bureau of Japan, Population Census of 1950 (Final Report), 8, 147. 
37 Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Kōsei Tōkei Geppō (Monthly Bulletin of the Welfare Statistics)." 
38 Repatriation Relief Bureau, Hikiage Engo No Kiroku. Ministry of Health and Welfare, Zoku Hikiage 
Engo No Kiroku ; Zoku Zoku Hikiage Engo No Kiroku  
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1950 census reports that the number of civilian repatriates on 1 October, 1950 was 
2,617,000. This is much lower than the figure of 3,432,919 reported in November 1949 
in the monthly statistics.39  The figures reported in the 1950 census are reproduced in the 
table below. It should also be noted that the figures appearing in the ‘total’ column seem 
to be incorrect. 
 
Table 3-4: Number of civilian repatriates and repatriated demobilised soldiers as of 1 















Male 1,362,000 1,984,000 3,419,000  40,812,000 
Female 1,255,000 136,000 1,405,000  42,388,000 





3,432,919 3,561,291    
(a) / (b) 82.2% 68.2%    
* Incorrect figures, copied from the original document. 
 
In an attempt to explain this discrepancy, the census states that some repatriates, 
specifically a certain number of demobilised soldiers, did not identify themselves as 
repatriates.42 This is quite likely because repatriates, specifically former soldiers, were 
often criticised for having been active participants in Japanese wartime aggression. War 
crimes and the cruelty of the Japanese military forces were widely reported in news stories. 
                                               
39 "Kōsei Tōkei Geppō (Monthly Bulletin of the Welfare Statistics)." 
40 Statistics Bureau of Japan, Population Census of 1950 (Final Report), 8, 135. 
41 Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Kōsei Tōkei Geppō (Monthly Bulletin of the Welfare Statistics)." 
42 Statistics Bureau of Japan, Population Census of 1950 (Final Report), 8, 135. 
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As the information for the census was collected through an interview, usually by the visit 
of a member of a neighbourhood association, some repatriates may have found it difficult 
to identify themselves as ‘repatriates’ in an interview with their neighbours and may have 
decided not to identify themselves as ‘repatriates.’ This research therefore only uses 
percentage figures obtained from the numbers reported in the census to shed light on 
repatriates’ job experiences. 
 
Ages and labour force participation 
The census reports the distribution of the age of repatriates. As Figure 3-5 shows, the 
proportion of repatriates in the 30s-40s age group was greater than that in the Japanese 
population. As will be shown later in this thesis, many of the repatriates were first 
generation migrants who went overseas to work in the 1930s. At the end of the war, they 















Figure 3-5: Age structure of repatriates43 
 
The percentage figure of employed people (shūgyōsha) in the population older 
than 14 years old, the age group that was regarded as the labour force in the census, was 
also higher among repatriates (77.8 per cent) than in the rest of the population (65.4 per 
cent). The possible reason for the higher percentage figure in the labour force and 
concentration in the 30-40 years age group is that the majority of civilian repatriates went 
to Japan’s overseas territories in the 1930s or early 1940s as adult migrants. Accordingly, 
the number of children and elderly were smaller in the repatriate population. The 
following table shows the overview of the occupational breakdown of repatriates in 1950 
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Table 3-5: Breakdown of employment by sector (population older than 14 years old) from 
the 1950 census.44 
 
Repatriates including 
demobilised soldiers (%) 
Non-repatriate 
Japanese (%) 
Agriculture, forestry and fishery 32.8 49.8 
Manufacturing 17.9 15.8 
Construction 5.9 4.2 
Mining 3.5 1.5 
Transport and communication 8.0 4.8 
Retail and wholesale 12.9 11.0 
Services 9.7 8.5 
Finance and real estate 1.3 1.0 
Public services 7.8 3.5 
Others 0.3 0.1 
Total 100.0 100.0 
 
According to this table, in the 1950s, Japan was still a predominantly agrarian 
country, and approximately half of the Japanese population of working age (those older 
than 14 years old) were in the primary sector, including in agriculture. For repatriates too, 
this sectors was a major destination, however, the proportion of repatriates working in the 
sector was much smaller, at 32.8 percent. Access to land may have caused the difference. 
Moreover, as this research will explore in Chapter 4, it seems likely that the majority of 
repatriates had worked in a non-agricultural sector abroad and may have preferred to work 
in sectors where their skills and experiences were useful. Repatriates who did not enter 
the agricultural sector found employment spread across other sectors. In fact, in all other 
sectors the percentage figures for repatriates were larger than those for the non-repatriate 
Japanese population. Specifically, their concentration is conspicuous in transport and 
                                               
44 Ibid., 137. 
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communications (8% for repatriates versus 4.8% for the rest), in the public sector (7.8% 
versus 3.5%) and mining (3.5% versus 1.5%).  
 It seems likely that the concentration in transport and communications was the 
result of a large number of repatriates working in overseas railway companies such as the 
South Manchuria Railway, and this possibility will be explored further below, making use 
of the database on the four prefectures. The public sector also absorbed a significant 
number of repatriates, perhaps as part of an attempt by the government to reduce 
unemployment. As mentioned in the previous section on Hokkaido prefecture, mining 
had been another major destination for repatriates. During the war, mining facilities did 
not receive sufficient maintenance and production levels declined. After the end of the 
war, coal mines also lost foreign labour (including the forced labourers brought from 
former Japanese territories). In the immediate postwar period, the energy shortage was 
one of the major economic problems, and the government prioritised coal production and 
mobilised labour for the mines. It was therefore quite natural that some repatriates should 
find their first employment after repatriation in coal mines, specifically in Kyūshū and in 
Hokkaido. Many worked in coal mines for a short period, but the census shows that in 
1950, five years after the war, a significant number of repatriates were still employed in 
the mining sector, which was expanding production. 
Retail and wholesale were another destination for many repatriates. Small 
retailing businesses had traditionally been a relatively easy sector to enter. The fact that 
many repatriates found employment in non-agricultural sectors and there were 
concentrations in several sectors, including transport and communications and the public 
sector, is consistent with the findings discussed in later chapters of this thesis. Following 
on from these national-level figures, in the next section, this research will use the 
databases created from the 1956 national survey into repatriates’ postwar lives to analyse 




Chapter 4  
Analysis at the prefectural level: Economic experiences of civilian 
repatriates in Ibaraki, Hiroshima and Kanagawa prefectures  
This chapter analyses the experiences of Japanese civilian repatriates during the wartime 
and the postwar period by using the Japanese government survey into repatriates’ postwar 
lives in 1956.1  As mentioned before, databases have been created from the information 
obtained from the survey forms collected for four prefectures: Ibaraki, Hiroshima, 
Kanagawa and Osaka. As explained in Chapter 2, the number of individual samples in 
each database is 500 for Ibaraki, 621 for Hiroshima and 640 for Kanagawa. For Osaka 
prefecture, the figures are 325 for Takatsuki city and 283 for Sennan county. The 
individual samples for Ibaraki, Hiroshima and Kanagawa have been taken by using the 
random sampling method, and for Takatsuki city and Sennan county, all available survey 
forms have been used. As the survey forms were available only for these two 
municipalities out of 32 in Osaka prefecture in 1956, this research uses the analysis of 
Takatsuki and Sennan to only highlight key points. Most analysis of these two 
municipalities is included at the end of this chapter as an independent section.   
The purpose of this chapter is to understand the general trends of civilian 
repatriates’ occupational changes from the wartime to postwar period. Unless otherwise 
stated, all figures in this chapter have been taken from the database compiled for each 
prefecture. In addition, when a figure for the repatriate population is compared with the 
                                                
1  Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into 
Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)," (1956). Numbers have been calculated from each prefecture’s database 
created for this research. 
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total population in each prefecture, it should be noted that the total population includes 
non-repatriates, demobilised soldiers and civilian repatriates.  
 
The four prefectures chosen for this research: Ibaraki, 
Hiroshima, Kanagawa and Osaka 
The postwar resettlement patterns of civilian repatriates are different in each prefecture, 
as analysed in Chapter 3. Table 4-1 summarises the numbers of returnees, including 
civilian repatriates and demobilised soldiers, in each prefecture chosen for this research 
in October 1947 when official statistics of repatriates and the population census could be 
compared.  It seems likely that patterns of resettlement were largely influenced by the 
characteristics of the prefecture. This section starts with a brief survey of the key 
characteristics of each prefecture, including its location, the size of its population, history 










Table 4-1: Numbers of civilian repatriates and demobilised soldiers in each prefecture 
and their percentage of the total prefectural population (including repatriates) in 



















































*Figures in parentheses show the percentage figures of civilian repatriates (Column a) 
and demobilised soldiers (Column b) in the total prefectural population. 
As we have seen in Chapter 2 and Chapter 3, the majority of civilian repatriates 
arrived in Japan by the end of 1950 (See Figure 1-2). The country was still an agrarian 
society in 1950 and approximately half of the population was in agriculture. Between 
1950 and 1955, economic recovery continued and industrialisation and urbanisation 
accelerated. Table 4-2 shows the sectoral breakdown of Japan and the four chosen 
prefectures for this research. Table 4-2 shows that agriculture was still a major sector in 
Japan and approximately one-third of households were in the sector in 1955, but the 
                                                
2 General Administrative Agency of the Cabinet Statistics Bureau of Japan, Population Census of 1947, 
vol. 2 (Tokyo1948), 5. Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Kōsei Tōkei Geppō (Monthly Bulletin of the 
Welfare Statistics)," (Tokyo: Ministry of Health and Welfare, April 1947 to November 1949). The 
population census of 1947 was completed in 1st October 1947. The figures from Kōsei Tōkei Geppō 
were counted and reported on 30th September 1947. 
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importance of agriculture is much lower in urban prefectures, Kanagawa and Osaka in 
this table.3 
Table 4-2: Share of households in each sector in the 1955 Census (as % of total prefectural 
population)4 
 All Japan Ibaraki Hiroshima Kanagawa Osaka 
Agriculture 29.9 48.5 30.7 11.2 6.9 
Industry 23.4 15.8 21.6 29.8 35.9 
Services 35.9 27.5 36.8 45.1 43.8 
Unemployed 1.6 0.8 1.8 2.9 2.6 
Not in labour force 9.2 7.6 9.0 10.9 10.8 
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 
 
Ibaraki prefecture 
Ibaraki prefecture is located in eastern Japan and is a part of the Kanto region which 
includes Tokyo and Kanagawa. In 1955, the prefecture had a population of 2,064,037 and 
ranked as the 14th largest prefecture in terms of total prefectural population. It was 
traditionally an agricultural prefecture. Although the value of Japan’s national industrial 
production had already surpassed that of agriculture during the First World War, the value 
of agricultural production in Ibaraki was larger than that of the industrial production until 
1935.5 Because Ibaraki is close to the Tokyo metropolitan area, the prefecture had been a 
                                                
3 General Administrative Agency of the Cabinet Statistics Bureau of Japan, Population Census of 1955 
(Tokyo: Statistics Bureau of Japan, General Administrative Agency of the Cabinet, 1956), 42-43. 
4 Ibid., 198-214. 
5 Ibaraki Kenshi Hensan Kindaishi Bukai, Ibarakiken Shiryō: Kindai Tōkei Hen (Mito: Ibaraki Prefectural 
Government, 1967), 202-04. 
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provider of not only rice, but also wheat, soy beans, vegetables and fruits.6 Table 4-2 
confirms the dominance of agriculture in Ibaraki’s economy in the mid-1950s.7 
In Ibaraki, another dominant sector was mining. Coal had been the most important 
product in mining in the late 19th century, but after the turn of the 20th century, copper, 
particularly which was produced at the Hitachi Kōzan mine, became a major product. 
Hitachi, which would become a major electrical company after the Second World War, 
started its operations in 1910 as a maintenance factory attached to the Hitachi copper mine. 
In 1928, the businessman Ayukawa Gisuke took over the mining company (Kuhara 
Kōgyō) and renamed it Nissan (Nihon Sangyō), from which the mining department was 
separated as Nihon Kōgyō in 1929. When Manchukuo started the five-year industrial 
development plan in 1937 to increase the production of armament, aircrafts, automobiles, 
steel, coal, liquid fuel, electricity, as well as to expand agriculture in the region and 
increase in Japanese migrants to Manchuria, Ayukawa was invited to join the project. He 
relocated and restructured Nissan into the Manchurian Industrial Development Company. 
He became the first president of the new company.8   
Ibaraki had another connection with Manchuria. The prefectural capital Mito city 
hosted a training centre for teenage farmers (mostly 16 to 19 years old) who were to be 
sent to Manchuria. Between 1938 and 1945 the school trained 86,530 students who were 
recruited from all prefectures.9 In a three-month programme, the students were taught 
academic subjects including Japanese language, history and geography of Japan and 
Manchuria, the social situation in Manchuria, as well as martial arts and practical 
agricultural techniques. However, despite these connections and the presence of the large 
agriculture sector in Ibaraki, the number of Ibaraki citizens who joined the reclamation 
                                                
6 Ibaraki Kenshi Kenkyūkai, Ibaraki Kenshi (Mito: Ibaraki Kenshi Kankō Iinkai, 1930), 202-07. 
7 Statistics Bureau of Japan, Population Census of 1955, 42-43. 
8 Makio Okabe, Manshūkoku (Tokyo: Kōdansha, 2007), 100-08. 




project in Manchuria was not significant. In fact, Ibaraki prefecture sent approximately 
0.2 per cent of its total population between 1937 and 1939 to Manchuria as reclamation 
farmers, while the equivalent figure for Japan’s population as a whole was 0.5 per cent.10 
A list of the number of reclamation farmers who went to Manchuria from each prefecture 
is included in Appendix.  
For Ibaraki prefecture, it is unfortunate but further relevant information on the 
prefecture’s economic history which could explain the migration and resettlement 
patterns of civilian repatriates, seems not to be available. The major focus of official 
records published by the Ibaraki prefectural government and other documents is on 
politics or activities of political leaders, including the history of Mito-Tokugawa’s 
governance during the Edo period, activities of Mito-born terrorists who opposed the 
foreign policy at the end of the Edo period, and newly introduced political systems after 
the Meiji Restoration or the coup d’état in 1932 caused by the group of terrorists called 
the Blood League (Ketsumeidan) who were based in Ibaraki prefecture.  
In terms of the number of civilian repatriates in the prefecture in the late 1940s, 
in the monthly statistics of the Ministry of Health and Welfare, the number of repatriates 
in Ibaraki in December 1946 was given as 37,326 (1.2 percent of the total repatriate 
population in Japan of 3,007,372) and the prefecture was ranked 29th out of the 46 
destination prefectures. In October 1947, the only time when the number of repatriates 
and the total prefectural population (including repatriates) in each prefecture can be 
compared, the percentage accounted for by civilian repatriates was only 2.2 per cent in 
the prefecture’s total population, as shown in Table 4-1. The prefecture also received a 
large number of demobilised soldiers (4.7 per cent of the prefecture’s total population in 
1947, including repatriates). This implies that although the presence of civilian repatriates 
alone was not significant in the prefecture, the total influx amounting to 6.9 per cent of 
                                                
10 Shinsuke Kobayashi, "Hitobito Wa Naze Manshū He Watattanoka," Minten, no. 30 (2013): 31. 
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the prefecture’s population may have caused short-term and mid-term problems. In 
November 1949, the number of the civilian repatriate population in Ibaraki was 42,214, 
and it was ranked 28th out of 46 prefectures. The rate of increase in the civilian repatriate 
population in Ibaraki between December 1946 and November 1949, therefore, was 13.1 
per cent, which was the 13th largest figure of increase in all prefectures. The increase 
included repatriates who returned between January 1947 and November 1949, as well as 
those who had migrated from other prefectures in Japan after repatriation for various 
reasons, including postwar reclamation widely implemented in the prefecture. 
Hiroshima prefecture 
Hiroshima prefecture is located in western Japan. It had a population of 2,149,044 in 
October 1947, which made it the 12th largest prefecture in terms of population.11 The 
prefecture historically had a high population density in relation to the cultivated areas, 
partly due to the prevalence of the Buddhist faction Jōdo Shinshū which prohibited 
abortion, a traditional means of controlling population, in the pre-modern period. 
Population pressure had led to continuing emigration to neighbouring regions, for 
example to Okayama prefecture, mostly in the form of temporary workers. After the Meiji 
Restoration in 1868, the destinations of Hiroshima migrants gradually expanded to 
include foreign countries, first Hawaii, the Americas and Oceania, and then Taiwan and 
Korea after Japan colonised them in 1895 and 1910 respectively.12 Hiroshima was the 
largest sending prefecture to the United States by 1925 (29.0 per cent of total Japanese 
migrants to the country), the fifth largest to Brazil (6.8 per cent of the total to Brazil) and 
the fourth largest to Taiwan (4.4 per cent).13 Unlike the cases of Ibaraki and Kanagawa, 
                                                
11 Statistics Bureau of Japan, Population Census of 1955, 30. 
12  Hiroshima Prefectural Government, Hiroshimaken Ijūshi (Hiroshima: Hiroshima Prefectural 
Government, 1993), 27, 35-41. Hiroshima Prefectural Archives, Hiroshima Kara Sekai He: Ijūsha No 
Rekishi to Genzai (Hiroshima: Hiroshima Prefectural Archives, 2015). 
https://www.pref.hiroshima.lg.jp/soshiki_file/monjokan/zuroku/iju-zuroku2015.pdf. Accessed on 11 
February 2016. 
13  Yasuo Wakatsuki, Sengo Hikiage No Kiroku (Tokyo: Jiji Tsūshinsha, 1995), 23-24. According to 
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migrants from Hiroshima went overseas early on as settler migrants or temporary 
labourers. Within Hiroshima prefecture, two military bases were located in Hiroshima 
city (the fifth Division of the Army) and Kure city (the Kure Naval District). Military 
industries occupied an important place in the prefecture. 
The prefecture’s capital, Hiroshima city, was attacked with the atomic bomb on 
6th August, 1945. The Hiroshima city government estimated that approximately 350,000 
people were in Hiroshima city that day, and that the atomic attack killed approximately 
140,000, roughly 40 per cent of the number of people who were in the city at the time.14 
If the city’s population of 350,000 in August 1945 is compared with the total prefectural 
population of 1,962,950 as of February 1944, it can be estimated that approximately 17.8 
per cent of the prefecture’s population was living in Hiroshima city. The destruction 
together with the demilitarisation of industries in Hiroshima and Kure cities created 
significant problems for postwar recovery and reconstruction, which may have made the 
influx of repatriates particularly challenging. 
Despite the fact that Hiroshima prefecture had suffered significant destruction, 
Hiroshima’s wartime experience and subsequent postwar problems were not unique. For 
example, many other cities in Japan experienced tremendous damage from American air 
raids during the latter stage of the war, sometimes at similar scales to Hiroshima, and 
wartime industries had to be dissolved or converted to civilian businesses. Moreover, as 
with many other prefectures, Hiroshima prefecture consisted of not only cities but also 
much wider agricultural regions to which an excess population could retreat. Table 4-2 
indicates that Hiroshima prefecture’s sectoral structure was quite similar to that of Japan 
                                                
Wakatsuki, the largest group of the Japanese population in Taiwan in 1935 came from Kagoshima 
prefecture, followed by Kumamoto prefecture and Fukuoka prefecture and Hiroshima prefecture. 
14 Hiroshima City, Genbaku to Heiwa (the Atomic Bomb and Peace) (Hiroshima: Hiroshima City, 2014). 
 http://www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/www/contents/0000000000000/1111638957650/. Accessed on 15 
December 2014. Not all people died on the day of the attack. The death toll of 140,000 was those 
who died between 6th August and 31st December 1945.  
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as a whole in 1955; approximately 30 per cent of household heads were in agriculture, 
22-23 per cent in industries and 36-37 per cent in services. In this sense, Hiroshima 
prefecture can be regarded as fairly typical of the overall Japanese profile. This contrasts 
with the economic structure in the metropolitan areas, such as Kanagawa and Osaka, 
where agriculture was the smallest among the three sectors.  
According to Kōsei Tōkei Geppō,15 the repatriate population in the prefecture in 
December 1946 was estimated to be 101,943 (3.3 per cent of the total repatriate 
population in Japan and the 9th largest destination for repatriates). In October 1947, the 
civilian repatriate population in Hiroshima accounted for 5.8 per cent of the total 
prefectural population including repatriates, as shown in Table 4.1. A further 5.8 per cent 
were demobilised soldiers. This means that more than 11 per cent of the population in the 
Hiroshima prefecture in 1947 were ‘returnees’ from Japan’s overseas territories or battle 
fields. By November 1949, the civilian repatriate population had increased to 113,899, 
which made the prefecture still the ninth largest destination for repatriates. The rate of 
increase in the civilian repatriate population in Hiroshima between December 1946 and 
November 1949 was 11.7 per cent, which was the 15th largest increase out of all 
prefectures.  
Kanagawa prefecture 
Kanagawa prefecture is located in the centre of Japan and is adjacent to Tokyo. Its capital 
is Yokohama city. Throughout modern Japanese history, Kanagawa has been an 
important region for transport and trade; the Tōkaidō Route connecting Edo (renamed 
Tokyo in 1868) and Kyoto (the capital of Japan until 1868) runs through Kanagawa. 
Yokohama Port was opened in 1859 as one of the five treaty ports named in the Treaties 
of Amity and Commerce with the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia and 
                                                
15 Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Kōsei Tōkei Geppō (Monthly Bulletin of the Welfare Statistics)."  
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the Netherlands. One of the major goods traded at Yokohama Port in the 19th century 
was the key export of raw silk. In 1872, the first railway in Japan was completed between 
Tokyo and Yokohama.  
Since around the turn of the 20th century, Yokohama has been, and is still, home 
to numerous other major companies, such as Nihon Kōkan (NKK, renamed JFE Steel in 
2003 when it merged with Kawasaki Steel), Tokyo Gas Corporation, Toshiba and the 
Tokyo Electric Company. During the economic boom brought by the First World War, 
as well as after the Kantō Earthquake in 1923, some other factories moved from Tokyo 
to Yokohama and Kawasaki in Kanagawa prefecture, which became the foundation of 
the Keihin Industrial District spreading from Tokyo to Yokohama city. In 1926, the 
Tsurumi Thermal Power Plant started operations to provide electric power to this region. 
In the 1930s, Yokohama Port became increasingly important as a hub for the sea routes 
to the Americas and Hawaii. During the same period, heavy industries, notably steel, 
shipbuilding, and automobiles, expanded and the development further accelerated in the 
1930s in the context of Japan’s war effort. In 1935, Nissan began automobile 
manufacturing in its factory in Yokohama, and the Yokohama Shipyard of Mitsubishi 
Heavy Industries acquired an existing shipyard in Yokohama city.  
Between 1942 and 1945, the Allied Powers bombed Yokohama city 
approximately 20 times, and the bombing on 29th May 1945 destroyed about 42 per cent 
of the city centre. Residential and commercial areas, as well as railways and government 
offices, were heavily attacked, but damages in the industrial district were relatively 
limited and most production facilities continued business operations. After the end of the 
war, the Allied occupation authorities entered Yokohama city on 30th August 1945. They 
took over a part of the city centre, in addition to approximately 90 per cent of Yokohama 
Port facilities. Yokohama city’s economic recovery was slow during the occupation 
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period, but began to accelerate in the 1950s.16 The foreign trade volume at Yokohama 
Port surpassed the pre-war peak level (recorded in 1937) by 1957.17  
According to Kōsei Tōkei Geppō, 18  the repatriate population in Kanagawa 
prefecture in December 1946 was estimated to be 40,387 (1.3 per cent of the total 
repatriate population in Japan) and the prefecture was only the 27th largest destination 
for repatriates. In October 1947, the percentage figure of the civilian repatriate population 
in Kanagawa accounted for 2.3 per cent of the prefecture’s population, as shown in Table 
4-1. A further 4.0 per cent were demobilised soldiers. This means that the number of 
‘returnees,’ including civilian repatriates and demobilised soldiers, was relatively small, 
compared to Ibaraki and Hiroshima, and only approximately 6.3 per cent of the 
prefecture’s population were ‘returnees’ from Japan’s overseas territories or battlefields. 
The civilian repatriate population increased from 40,387 in December 1946 to 58,613 by 
November 1949 by 45.1 per cent, but the prefecture was still only the 26th largest 
destination for repatriates. However, although the proportion of civilian repatriates in the 
total prefecture’s population was not significant, the rate of increase in the civilian 
repatriate population in Kanagawa between December 1946 and November 1949 was 
21.8 per cent, the 8th largest increase out of all prefectures. It seems likely, therefore, that 
many repatriates joined the wave of urbanisation and industrialisation to capture better 
opportunities in postwar Kanagawa when industrial production in Japan started to grow. 
                                                
16  Yokohama City Government, "Kanagawa Kenkano Kūshū Higai Jōkyō," ed. Yokohamashi 
Shiryōshitsu (Yokohama2000).  
http://www.city.yokohama.lg.jp/somu/org/gyosei/sisi/web-air-raid/images/pdf/65-1.pdf. Accessed 
on 12th February, 2016. Yokohama Customs, Yokohama Kaiki 150 Nen No Rekishi (Yokohama: 
Yokohama Customs, 2006), 46-50. 
 http://www.customs.go.jp/yokohama/history/history150.html. Accessed on 12 February 2016. 
17  Yokohama City Government, Yokohamashi Hōkatsu Gaibu Kansa Hōkokusho, ed. Yokohamashi 
Hōkatsu Gaibu Kansa Hōjin (Yokohama: Yokohama City Government, 2006), 9-10. 
 http://www.city.yokohama.lg.jp/kansa/kekka/pdf/gai18.pdf. Accessed on 12th February 2016. 
18 Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Kōsei Tōkei Geppō (Monthly Bulletin of the Welfare Statistics)."  
 115 
 
This trend might have accelerated especially after the Korean War broke out in June 1950 
and U.S. procurement orders dramatically increased.  
Osaka prefecture 
Osaka is the financial and economic centre of Western Japan. In 1955, the prefecture had 
a population of 4,618,308 and ranked as the third largest prefecture in Japan in terms of 
total population.19 During the Edo period, representatives of each feudal domain brought 
rice which had been collected as tax to Osaka to exchange it for cash, and this had helped 
Osaka to grow as a major financial and economic hub. After the Meiji Restoration, Osaka 
experienced stagnation because the financial system during the Edo period became 
obsolete, but new sectors such as railway transport, banking and cotton spinning and 
weaving started to develop in Osaka prefecture. The textile sector especially became a 
major one and flourished to the extent that Osaka was called the Manchester of the 
Orient.20 The centre of the textile sector was Senboku and Sennan counties,21 the latter of 
which is included in the analysis for this thesis. Takatsuki city, another municipality used 
in this research, had been an agricultural village which mainly produced rice, wheat and 
rapeseeds. As Osaka prefecture industrialised, however, several industrial firms were 
established in Takatsuki due to its convenient location midway between Osaka and Kyoto. 
In 1919, Takatsuki city became the host of two major companies, Japan Cotton Silk 
Spinning (Nihon Ken-men) and Yuasa Battery. Yuasa Battery was a major supplier of 
batteries for submarines to the Japanese Navy and expanded its business to Japan’s 
overseas territories including Manchuria.22 Around the turn of the 20th century, sea routes 
                                                
19 General Administrative Agency of the Cabinet Statistics Bureau of Japan, Population Census of 1955 
(Osaka Prefecture), vol. 5-27 (Tokyo: Statistics Bureau of Japan, General Administrative Agency of the 
Cabinet, 1956), 28-31.  
http://www.e-
stat.go.jp/SG1/estat/GL08020103.do?_toGL08020103_&tclassID=000001026556&cycleCode=0&re
questSender=search. Accessed on 1 February, 2016. 
20 Osaka Shishi Hensanjo, Osaka No Rekishi (Osaka: Sōgensha, 1999), 256-59. 
21 Shigeru Nakajima, Menkōgyō Chiiki No Keisei (Tokyo: Taimeidō, 2002), 62. 
22 Takatsuki City Government, Takatsuki Shishi, vol. 2 (Takatsuki: Takatsuki City Government, 1977), 
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from Osaka to other Asian countries were also opened. Osaka port was one of the major 
ports in Japan’s trade with Asian countries before 1945. For example, 79.9 per cent of 
exports from Osaka in 1937 went to other Asian countries such as Manchuria. Together 
with light industry, heavy industry was also developed in the prefecture, specifically 
during the wartime years. After the war, light industrial sectors, including textiles, 
furniture manufacturing and food processing, as well as heavy industries such as metal, 
machinery and chemical engineering, recovered and thrived.23   
According to Kōsei Tōkei Geppō,24 the repatriate population in Osaka prefecture 
in December 1946 was estimated to be 63,086 (2.1 per cent of the total repatriate 
population in Japan). The prefecture was the 15th largest destinations for repatriates. In 
October 1947, the percentage figure of the civilian repatriate population in Osaka was 2.7 
per cent of the prefecture’s population (including repatriates), as shown in Table 4.1. A 
further 3.2 per cent of the total population were demobilised soldiers. The repatriate 
population rapidly increased to 101,466 by November 1949, which made the prefecture 
the tenth largest destination for repatriates. If the populations of civilian repatriates in 
Osaka prefecture between December 1946 and November 1949 are compared, we find 
that the prefecture experienced the third largest increase among all prefectures, of 60.8 
per cent, following only Hokkaido (133.2 per cent) and Aomori (62.2 per cent). Tokyo 
was behind Osaka, ranking fourth with an increase of 58.0 percent.  
 
                                                
765-76. 
23 Osaka Prefectural Government, Osakafu Tōkeisho (Osaka: Osaka Prefectural Government, 1951). 
24 Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Kōsei Tōkei Geppō (Monthly Bulletin of the Welfare Statistics)."  
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Wartime experiences of civilian repatriates in the database for 
Ibaraki, Hiroshima, Kanagawa and Osaka prefectures 
As discussed in the overview of Hiroshima prefecture, a small group of Japanese people 
started to migrate to other countries only after the 1880s, first to Hawaii. However, it was 
after Japan colonised Taiwan in 1895 and annexed Korea in 1910 the number of emigrants 
started to increase.25 Although it is difficult to know the number of Japanese people living 
outside of Japan between the 1880s and 1945 and their whereabouts because reliable and 
consistent statistics are not available,26  this thesis attempts to show the trend of Japanese 
migrants’ whereabouts at the end of the war. Table 4-3 shows the geographical 
distribution of repatriates’ places of residence in August 1945. The figures contained in 
this table were obtained from the database created from the 1956 survey forms. From 
Table 4-3 we see that the number of individuals living in Manchuria at the end of the war 
was the largest group for each of the prefectures, followed by those who were in China, 
Korea and Sakhalin. The distribution varies by prefecture. In Ibaraki, for example, more 
than half of the 1956 repatriates had been in Manchuria in August 1945. In Hiroshima, 
approximately one-third had returned from Korea and Taiwan. ‘Other regions’ are 
Southeast Asia, islands in the Mandated Territories in South Pacific, the United States 
and Australia. If we compare Ibaraki, Hiroshima and Kanagawa prefectures on which we 
have the most comprehensive data, the largest number from ‘other regions’ in this table 
settled in postwar Kanagawa. In the Kanagawa database, 44 repatriates from ‘other 
regions’ included those from Southeast Asia (22 individuals), the Mandated Territories 
in South Pacific (17 individuals), the United States (2 individuals) and Australia (3 
individuals).  It is particularly noteworthy that out of 17 individuals from South Pacific, 
six were originally from Okinawa prefecture. Both pre-war and wartime, more than half 
                                                
25 Wakatsuki, Sengo Hikiage No Kiroku 16-17. 
26 Wakatsuki estimated the number of Japanese who lived outside of Japan between 1881 and 1942, 
which is included in Appendix of this research.  
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of Japanese migrants to South Pacific were originally from Okinawa. Okinawa became a 
source of migrants in the economic stagnation after the First World War when the price 
of Okinawa’s primary product sugar sharply dropped, and the prefecture’s economy was 
not able to support the residents’ lives.27 In Kanagawa prefecture, there has been a large 
community of people from Okinawa in Tsurumi region in Yokohama city since the 1920s, 
many of whom worked for industrial firms as day labourers in public works projects or 
low skilled labourers in industry in the Keihin Industrial District. After the war, 560,000 
Okinawan repatriates from the South Pacific, Taiwan and Southeast Asia arrived in Uraga 
Port in Kanagawa and some settled in the prefecture where there was already an Okinawa 
community, believing there may be limited prospects in war-devastated Okinawa. 28 The 
Kanagawa sample of individuals supports this settlement pattern.  
For Osaka prefecture, the pattern of wartime region of residence of repatriates is 
similar to that for Kanagawa, but the number of those who returned from Korea were 
larger than that for Kanagawa. For Sennan county, repatriates who returned from ‘other 
regions’ were also significant. Unlike the case of Kanagawa, the largest number were 
repatriated from Southeast Asia, and had worked as merchants or staff members of 
Japanese companies, including textile and trading companies, such as Nichimen 




                                                
27 Isao Tanno, "Senzen Nihon Kigyō No Nanyōguntō Shinshutsu No Rekishi to Senryaku," Kanagawa 
University Kokusai Keiei Ronshū 49 (2015): 33. According to Tanno, the number of Japanese who were 
in South Pacific at the end of the war was approximately 50,000, of which 36,000 were from Okinawa. 
28  Masaaki Aniya, "Sengo Okinawa Ni Okeru Kaigai Hikiage," Okinawa Prefectural Library Shiryō 
Henshūshitsu Kiyō 21 (1996): 10. Ryōsuke  Kurihara, "Little Okinawa No 100 Nen Wo Yomitoku," 




Table 4-3: Repatriates’ wartime region of residence (August 1945) (as % share of all 
repatriates)29 




Ibaraki 53.8% 19.0% 13.4% 7.6% 3.0% 3.2% 100% 
Hiroshima 40.6% 18.5% 27.1% 9.8% 0.5% 3.5% 100% 








42.4% 21.6% 20.8% 7.1% 0.4% 8.1% 100% 
*For Manchuria, China and Korea, the figure for the prefecture which had sent the 
largest proportion of migrants to each of these areas is shaded in grey.  
 
 Regarding the timing of migration, Figure 4-1, 4-2 and 4-3 show the distribution 
of the number of migrants to each region in different periods. The overall time period has 
been divided into three sub-periods: a) the period between 1890 and 1931, the year before 
Manchukuo was established in 1932; b) the period between 1932 and 1940, the year 
before the Pacific War broke out in 1941; and c) the period between 1941 and 1945. 
Individuals who migrated up to and including 1931 can be labelled as colonial settlers.  
 
 
                                                
29  Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into 
Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)." Figures have been calculated from each prefecture’s database created 
for this research. 
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Figure 4-1: Period of migration to each region (share of total number of individuals in 
each prefectural database): Ibaraki prefecture30
 
 
Figure 4-2: Period of migration to each region (share of total number of individuals in 
each prefectural database): Hiroshima prefecture31 
*For actual numbers, please see Appendix (Table 4 in Page 276). 
 
                                                
30 Ibid. Numbers have been calculated from each prefecture’s database created for this research. 
31 Ibid. 


































Figure 4-3: Period of migration to each region (share of total number of individuals in 
each prefectural database): Kanagawa prefecture32
 
*For actual numbers, please see Appendix (Table 5 in Page 277). 
Their major destinations were Korea, Taiwan and Sakhalin and some had lived in 
these regions for decades. In this group, some migrated as a child migrant (identified as 
those who had migrated by the age of 13 years). They tended to spend longer years than 
other repatriates. For example, in the databases for the three prefectures (Ibaraki, 
Kanagawa and Hiroshima), we find that the repatriates who had spent the most years in 
Japan’s overseas territories were a wartime shop owner who had migrated to Korea in 
1895 at the age of seven (Ibaraki), a wartime chinaware shop owner who had migrated to 
Korea in 1890 when he was an 11-month-old baby (Hiroshima), and a restaurant owner 
who had migrated to New York in 1899 at the age of three (Kanagawa). As a traditional 
place of origin of migrants, we find that Hiroshima had the highest number of colonial 
settlers in the database.   
                                                
32 Ibid. 


















However, these long-term settlers were minorities in the repatriate population in 
the database for all of the prefectures. In fact, the majority in each database (79.6 per cent 
in Ibaraki prefecture, 59.7 per cent in Hiroshima prefecture, 71.4 per cent in Kanagawa 
prefecture, as well as 69.4 in Takatsuki city and 72.4 per cent in Sennan county in Osaka 
prefecture) migrated in the period after 1932, when Japan’s aggression accelerated. Some 
individuals migrated even a few months before the end of the war. For example, the last 
repatriates to migrate in each database was a farmer who migrated to Manchuria in April 
1945 at the age of 17 (Ibaraki), a farmer who migrated to Manchuria in April 1945 at the 
age of 20 (Hiroshima), and a wartime female telephone operator who migrated to 
Manchuria in July 1945 at the age of 24 (Kanagawa). 
We should certainly consider the possibility that the number of migrants to Korea 
and Taiwan up to 1931 could have been much larger than the figures shown in the table 
because there might have been short-term settlers, and some colonial settlers would have 
already returned to Japan or died by 1945. However, if we focus on ‘civilian repatriates’, 
those who were outside of Japan on 9th August 1945 as defined by the Ministry of Health 
and Welfare, 33  it is clear that the number of individuals who migrated after 1932 
constituted the majority. 
If we examine the wartime experiences of the civilian repatriates in the database, 
we see that their overall length of overseas residence was less than 15 years, Table 4-4 
summarises the profile of civilian repatriates obtained from each prefecture’s database.  
We see that the average years of overseas residence for the Ibaraki repatriates was the 
shortest at only 10.7 years on average, while the figure for the Hiroshima repatriates was 
the longest. The majority were first generation migrants. In the total civilian repatriate 
population in each prefectural sample, we find that only 5.2 per cent in Ibaraki, 12.9 per 
                                                




cent in Hiroshima and 13.0 per cent in Kanagawa were born outside of Japan or had 
migrated as a child migrant. The figures for the two municipalities in Osaka prefecture 
show similar trends. This suggests that the majority of civilian repatriates would have 
been educated under the Japanese educational system, would have been familiar with 
Japanese culture and had been fluent in Japanese.34 The fact that the majority were first 
generation migrants was more likely to have allowed the repatriates to have maintained 
their networks with people in Japan, which could conceivably have helped the repatriates’ 
postwar resettlement after repatriation.  
Table 4-4: Profiles of civilian repatriates in each prefecture’s database35 
 Average length 
of overseas 
residence (years) 
Percentage of repatriates who had 
emigrated as child migrants (under the age 
of 13) or were born outside of Japan 
Ibaraki 10.7 5.2 % 
Hiroshima 14.2 12.9 % 
Kanagawa 12.5 13.0 % 
Osaka Takatsuki 
city 
12.5 16.6 % 
Osaka Sennan 
county 
11.5 11.0 % 
 
As noted earlier, the popular image of Japanese repatriates has been to some extent 
dominated by that of farmers who had been sent to Manchuria by the Japanese 
government to reduce the population in rural regions in Japan and to develop rural 
agricultural land in Manchuria. However, we find that the agricultural population in 
                                                
34 In colonies, such as Taiwan and Korea, Japanese children were educated under the direction of the 
Ministry of Education. Some other regions, including Manchuria, had independent school systems, 
but were still under the strong influence of the Japanese Ministry of Education.  
35  Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into 
Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)." Figures have been calculated from each prefecture’s database created 
for this research. 
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Japan’s overseas territories, including the immigrant farmers in Manchuria, constituted 
only a minority of the total sample in the database, as shown in Table 4-5.36  
 




















Ibaraki 13.2 % 2.0 % 52.6 % 5.6 % 26.6 % 100% 
Hiroshima 5.2 % 2.6 % 45.9 % 4.0 % 
42.4 % 100% 
Kanagawa 2.0 % 3.4 % 53. 4 % 6.6 % 









3.2% 2.5% 36.4% 15.2% 
42.8% 100% 
Note: SMEs is an abbreviation for small and medium sized enterprises. 
 
For Ibaraki and Hiroshima, the majority of emigrant farmers had migrated to 
Manchuria. The largest number in the Ibaraki and Hiroshima databases went to 
                                                
36 In the database for each prefecture, all those in the sample who had been in the wartime primary 
sectors identified themselves as agricultural farmers, and not as fishermen or other occupations. 
37  Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into 
Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)." Numbers have been calculated from each prefecture’s database created 
for this research. 
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Manchuria between 1937 and 1941 after a policy to send one million agricultural 
households to Manchuria was introduced in 1936 as explained below. Apart from the 
immigrant farmers in Manchuria, the other farmers had mostly been in other regions, for 
example, in Korea, as well as in Taiwan, the Philippines, Canada, the U.S. and Australia. 
They were more like colonial settlers and had spent longer years outside of Japan. Table 
4-6, 4-7 and 4-8 show the different migration patterns of farmers who emigrated to 
Manchuria and other regions.  
Table 4-6 also shows that farmers’ migration to Manchuria had already started 
before in 1936, and 12 individuals participated in the Ibaraki database. In the total for all 
of Japan, the first group of 420 farmers recruited by the government went to Manchuria 
in 1932, and the second group of approximately 500 individuals arrived in 1933.38 Behind 
this early migration, there was a promoter of agrarian migration, Kanji Katō. He believed 
that one of the fundamental problems in Japan’s agriculture was a scarcity of land. In 
Ibaraki, he opened a private school in 192639 to train and educate young students from 
farming families. He first sent a group of his students to Korea as migrant farmers in 
1925.40 His students might have been in the group of individuals in the Ibaraki database 
who had migrated to Manchuria in 1936. Katō continued to promote the plan of the 
reclamation project in Manchuria and successfully persuaded the government to send a 
large number of migrants.41 Partly due to Kato and his collaborator’s lobbying effort, the 
Japanese government created a policy in 1936 of sending one million agricultural 
households to Manchuria. This policy was called Nijūnen Hyakumanko Keikaku (Plan to 
send one million households in the next twenty years). The number of one million 
                                                
38 Sengo Kaitakushi Hensan Iinkai, Sengo Kaitakushi (Tokyo: Zenkoku Kaitaku Nōgyō Kumiai Rengōkai, 
1977), 23. 
39 Nihon Nōgyō Jissen Gakuen, Enkaku (Mito: Nihon Nōgyō Jissen Gakuen, 2016).  
http://www.nnjg04.com/gaiyo/enkaku.html. Accessed on 20 March 2016. 
40 Manshū Kaitakushi Kankōkai, Manshū Kaitakushi (Tokyo: Manshū Kaitakushi Kankōkai, 1966), 36. 
41 Ibid., 36-37. 
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households was decided on in order to make the Japanese population 20 percent of the 
total population of Manchuria by 1956. However, the actual number of Japanese who 
went to Manchuria as reclamation farmers was estimated to be only 270,000.42  
There is no doubt that at the end of the war in 1945, many reclamation famers had 
difficult experiences. Many had been drafted towards the end of the war and lost their 
lives, or were taken to Siberia to be detained for several years after the war. Survivors, 
females, the elderly and children were attacked by the U.S.S.R. military forces and the 
local population in Manchuria, who resented the Japanese for having deprived them of 
their farmland and for harsh treatment towards them. The government estimated that 
90,000 immigrant farmers and family members died during the repatriation and 160,000 
returned to Japan.43 Partly due to their difficult repatriation experiences, which were 
frequently documented in memoirs and were reproduced in television dramas, the 
existence of Manchuria reclamation farmers has become well known to the Japanese 
general public in the post war period, and they have come to symbolize the repatriates.44  
Table 4-8 for Kanagawa once again shows a different migration pattern of farmers. 
In the Kanagawa database, the number of farmers who went to Manchuria was smaller 
than that of those who migrated to other regions. This may reflect the fact that wartime 
Kanagawa sent only 1,588 farmers to Manchuria, the second lowest figure in the 47 
prefectures. (See Appendix). The largest destination for farmers in the Kanagawa 
database was the Mandated Territories in South Pacific as discussed in an earlier section. 
 
 
                                                
42 Sengo Kaitakushi Hensan Iinkai, Sengo Kaitakushi 31. 
43 Ibid. 
44 Since 2010, at least 10 television programmes about the repatriation have been broadcasted, of 
which seven focused on Japanese civilians’ tragic experiences in Manchuria. 
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Table 4-6: Period of migration of settler and reclamation farmers (number of individuals 
in each prefectural database): Ibaraki prefecture45 
 Up to 1936 1937-1941 1942-1945 Total 
Manchuria 12 46 8 66 
Other regions 7 3 0 10 
 
Table 4-7: Period of migration of settler and reclamation farmers (number of individuals 
in each prefectural database): Hiroshima prefecture46 
 Up to 1936 1937-1941 1942-1945 Total 
Manchuria 2 12 18 32 
Other regions 14 1 1 16 
 
Table 4-8: Period of migration of settler and reclamation farmers (number of individuals 
in each prefectural database): Kanagawa prefecture47 
 Up to 1936 1937-1941 1942-1945 Total 
Manchuria 2 9 3 14 
Other regions 14 5 0 19 
 
In addition to farmers, the civilian repatriates in the 1956 databases were 
comprised of various other groups of people: 40 – 50 per cent were in the public sector 
(See Table 4-5), including public corporations specialising in transport, communication 
                                                
45  Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into 
Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)." Figures have been calculated from each prefecture’s database created 





and utilities, of which the most famous example was the South Manchuria Railway 
Company. In addition, approximately five per cent of individuals in each prefectural 
database were working for overseas branches of major Japanese companies. This fact is 
important because their affiliation and networks with the core part of the economy in 
Japan as well as their knowledge of industrial technology or management are likely to 
have helped them with their postwar settlement.  
Other than wartime farmers and individuals affiliated with the public sector and 
major companies, the remainder consisted of owners or employees of small or medium-
sized enterprises (SMEs) in industry or in the tertiary sector. In the SME category in all 
databases except Ibaraki, more than half were in the tertiary sector (66.5 per cent for 
Hiroshima, 58.4 per cent for Kanagawa, 67.3 per cent for Takatsuki city and 62.8 per cent 
for Sennan county in Osaka prefecture) and the rest were SME owners or employees in 
industry, which included small scale manufacturing such as food processing and 
construction companies. By contrast, in the Ibaraki database, more than half of individuals 
in the SME category were in industry (54.1 per cent in the SME group) and worked in 
local coal mines, construction and steel manufacturing, while the rest were in the tertiary 
sector. The reason for this trend for Ibaraki repatriates is not clear. However, it would be 
possible to hypothesise that this may be related to the fact that Ibaraki’s major sector 
included coal and copper mining and people were likely to have accumulated related skills. 
Additionally, the presence of Nissan’s Ayukawa might have encouraged some Ibaraki 
people to migrate to Manchuria and participate in the development of the region. It is 
possible that there was some recruitment effort in Ibaraki to send technicians or engineers 
who could work in Manchuria at various companies including at SMEs, but establishing 
whether or not this was the case will require further research.    
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The lengths of overseas residence of each sectoral or occupational group (farmers, 
people in the public sector, major firm employees and those in SMEs) certainly differed. 
Table 4-9 shows that among these groups, the reclamation farmers had the shortest 
duration of foreign residence because many migrated in the later stages of the war, 
including in the first half of the year of 1945.48 By contrast, the length of overseas 
residence of non-reclamation farmers and those working in SMEs, who accounted for a 
large number of the colonial settlers in Korea and Taiwan, was the longest. These groups 
were also on average older than the other groups in August 1945. This, too, would suggest 
that if the postwar occupational transitions of the wartime reclamation farmers and the 
settler farmers are compared, their different wartime experiences and lengths of stay 
abroad may be expected to lead to differences in their patterns of transition after 
repatriation. However, as will be shown later, there is evidence to suggest that these two 
groups (reclamation farmers and settler farmers) actually experienced similarly difficult 
transitional patterns. Those in the public sector and major firm employees occupied 
something in the middle ground between the above two groups (reclamation farmers in 
Manchuria and colonial settlers), because many had migrated to work for specific 
corporations or for the public sector in the late 1930s.  
 
 
                                                
48 The databases show that one wartime reclamation farmer out of 66 in the Ibaraki database went 
to Manchuria in March 1945. In the Hiroshima database, out of 36 wartime reclamation farmers, 
three individuals went to Manchuria in 1945. One arrived in January and two others arrived in April. 
In the Kanagawa database, two reclamation farmers out of 13 arrived in March 1945. It is not clear 
whether it was the case for these people, but some Japanese people believed that Manchuria was 




Table 4-9: Average age of repatriates as of August 1945, and length of residence in 














30.0  years old 
(6.7 years) 
41.8 years old 
(15.8 years) 
36.8 years old 
(11.1 years) 
34.3 years old 
(10.5 years) 
Hiroshima 
32.7 years old 
(3.7 years) 
42.9 years old 
(23.9 years) 
38.9 years old 
(15.5 years) 
35.5 years old 
(13.6 years) 
Kanagawa 
33.7 years old 
(5.4 years) 
38.7 years old 
(15.0 years) 
37.1 years old 
(12.8 years) 





31.0 years old 
(4.4 years) 
43.5 years old 
(22.3 years) 
36.2 years old 
(13.9 years) 





25.6 years old 
(3.7 years) 
41.1 years old 
(20.7 years) 
37.9 years old 
(13.4 years) 
32.2 years old 
(12.7 years) 
*Please note that figures for Takatsuki and Osaka have been included for reference only. These 
figures should be treated carefully because the numbers of individuals in the primary sector in 
the databases is very small. For example Takatsuki city had only eight repatriate reclamation 
farmers and two settler farmers out of 325 individual samples. Sennan county had nine 
repatriate reclamation farmers and seven settler farmers in the 283 individual samples. 
 
 
By the end of the war, the average civilian repatriate had spent less than 15 years 
outside Japan, and was in his or her mid-30s in August 1945. This means that the majority 
were in the midst of their working life and were ready to re-enter the Japanese postwar 
labour market after their repatriation. As the database findings in Table 4-10 show, by the 
                                                
49 Numbers have been calculated from each prefecture’s database created for this research. 
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end of 1946 approximately 70-80 per cent of repatriates had returned to Japan and started 
looking for ways to re-enter the postwar Japanese labour market.  
Table 4-10: Timing of repatriation50 
 Percentage of repatriates who had been 
repatriated by the end of 1946 
Ibaraki 73.8 % 
Hiroshima 81.6 % 




Osaka (Sennan county) 79.5 % 
 
 This table indicates that the proportion of repatriates who returned after January 
1947 was larger in the Ibaraki database, compared to other prefectures. The reason for 
this is not clear, but if we examine 54 individuals in the Ibaraki database who were able 
to come back only after January 1948, the majority (45 individuals) were living in 
Manchuria during the war, of which 17 individuals were reclamation farmers.51 Many 
individuals in this group might have been taken to Siberia and were detained until after 
January 1948. Nine other repatriates who came back from other regions to postwar Ibaraki 
comprised of four from North Korea, four from Sakhalin and one from China, where 
repatriation was generally delayed under the Soviet and Chinese administrations. In the 
next section, the overall trend of their occupational transitions will be examined. 
 
                                                
50  Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into 
Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)." Figures were taken from the databases created for this research. 
51 The other nine repatriates were living in North Korea (four individuals), Sakhalin (four individuals) 
and China (one individual).  
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Postwar experiences of civilian repatriates 
Postwar settlement and mobility of civilian repatriates 
In contrast to the prevailing images that suggest that repatriates started their postwar lives 
from scratch, many of them at least had a place to return to, although this does not 
necessarily mean that they were welcomed by their families in their hometowns or found 
housing without any problems. After the repatriation, approximately half or more of 
repatriates first settled in their hometowns where they had their family registration 
addresses. In the database drawn from the 1956 survey, we find that 72.8 per cent of 
repatriates in Ibaraki prefecture, 62.6 per cent in Hiroshima prefecture and 48.9 per cent 
in Kanagawa prefecture responded that they had first settled in municipalities where their 
families had been registered (honsekichi).52 The highest percentage figure was in Ibaraki, 
an agricultural prefecture, while Kanagawa, a highly-urbanised prefecture, had the lowest 
figure. This may reflect a situation in which agricultural families were able to absorb 
returnees relatively easily. For Osaka prefecture, the information as to whether repatriates 
first settled in their hometowns or not is not available because the information on their 
registration addresses has been blacked out from the photocopied survey forms obtained 
from the Osaka prefectural archives due to the information protection policy. The 
proportion of individuals who first settled in their hometowns in Hiroshima prefecture 
was midway between the figures for Ibaraki and Kanagawa. The proportion for those 
whose family was registered in Hiroshima city, at 51.0 per cent, is lower than the 
equivalent figure for the total repatriate population in Hiroshima prefecture. This is not 
surprising, because according to the Hiroshima city government, more than 91.9 per cent 
                                                
52 In Japan, each citizen is required to register with a local government office in their hometown to 
give personal information (such as name, names of family members including parents, spouse and 
children, date of birth, and an address where the family was registered). The registration address 
(honsekichi) is not necessarily the place where a family is currently living because it has usually 
remained the same even when the actual living address has changed. But in most cases, it is a place 
closely related to the family in some way. For example, it could be the one where the family is 
originally from. It is worth noting, however, that there is a possibility that some repatriates changed 
their registration address after repatriation for various reasons. 
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of buildings and houses in the city were destroyed or seriously damaged in the atomic 
attack,53 which made it difficult for returnees to go back and settle in Hiroshima city. 
However, it is striking that even so approximately half of the repatriates whose 
registration addresses were in Hiroshima city returned there after the repatriation. Many 
who had no place to settle first lived in repatriate accommodations or barracks.54 The 
destruction of Hiroshima city might initially have retarded the settlement of repatriates, 
but the significant death toll could also have meant more job opportunities in the city for 
survivors and repatriates. It is tempting to hypothesise that the influx of more than 
110,000 repatriates may have helped to fill some of the positions previously held by the 
140,000 dead55 in the city, and this may be partly true. However, repatriates actually 
settled in various parts of the prefecture, and it is difficult to gauge the employment 
situation during the immediate postwar period due to the limited availability of statistics 






                                                




765O0BFDIVEMNF05U8E899FCTASV7S7ISKQ0UH7G2000M4000000.heiwadb_001. Accessed on 20 
September 2015. 
54  Hiroshima Prefectural Government, Hiroshimaken Sensaishi (Hiroshima: Hiroshima Prefectural 
Government, 1988), 522-23. 
55 Hiroshima City Government, "Shishasū Ni Tsuite," Hiroshima City Government. 
http://www.city.hiroshima.lg.jp/www/contents/1111638957650/index.html. 
Accessed on 3 March 2016. 
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Table 4-11: Repatriates’ first addresses in postwar Japan and geographical mobility 
(between the time of repatriation and 1956. Figures are the number in the sample out of 
the total number of repatriates in the database).56 
 First 
settlement 

































































N/A  N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
Table 4-11 clearly shows that out of the prefectures examined in this research, the 
early postwar mobility was lowest in Ibaraki and highest in Kanagawa. It seems likely 
                                                
56  Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into 
Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)." Figures have been calculated from each prefecture’s database created 
for this research. 
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that the high proportion of repatriates staying in their hometowns in 1956 was due in part 
to the prominence of agriculture in Ibaraki, but it may also have been associated with 
other opportunities. By contrast, the majority of repatriates living in Kanagawa in 1956 
had moved into the prefecture from other places, and it seems likely that this was mainly 
due to the availability of economic prospects in growing industries. If we analyse postwar 
occupations of those who had migrated from other prefectures, it would be possible to see 
some of pull factors in each prefecture. For example, in the Ibaraki database, 119 
individuals out of 500 total individual samples had moved into Ibaraki between the time 
of their repatriation and 1956. The largest number (36 individuals) were in agriculture, 
including postwar reclamation. The second largest group (22 individuals) were in mining, 
of which 18 had wartime experiences in mining or other industrial sectors. 
Aforementioned mining company Nihon Kōgyō in Hitachi city employed seven 
repatriates who had worked for the SMR, the Manchuria Steel or other companies in the 
industrial sector.  It is also interesting to note that out of 34 repatriates living in Hitachi 
city, who are included in the Ibaraki database, half (17 individuals) were affiliated with 
the Hitachi group, of which ten were migrated from other prefectures. The third largest 
group were in the tertiary sector (18 individuals), mostly as independent retailers.   
On the other hand, in the highly-urbanised Kanagawa prefecture, possible pull-
factors seem to be different. In Kanagawa, 58.4 per cent of individual samples in the 
database had migrated from other prefectures. Both industry and the tertiary sector (retail 
and services) absorbed roughly 30 per cent of new comers, and the public sector became 
a destination for another 23 per cent. In the tertiary sector, the majority (approximately 
80 per cent) of newcomers became employed mostly by SMEs and only 20 per cent were 
self-employed, possibly reflecting the development of the tertiary sector.  
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In addition to this kind of pull factor, it seems likely that Kanagawa may have 
attracted individuals from other prefectures, specifically those who did not have 
hometowns to return to or had only weak family connections. The fact that among the 
prefectures chosen for this research, the proportion of repatriates who had initially settled 
in their hometowns (and stayed there) was the lowest in the Kanagawa database, and that 
the proportion of repatriates who had been born outside of Japan or emigrated as child 
migrants was the highest in the Kanagawa database, at 13.0 per cent, (see Table 4-4) may 
also support this hypothesis. 
 
Occupational transitions of civilian repatriates  
The 1956 national survey also required that repatriates include information on their 
current employment. Table 4-12, 4-13 and 4-14 compares repatriates’ postwar 
occupational sectors with the profile of the total population (including civilian repatriates) 
in each prefecture in the 1955 population census.57 Again the occupational breakdown is 
drawn from the database for the selected prefectures. For both the repatriates and the total 
prefectural population the figures are for household heads. The most notable 
characteristic in the data presented in this table is that although Japan was still an agrarian 
society, the proportion of civilian repatriates who were in the primary sector in the mid-
1950s was much smaller compared to that in the total population (including civilian 
repatriates) in the selected prefectures. Out of the three prefectures, the proportion of 
civilian repatriates in the primary sector in 1956 was the highest in Ibaraki, at 27.6 per 
cent, but this figure was much lower than the primary sector proportion for the total 
population of Ibaraki in 1955. In Kanagawa prefecture, only 2.5 per cent of civilian 
                                                
57 Ibid. 
General Administrative Agency of the Cabinet Statistics Bureau of Japan, Population Census of 1955 
(Hiroshima Prefecture), vol. 5-34 (Tokyo: Statistics Bureau of Japan, General Administrative Agency of 
the Cabinet, 1956), 22. 
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repatriates in the database were in the primary sector, while 11.2 per cent of the total 
population of Kanagawa prefecture was in the primary sector in 1955.  
If the proportion of individuals in the public sector is compared, we see that a 
much higher proportion of civilian repatriates was in the public sector than was the case 
with the prefectural populations (including repatriates) as a whole in all of the prefectures. 
This is consistent with the data published in the 1950 census (see Table 3-5). It should be 
noted that medical doctors were categorised in the database as working in the public 
sector, because either a majority, or close to half of them, depending on the prefecture, 
had worked for public or semi-public hospitals including university hospitals or Red 
Cross hospitals during the wartime. Because in the national population census, medical 
doctors were categorised differently as being in the tertiary sector, this may raise some 
questions about the comparison. However, as the number of medical doctors in each 
prefecture’s database is relatively small, this is unlikely to be a significant problem for 
this research.58  
The figures for other sectors, including industry, as well as transport, 
communications and utilities, do not show significant differences between the civilian 
repatriate population and prefectural population as a whole. However, a larger proportion 
of repatriates in the sample tended to be unemployed than was the case for the total 
prefectural population. The unemployment figures for the civilian repatriates should be 
treated with some caution, because some of the individuals who are categorised as 
unemployed in this research may have been out of the labour force, for example due to 
retirement or due to physical disability or illness, rather than unemployed while they were 
still of working age (between 15 and 60 years old).  
 
                                                
58 The number of medical professionals in the Ibaraki database is seven in the 500 individual samples, 
that in the Hiroshima database 14 out of 621 and that in the Kanagawa database 16 out of 640. 
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Table 4-12: Postwar sectors of occupation of repatriate household heads compared to 




Total prefectural population 
including repatriates (1955) 
Primary sector 27.6 % 48.5 % 
Industries 17.4 % 15.8 % 
Transport, communications, 
utilities 
5.2 % 4.1 % 
Public sector 20.6 % 3.5 % 
Tertiary sector 19.4 % 19.9 % 
Others 1.0 % 0.0 % 
Unemployed 7.4 % 1.8 % 
Not in labour force 1.4 % 7.6 % 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
* Sectors where the figures for 1955 and 1956 differ by a factor of more than 1.5 are 






                                                
59  Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into 
Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)." Numbers have been calculated from each prefecture’s database created 
for this research. General Administrative Agency of the Cabinet Statistics Bureau of Japan, Population 
Census of 1955 (Ibaraki Prefecture), vol. 5-8 (Tokyo: Statistics Bureau of Japan, General Administrative 
Agency of the Cabinet, 1956), 22. 
Population Census of 1955 (Hiroshima Prefecture), 5-34 22. 
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Table 4-13: Postwar sectors of occupation of repatriate household heads compared to 




Total prefectural population 
including repatriates (1955) 
Primary sector 9.7% 30.7% 




Public sector 20.1% 5.7% 
Tertiary sector 26.7% 23.6% 
Others 0.8% 0.0% 
Unemployed 3.7% 1.8% 
Not in labour force 7.9% 9.0% 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
* Sectors where the figures for 1955 and 1956 differ by a factor of more than 1.5 are 








                                                
60  Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into 
Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)." Numbers have been calculated from each prefecture’s database created 




Table 4-14: Postwar sectors of occupation of repatriate household heads compared to 




Total prefectural population 
including repatriates (1955) 
Primary sector 2.5 % 11.2 % 
Industries 23.9 % 29.8 % 
Transport, communications, 
utilities 
11.9 % 9.5 % 
Public sector 23.1 % 4.1 % 
Tertiary sector 21.3 % 31.5 % 
Others 1.9 % 0.0% 
Unemployed 6.1 % 2.9 % 
Not in labour force 9.4 % 10.9 % 
Total 100.0% 100.0% 
* Sectors where the figures for 1955 and 1956 differ by a factor of more than 1.5 are 
shaded in grey. 
 
Tables 4-12, 4-13 and 4-14 show several interesting patterns of the repatriates’ 
resettlement. First of all, the size of agriculture and its importance in the resettlement of 
repatriates differed in each prefecture. Table 4-12 shows that in Ibaraki prefecture, 
agriculture was the major sector in the mid-1950s and approximately half of household 
heads in the prefecture’s total population (including repatriates) were in agriculture. For 
repatriates in Ibaraki, agriculture was an important destination. In Hiroshima and 
                                                
61  Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into 
Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)." Numbers have been calculated from each prefecture’s database created 
for this research. General Administrative Agency of the Cabinet Statistics Bureau of Japan, Population 
Census of 1955 (Kanagawa Prefecture), vol. 5-14 (Tokyo: Statistics Bureau of Japan, General 
Administrative Agency of the Cabinet, 1956), 22. 
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Kanagawa, agriculture was smaller in size compared to Ibaraki. In the database for 
Hiroshima, roughly 10 per cent of repatriates were in agriculture, and the figure was much 
lower in Kanagawa at 2.5 per cent.  
In addition, these tables show that the public sector employed a much larger 
proportion of repatriates compared to the total prefectural population in all three 
prefectures. In terms of the proportion, six times more repatriate household heads in the 
Ibaraki database in 1956 were in the public sector, compared to the total prefectural 
population in 1955. In the Hiroshima and Kanagawa databases, the figures were 3.5 times 
and 5.6 times larger for repatriates, compared to those for the total population. In addition 
to the public sector, the tertiary sector was another major destination in each prefecture. 
In the databases of Ibaraki and Hiroshima, the proportions of repatriate household heads 
in the tertiary sector were approximately the same as those of the total prefectural 
population. For the Kanagawa database, however, the proportion of repatriate household 
heads in the tertiary sector was smaller than that of the total prefectural population. 
Instead of the tertiary sector, it seems that the public sector and the transport, 
communications and utilities sector were large destinations for repatriates in Kanagawa. 
For all three prefectures, industrial sectors also became important destinations for 
repatriates. In the databases for Ibaraki and Hiroshima, the proportion of repatriates is 
approximately the same as that of the total prefectural population in industry. In 
Kanagawa, by contrast, the proportion of repatriates in industry was smaller than that of 
the total prefectural population.  
In order to understand the patterns of repatriates’ occupational transitions further, 
Tables 4-15, 4-16 and 4-17 summarise the patterns of civilian repatriates’ occupational 
changes in each sector in a matrix. Again, the figures were calculated from each 
prefecture’s database. The numbers in the table show the number of individuals in the 
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database with the total sample size of 500 for Ibaraki prefecture, 621 for Hiroshima 
prefecture and 640 for Kanagawa prefecture. According to this table, 42.0 per cent of the 
repatriate population in Ibaraki, 43.8 per cent in Hiroshima and 37.7 per cent in Kanagawa 
returned to work in the same sectors as they had worked in during the war. However, this 
does not necessarily mean that they were able to take up the same occupations or were 
able to return to firms which occupied similar positions in the market in terms of size, 
market share and status as their wartime employers. The proportion of repatriates who 
were able to return to the same sector appears to have been different in each sector. For 
example, approximately half of government officials and half of individuals in the tertiary 
sector in each prefecture’s sample were able to return to the same sector after the war. In 
addition to these individuals, 75.0 per cent of wartime farmers in Ibaraki, and 
approximately half of those who were in wartime industry in the Hiroshima and 
Kanagawa databases, returned to postwar industry, but they often moved to other sectors 
within industry. By contrast, only a minority of the repatriates who had worked in 
transport, communications and utilities in all of the prefectures, and a minority of the 
wartime farmers in the Hiroshima and Kanagawa databases, returned to the same sector.  
As explained earlier in the methodology section, those who were unemployed 
during the wartime have been omitted from this analysis, because such people could not 
constitute necessary information for any analysis of repatriates’ occupational transitions.  
In addition, in the sample in the database, there was no individual who responded that he 
had been a day labourer during the wartime. This was perhaps because Japanese people 
were more likely to take up skilled jobs in the country’s overseas territories, while other 
nationals were relegated to the lower echelons of the labour market to do unskilled jobs.62 
This trend seems to have increased towards the end of the war because young Japanese 
                                                
62 Hikiagesha Dantai Zenkoku Rengō Kai, "Minshu Kakumei to Hikiagesha: Hikiagesha Seikatsu Jittai 
Chōsa," (Tokyo: Hikiagesha Dantai Zenkoku Rengō Kai, 1947), 32. 
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men were mobilized into the armed forces, which caused a labour shortage in Japan’s 
overseas territories, as well as in Japan. 63  For this reason, day labouring and 
unemployment have been considered only for the postwar period. It should be also noted 
that for the primary sector, industry and the tertiary sector, even though the figures did 
not change to a great degree, the nature of the participants significantly changed, as will 
be examined later in this section. By 1956, there were a number who were no longer in 
the labour force, for various reasons; some had already retired ten years after the war, 
while some young female repatriates, for example those who had been wartime school 
teachers, nurses and telephone operators, might have gotten married and stopped working. 
Some others experienced a difficult transition and were unemployed in 1956 even though 
they were still of working age or became day labourers. This indicates that repatriates are 








                                                
63 Hiroyuki Amano, Mantetsu Wo Shirutameno 12 Shō (Tokyo: Yoshikawa Kōbunkan, 2009), 178. 
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Table 4-15: Postwar occupational transitions of civilian repatriates: Ibaraki prefecture64 
 (Figures are the number in the sample out of the total number of repatriates in the database)   
 
(Figures are the number in the sample out of the total number of repatriates in the database)   



















Agriculture 57 4 1 4 6 4 0 76 15.2% 
Mining, construction, 
manufacturing 




22 12 19 16 28 13 2 112 22.4% 
Public sector 22 11  65 25 12 3 138 27.6% 
Tertiary sector 9 10 1 7 28 8 1 64 12.8% 
Postwar total 138 78 24 103 104 46 7 500 100% 




                                                
64 Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)." Numbers have been calculated from each 
prefecture’s database created for this research. 
 145 
 
Table 4-16: Postwar occupational transitions of civilian repatriates: Hiroshima prefecture65 























Agriculture 15 7 1 3 13 7 2 48 7.7% 
Mining, construction, 
manufacturing 




13 28 29 20 17 6 9 122 19.6% 
Public sector 9 10 6 76 26 6 8 141 22.7% 
Tertiary sector 14 26  10 92 11 22 175 28.2% 
Postwar total 60 131 40 125 178 38 49 621 100% 








Table 4-17: Postwar occupational transitions of civilian repatriates: Kanagawa prefecture66 
(Figures are the number in the sample out of the total number of repatriates in the database)   






















Agriculture 7 4  3 6 7 6 33 7.7% 
Mining, construction, 
manufacturing 




4 43 34 49 44 9 9 192 19.6% 
Public sector 1 11 8 67 23 8 14 132 22.7% 
Tertiary sector 3 20 1 13 63 12 22 134 28.2% 
  Postwar total 16 148 48 151 168 48 60 640 100% 
Postwar total (%) 2.5% 23.1% 7.5% 23.6% 26.3% 7.5% 9.4%   
 
 




Before moving to a detailed analysis of each sector, it is worth examining 
repatriates’ wartime (as of August 1945) and postwar sectors of occupation (as of June 
1956) taken from each prefecture’s survey forms so as to provide an overview of the 
major trends in their postwar transitions. Table 4-18, 4-19 and 4-20 summarises the 
changes in the proportions of repatriates’ employment in each sector. It confirms that 
between 1945 and 1956, the largest change was a reduction in the proportion of 
repatriates working in transport, communications and utilities, reflecting the fact that 
public corporations in this sector had occupied an important position in the Japanese 
empire and employed a significant number of individuals until the end of the war. We 
also see that employment in the public sector declined in Ibaraki and Hiroshima, to a 
lesser degree, but slightly increased in Kanagawa. In postwar Ibaraki, both the primary 
sector and the tertiary sector became important destinations for repatriates. In 












Table 4-18: Repatriates’ wartime and postwar sectors of occupation (number of 






Changes in the 
sector 
Primary sector 76 138 +62 
Industries 110 78 -32 
Transport, communications, 
utilities 
112 24 -88 
Public sector 138 103 -35 
Tertiary sector 64 104 +40 
Day labourers or unemployed 0 46 +46 
Not in labour force 0 7 +7 
Total 500 500  
  
Table 4-19: Repatriates’ wartime and postwar sectors of occupation (number of 








Primary sector 48 60 +12 
Industries 135 131 -4 
Transport, communications, 
utilities 
122 40 -82 
Public sector 141 125 -16 
Tertiary sector 175 178 +3 
Day labourers or unemployed 0 38 +38 
Not in labour force 0 49 +49 
Total 621 621  
                                                




Table 4-20: Repatriates’ wartime and postwar sectors of occupation (number of 








Primary sector 33 16 -17 
Industries 148 148 0 
Transport, communications, 
utilities 
192 48 -144 
Public sector 132 151 19 
Tertiary sector 134 168 34 
Day labourers or unemployed 0 48 48 
Not in labour force 0 60 60 
Total 640 640  
 
When repatriates started looking for postwar employment, for the majority, 
returning to the same employer or finding similar jobs to their wartime ones seems to 
have been the favourite option. As I will show in the next section, some public 
corporations and government agencies did reemploy some of their repatriate staff 
members. In the next section, this chapter analyses the trends of repatriates’ 
occupational transitions. I will look first at trends in the primary sector, and then 
discuss the reemployment policies of some public corporations and private companies. 
I will then consider the government’s hiring policies, skilled employment in the 





The primary sector 
As previously mentioned, there were two types of wartime farmers in Japan’s 
overseas territories. The first group consisted of settlers who had migrated to Korea, 
Taiwan, China, the Philippines, the United States, Canada, and Australia, mostly 
before the year 1931, and who had spent decades in these regions. The other group 
comprised of reclamation farmers who had migrated to Manchuria. As Table 4-9 in 
the previous section showed, the former group had spent longer periods in the regions 
where they had been during the war and were much older, in comparison with the 
reclamation farmers who had migrated to Manchuria mostly from the 1930s. The 
analysis of my database indicates that despite these differences, these two groups 
experienced similar difficult transitional patterns.  
It was perhaps a natural option for some settler farmers and reclamation 
farmers to return to the agriculture sector in the postwar period, especially for wartime 
farmers who returned to Ibaraki. If we look at Table 4-15, 4-16 and 4-17, however, it 
seems that Ibaraki’s case was exceptional. Only a small number of wartime farmers 
included in the Hiroshima and Kanagawa databases were able to return to agriculture 
after the war. Possible reasons for the difficulties faced by repatriate farmers in 
Hiroshima and Kanagawa in returning to the primary sector may include the fact that 
many of these wartime farmers had sold their land in Japan before they emigrated, or 
had never owned land in the country, having been either tenants or the younger 
children of farmers who had not been entitled to inherit the family land. 68  For these 
                                                
68  Manshū Kaitakushi Kankōkai, Manshū Kaitakushi, 36. One reason that the Japanese 
government and leaders in the primary sector promoted the reclamation in Manchuria was the 
fact that younger sons in farming families in Japan were not entitled to inherit the family land and 
their unemployment was perceived as a major problem in the primary sector. 
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people, returning to postwar agriculture would have been a difficult option even if they 
had been in farming during the war.  
In the case of Ibaraki, only one-third of postwar farmers in 1956 were engaged 
in farming in their hometowns and the remaining two-thirds were engaged in farming 
outside of their hometowns within Ibaraki prefecture or had moved from other 
prefectures after the repatriation. This is true for all the prefectures in the database, 
and 12 out of 60 postwar farmers in Hiroshima and 6 out of 16 in Kanagawa were 
living outside of their hometowns. Some may have been engaged in family farming 
with their relatives or spouses’ families. 
According to one account of the history of the reclamation in Manchuria, 
roughly half of the survived wartime reclamation farmers were re-engaged in postwar 
reclamation projects in Japan, 69  which was introduced by the government in 
December 1945 to absorb displaced people and to increase food production.70 When 
the government survey into repatriates’ postwar lives was conducted in 1956, the 
number of households in the reclamation project had reached a peak of 141,072.71 The 
government started to reduce the amount of reclamation farmland by closing non-
profitable projects after 1957.72 Given the fact that a large scale postwar reclamation 
project was implemented in Ibaraki prefecture,73 it would be reasonable to assume that 
                                                
69 Ibid., 769. 
70 Sengo Kaitakushi Hensan Iinkai, Sengo Kaitakushi 70-72. 
71 Ibid., 776. 
72  Hokkaido Regional Development Bureau, "Hokkaidō Kaihatsukyoku No Ayumi 60 Nen." 
http://www.hkd.mlit.go.jp/topics/archives/60-3/06.pdf. Accessed on 13 March 2016. 
73  Sengo Kaitakushi Hensan Iinkai, Sengo Kaitakushi 706-07, 76. In terms of the land areas used 
for the reclamation projects, if we exclude the northern prefectures in the Tōhoku region, Ibaraki’s 
was the fourth largest in Japan’s main island (Honshū), following Nagano, Niigata and Tochigi. In 
1954, Ibaraki was home for 5,200 reclamation farm households. This was 3.7 per cent of the total 
reclamation household in Japan that year.  
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the majority of those who were farming outside of their hometowns were involved in 
postwar reclamation projects. 
However, it seems likely that not all postwar farmers involved in reclamation 
indicated in the 1956 survey that they were involved in the reclamation projects, and 
it is not possible to know how many were actually in reclamation. For example, out of 
138 individuals in agriculture in the Ibaraki database, 38 had moved into Ibaraki from 
other prefectures by 1956. The 38 included 14 former reclamation farmers in 
Manchuria. Given the fact that approximately half of wartime reclamation farmers 
were reengaged in postwar reclamation projects, it would seem reasonable to suggest 
that many had moved into Ibaraki to participate in the reclamation. However, out of 
38 farmers in Ibaraki, only four individuals specified in the survey form that they were 
in the reclamation. 
Table 4-21 shows the occupational transitions of wartime farmers into other 
sectors in the postwar period. The number in the individual samples is small, and needs 
to be treated cautiously, but it is still possible to identify some trends. Other than the 
agricultural sector, it appears that the tertiary sector also became a major destination 
for repatriate farmers, and a number became independent retailers or service 
providers.74  Examples of these small businesses in the database are fishmongers, food 
shops, fashion stores, a flower shop, confectioners, cleaning shops, and house painters, 
to name but some. 
 
                                                
74 Although the majority of wartime farmers who entered the tertiary sector in the post-war 
period found employment in SMEs, there is one exception in the Hiroshima database; an 
individual who was working for the Chiyoda Mutual Life Insurance Company. 
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Table 4-21: Postwar occupational transitions of wartime farmers75 






















Total 66 10 32 16 14 19 
 
Postwar  








s and transport 
5 0 3 1 2 1 
Tertiary sector 
including 
finance and real 
estate 





3 1 5 2 2 5 
Out of labour 
force 
0 0 0 2 1 5 
                                                
75 Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into 
Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)." Figures have been calculated from each prefecture’s database 




For repatriate farmers who did not enter the postwar agriculture or tertiary 
sector, entering other sectors seems to have posed further difficulties. When we look 
at the repatriate farmer population in each prefecture’s database, it is apparent that the 
proportion who entered the public sector in the years after the war was much smaller 
than was the case for the civilian repatriate population in the database as a whole. 
Among those who entered employment in manufacturing, here too the majority found 
employment at SMEs, rather than with major industrial firms. The exception was six 
individuals out of the 48 repatriate farmers in the Hiroshima database, who obtained 
employment at major firms as factory workers, half of them working for textile firms 
such as Teijin. None of the wartime farmers in the Ibaraki and Kanagawa databases 
were working for major industrial firms in 1956. Moreover, although this should be 
treated carefully because the number of relevant individuals in the sample is small, the 
proportion of wartime farmers who ended up as postwar labourers or unemployed 
seems to have been particularly high for the repatriate farmers in the Hiroshima and 
Kanagawa databases compared to the proportion for the repatriate population in these 
prefectures as a whole, and this may also suggest the difficult transition that they 
encountered. 
In the Kanagawa database, it is particularly striking that out of 33 wartime 
farmers, nine had been repatriated from the primary sector in the Mandated territories 
(under the League of Nations) in the Pacific Islands. They were not long-term settlers 
and the individual who had spent the longest time period outside Japan was a farmer 
in Tinian who had migrated from Okinawa in 1931 and lived there until 1945 when 
he turned 34 years old. Even though they may have settled in the highly-industrialised 
Kanagawa of the postwar period, finding secure employment appears to have been 
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challenging for the repatriate farmers who returned from the South Pacific. Out of the 
nine repatriate farmers from the region in the Kanagawa database, three entered the 
agricultural sector, two became day labourers, and two became unemployed, while the 
other two were already out of the labour force. These examples suggest that the 
postwar transition was far from smooth for these people. Moreover, for those who 
were originally from Okinawa, the cultural differences between mainland Japan and 
Okinawa may have made their transitions even more challenging.76  
Table 4-15, 4-16 and 4-17 shows that in addition to wartime farmers the 
postwar agricultural sector also became an important destination for some repatriates 
who had formerly been in sectors other than agriculture. If we compare the proportion 
of individuals working in the agricultural sector at the end of the war outside of Japan 
and that in the 1956 database, it is apparent that there was a significant increase in that 
proportion among the civilian repatriate population in Ibaraki prefecture. Hiroshima 
and Kanagawa prefectures experienced a small increase and a decrease respectively. 
The makeup of the participants in the sector also changed between 1945 and 1956, as 
postwar agriculture became one of the major destinations for new entrants. Table 4-
22 compares the proportion of new entrants in each postwar sector, and shows that the 
agricultural sector had either the highest (Hiroshima) or the second highest proportion 
(Ibaraki and Kanagawa) of new entrants, followed by industry or the tertiary sector. 
The new entrants to the postwar primary sector included repatriates from various 
wartime sectors, such as the tertiary sector, transport and communications, utilities, 
public offices and industry.  
                                                
76 Kurihara, "Little Okinawa No 100 Nen Wo Yomitoku," 15. 
 156 
 
It is not possible to know the reasons why some individuals decided postwar 
to enter the primary sector rather than other sectors where they might have 
accumulated a degree of experience during the wartime years. One possible 
explanation might be the presence of family in Japan, who were already engaged in 
agriculture in the place of their formal registration address. As previously mentioned, 
many repatriates first settled in their hometowns. It is not clear how many were 
actually engaged in family agriculture in the early postwar period; however, in the 
1956 repatriate survey, we find that 18.2 per cent of repatriates (91 individuals) in the 
Ibaraki database, 8.2 per cent in the Hiroshima database (51 individuals), and 1.6 per 
cent (10 individuals) in the Kanagawa database were still in agriculture in their 
hometowns. These relatively large numbers, especially in the samples for Ibaraki and 
Hiroshima, suggest that the presence of family in agricultural regions may have been 
one of the reasons why so many were recorded as being in the agricultural sector in 















Table 4-22: New entrants in each postwar sector as a percentage of total repatriates 
in the sector (prefectural databases)77 
Sector 
Postwar new entrants (%) in the total population in each 
sector/occupational group 
 Ibaraki Hiroshima Kanagawa 
Primary sector 58.7 75.0 56.3 









Tertiary sector 74.0 52.6 68.8 
Public sector 36.9 39.2 55.6 
*Sectors where the figures are larger than 60 per cent are shaded in grey. 
In summary, it is clear that only a portion of wartime farmers, both settlers and 
Manchuria reclamation farmers, were able to return to the agricultural sector.  
However, the postwar primary sector became an important destination for those who 
had access to family or reclamation land in postwar Japan, and this was specifically 
true for new entrants who had worked in non-agricultural sectors during the wartime. 
Although the number of repatriates engaged in farming in 1956 was not necessarily 
numerically significant especially in Hiroshima and Kanagawa, and many wartime 
farmers were not able to return to the sector, the evidence collected here suggests that 
the role of the postwar primary sector in absorbing a significant number of repatriates, 
particularly from other occupational sectors, should not be discounted.  
                                                
77 Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into 
Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)." Figures were taken from the database, created for this research. 
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Reemployment by wartime companies 
Repatriates who did not enter the postwar agricultural sector spread across to other 
sectors. When repatriates considered new jobs, it seems likely that the most favoured 
option for the majority was to return to the same job, and if possible to the same 
employers as they had worked for during the war. Some large private companies and 
public corporations offered such opportunities to a small number of repatriates, and it 
seems this was still an important option, especially in industrialised areas such as 
Kanagawa. In the sample of 640 individuals in the Kanagawa database, we find that 
49 individuals (7.6 per cent) were able to return to their wartime employers or related 
companies. The equivalent figure in the Hiroshima database is 35 individuals (5.6 per 
cent), while it was lower, at 17 individuals (3.4 per cent) in the Ibaraki database. The 
largest employers able to employ some former staff members from wartime related 
companies were public corporations such as Japan National Railways (JNR) and the 
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation (NTT). Postal services also 
reemployed repatriated postal service staff members. Although it was not precisely a 
public corporation, postal services is also categorised in this group because it had 
operated under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Communications and Transport 
(Un’yu Tsūshinshō), which existed between November 1943 and May 194578. It is 
noteworthy that all three public corporations and services which had been related with 
this ministry absorbed some of the former staff members repatriated from related 
public corporations or foreign government agencies such as the Korean government 
railway in the Japanese empire.  
                                                
78 The ministry was established by merging the Ministry of Communications and the Ministry of 
Transport in 1943 and was separated again in May 1945.  
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In the private sector, several major companies, such as Nihon Cement 
Corporation, the Tokyo Electric Company and the construction firm Ōbayashi 
Corporation, employed several individuals in the database. A full list of the public 
corporations and private companies which offered reemployment programmes in the 
databases is included in Table 4-23. All of these corporations had already been major 
companies during the wartime. Some had expanded to Manchuria after Manchukuo 
was established in March 1932.79 When they resumed postwar business operations, 















                                                
79  "Nichiman Renraku Kōroni Kakushaga Dai Zōsen Keikaku," Jiji Shinpō, 12 April 1932. 
http://www.lib.kobe-
u.ac.jp/das/jsp/ja/ContentViewM.jsp?METAID=00159122&TYPE=IMAGE_FILE&POS=1. Accessed 
on 5 February 2015. 
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Table 4-23: Major companies which employed repatriates from their overseas 
branches or related companies (number of re-employed repatriate employees in 
parentheses)80 
Ibaraki Japan National Railways (11), Tokyo Electric Power Company (3), 
Postal services (2), Taiwan Sugar Corporation (1) 
Hiroshima Japan National Railways (15), Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public 
Corporation (9), Nihon Cement Corporation (3), Taisei Corporation 
(1), Morimoto Corporation (1), Mitsubishi Cement (1), Mitsubishi 
Shipyard (1), Kure Grinding Wheel81  (1), Postal services (1), Dōwa Fire 
& Marine Insurance (1)82, Daiichi Bank (1) 
Kanagawa Japan National Railways (21),  Nippon Telegraph and Telephone 
Public Corporation (9), Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation (2), 
Tokyo Electric Power Company (2), Ōbayashi Corporation (2), Bank of 
Tokyo (2), Kajima Corporation (1), Meiji Sugar Corporation (1), Kirin 
Brewery (1), Nihon Glass (1), Dai-Nihon Sugar Corporation (1), Shōwa 
Denkō (1), Nittō Chemical (1), Tōyō Wharf83 (1), Gōshō Corporation 
(1), Mitsubishi Corporation (1), Mitsukoshi Department Store (1) 
 
There seem, however, to have been certain conditions associated with the 
ability to seize this type of opportunity. For example, those who managed to become 
                                                
80 Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into 
Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)."  Figures have been calculated from each prefecture’s database 
created for this research. 
81 This company has been in the shipbuilding sector since the wartime. 
82  This company was established in 1944 by merging four major fire and marine insurance 
companies under the government’s monetary control policies. 
83 This company was a subsidiary of the South Manchuria Railway. It is still in business as of 2016. 
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re-employed by the same company mainly comprised of considerably younger people. 
The differences are clear in the figures: the average age of re-employed repatriates in 
Ibaraki was 31.2 years old, 3.7 years younger than the average age of all repatriates in 
the database. The equivalent figure for the Hiroshima database was 32 years old (4.8 
years younger than the average for all repatriates), and that for the Kanagawa database 
was 32.8 years old (3.4 years younger than the average for all repatriates). It is not 
clear how the timing of repatriation, especially delayed repatriation as a result of 
detentions in Siberia and postwar employment by the Chinese and Taiwanese 
governments, affected repatriates’ chances of capturing opportunities of being 
employed by the same employer. In the case of wartime rail workers, however, it 
seems likely that the timing mattered, because the Transport Ministry finished its re-
employment programme for repatriated railway staff members in May 1947, and new 
positions had been filled by those who had already arrived in Japan by June 1947.84 
However, there are some exceptions in which repatriates who arrived in Japan later, 
in some cases after 1948, were re-employed by the same employers. For example, out 
of the individuals in each prefectural database who had been repatriated after January 
1948, we find that one individual in Hiroshima was re-employed by NTT after he 
returned from China in 1953, and two individuals in Kanagawa were re-employed by 
Ōbayashi Corporation after respectively being repatriated from China in 1948 and 
from Siberia in 1953. It is difficult to know further details, but for these cases, it is 
possible that employers’ business situations and job openings, as well as the presence 
of people who were committed to supporting repatriates, may have played important 
roles in creating opportunities for re-employment.  
                                                
84 Tairiku Tetsudō Jūjiin Engokai, "Jigyō Gaiyō Kessan Hōkoku Tsuzuri," (Tokyo1946). 
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Although some of the public corporations and major companies played key 
roles in absorbing repatriates by reemploying wartime staff members, these 
corporations were not able to hire as many repatriates as might have been expected.85 
For instance, if we look at the wartime railway workers in each prefectural database, 
we find that only 11.2 per cent in Ibaraki, 18.8 per cent in Hiroshima and 15.8 per cent 
in Kanagawa were working at the postwar Japan National Railways (JNR) in 1956. 
The figure for the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone (NTT) Public Corporation was 
higher at 52.9 per cent in the Hiroshima database and 60.0 per cent in the Kanagawa 
database, while there were no wartime telecommunications companies’ staff members 
who were re-employed by the NTT in Ibaraki. The higher percentage figures in 
Hiroshima and Kanagawa can possibly be explained by the fact that communications 
companies in former Japanese territories maintained a close relationship with the 
Ministry of Communications (Teishinshō) in Japan. In the reemployment programmes 
in the telecommunications sector, the role of the association of the companies in the 
industry (Denkitsūshin Kyōkai) was significant. 86  After the war, this association 
agreed with its overseas counterpart association (Daitōa Denkitsūshin Kyōkai) to 
assist telecommunications repatriates from the Manchuria Telegraph and Telephone 
                                                
85 Ibid. The leaders of the repatriate railway workers’ organisation also wrote in the annual report 
for the fiscal year of 1947-1948 that the number of repatriate railway workers who were offered 
a job was lower than the organisation had wished. 
86 Denki Tsūshin Kyōkai, Denki Tsūshin Kyōkai 20 Nenshi (Tokyo1958), 19-30.  
This association was established in 1937 to coordinate the development of the 
telecommunications network in Japan’s overseas territories and to reinforce its own research and 
development capability, specifically after Japan retreated from the international community, and 
technical cooperation with Europe and the United States was cut off. The members of the 
association were private companies such as Fujitsū, Hitachi and Nihon Denki (NEC, Nippon Electric 
Company), but they received support from the government and also worked with leading 
universities. The organisation tried to export Japanese telecommunications technologies to 
Thailand and Brazil, facilitated technological cooperation among Japanese companies by 
purchasing and pooling patents, and also attempted to increase the number of 
telecommunications engineers by creating recruitment programmes targeting graduates of 
technical schools.  
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Company (Manshū Denshin Denwa Kabushikigaisha), the North China Telegraph and 
Telephone Company (Kahoku Denshin Denwa Kabushikigaisha), the Central China 
Telecommunications Company (Kachū Denki Tsūshin Kabushikigaisha) with the 
provision of housing and a portion of living costs to repatriates. The association also 
coordinated the job search of telecommunications repatriates. 
According to the association’s record, out of 8,855 telecommunications 
repatriates who applied for re-employment to the Ministry of Communications, 3,184 
(36.0 per cent) were offered places via this organisation. Some others were also 
employed by the ministry via personal connections. In addition, the records published 
by the organisation state that as a part of the programme to help the job search of 
telecommunications repatriates, the association helped with the establishment of 23 
start-ups (details are unknown), coordinated radio repair services that employed some 
repatriate telecommunications engineers, and sent requests to private companies to 
hire telecommunications repatriates.87  
In terms of reemployment policies in the private sector, hiring policies were 
different in each company. While some companies attempted to absorb as many 
repatriates as possible, not all companies were able to (or were willing to) introduce a 
programme to reemploy repatriates and demobilised soldiers. One example of a 
company which tried to re-employ as many repatriate staff members as possible was 
Ōbayashi Corporation. The number of employees of Ōbayashi in Japan at the end of 
the war was approximately 2,000 (excluding those who were in the military or at 
related companies in Japan’s overseas territories, such as Manchuria Ōbayashi 
Corporation and Ōbayashi Farm in Korea), but the figure had increased to 3,000 by 
the end of 1945. Ōbayashi Corporation started its postwar operation by engaging in 
                                                
87 Ibid., 52-55. 
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public reconstruction works and construction projects for the Allied occupation forces. 
All employees who had wished to stay with the company were allowed to do so.  
However, there was not enough business to use all existing workers.  ‘Jobless people’ 
in Ōbayashi were engaged in various sorts of business activities. Examples were 
farming, the operation of a timber mill and salt works, and the manufacturing of 
kitchen tools such as pots and cookers which were made from the company’s wartime 
stockpiles.88   
Reemployment options of this kind were certainly limited to individuals who 
had been affiliated with the public corporations or private companies that could offer 
these opportunities. Although work experiences and connections could have helped 
the repatriates’ postwar job search, only a fraction of the total were actually 
reemployed by the same employers as they had worked for during the war. However, 
the evidence suggests that this option still helped some repatriates resettle in postwar 
Japan. 
 
The public sector 
Public corporations and major companies thus played limited but important roles in 
re-employing repatriates. In addition to these public corporations, various government 
offices also hired both wartime public servants and new employers who had previously 
been in wartime public corporations and other fields. The figures in my database 
suggest that the role of the public sector was much larger than that of private 
corporations which reemployed some of their repatriate staff members. We see that in 
each database, 20.6 per cent of civilian repatriates in Ibaraki, 20.1 per cent in 
                                                
88 Ōbayashigumi Hyakunenshi Henshū Iinkai, Ōbayashigumi Hyakunenshi (Online Edition) (Tokyo: 




Hiroshima and 23.6 per cent in Kanagawa entered the postwar public sector, which 
included various city governments, and the local offices of central government 
agencies including the Coast Guard, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of 
Justice, the Ministry of Finance, the Ministry of Labour and the Special Procurement 
Agency. It may be counterintuitive that postwar sectors became one of the major 
destinations for repatriate wartime public servants, because the postwar public sector 
in Japan experienced a political purge between 1946 and 1948. However, the purge 
mostly targeted war criminals and leaders of military and political organisations such 
as the Imperial Rule Assistance Association (Taisei Yokusankai), right-wing activists, 
influential business people and executive members of colonial governments and 
foreign public corporations. 89  The majority of ordinary public servants, including 
those who had been in Japan during the war and repatriate public officers were not 
affected by the purge. School teachers are also categorised as belonging to the public 
sector as will be explained later in this section. In addition, staff members of semi-
public organisations such as agricultural cooperatives (nōgyōkyōdō kumiai) and 
individuals who were working in U.S. military in Kanagawa and the British 
Commonwealth Forces Korea (BCFK) 90  stationed in Hiroshima prefecture are 
included in the public sector as quasi-public servants. 
The figures in the database show that many of the repatriates who were in the 
postwar public sector had also worked for the public sector during the war. In fact, the 
                                                
89 Hiroshi Masuda, "Yokohamashi Zaiseikai No Kōshoku Tsuihō to Sengo Keizai Fukkō," Chōsa Kihō, 
no. 128 (1997). 
90 Hiroshima Prefectural Archives, "Chūryūgun to Kengyōsei," (Hiroshima: Hiroshima Prefectural 
Archives, 2010), 1. James Wood, "The Australian Military Contribution to the Occupation of Japan, 
1945–1952," (Canberra: Australian War Memorial). Toshikuni Nakagawa, "Senryōgun Shiryō Wo 
Chūshin Tosuru Hiroshimashi Fukkō Komon to Fukkō Keikaku He No Ichi Kōsatsu," Hiroshima Shi 
Kōbunshokan Kiyō 28 (2015): 45. As part of the Allied Occupation Forces, British Commonwealth 
Occupation Force (BCOF) arrived in to Hiroshima in February 1946. In November 1950 part of the 
BCOF was restructured to become the British Commonwealth Forces in Korea (BCFK). The BCFK 
continued to stay in Hiroshima prefecture until November 1956. 
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‘re-employment rate’ in the public sector was 47.1 per cent (65 individuals) in the 
database for Ibaraki, 53.9 per cent (76 individuals) for Hiroshima and 50.8 per cent 
(67 individuals) for Kanagawa. Re-employment was common not only for ordinary 
public servants, but also for school teachers and police officers.91 Hiring policies in 
the public sector are not well-documented, but the following episode relating to the 
Hiroshima police department offers an indicator of its situation.  
The Hiroshima Police Department was short of staff members at the end of the 
war. It was down by 50 per cent from its full capacity due to the deaths of police 
officers following the atomic bomb and a large number of vacancies caused by 
conscription. Immediately after the war ended, the police department started a large-
scale recruitment programme in order to secure the required number of police officers, 
especially before the Occupation Authority’s arrival in September 1945. The police 
department even arranged to bring some demobilised soldiers who had been stationed 
in the Kure Naval District into the training centre of the police department, without 
ever asking the new recruits if they were interested in becoming police officers. 
However, the majority of these new staff members soon ran away from the training 
centres and this type of emergency recruitment did not produce the hoped-for results. 
The emergency recruitment programme ended in February 1946 and the hiring process 
returned to normal.92 This example of the police department in the immediate postwar 
period is not specifically about civilian repatriates, but it does depict one aspect of 
                                                
91 Out of 65 reemployed public servants in the Ibaraki database, 13 individuals were school 
teachers and five were police officers. Out of 76 reemployed public servants in the Hiroshima 
database, 24 individuals were school teachers and nine individuals were police officers. In the 
Kanagawa database, out of 47 re-employed post-war public servants, eight individuals were 
school teachers and 12 were police officers.     
92  Hiroshimaken Keisatsushi Hensan Iinkai, Hiroshimaken Keisatsu Hyakunenshi Gekan 
(Hiroshima: Hiroshimaken Keisatsushi Hensan Iinkai, 1971), 461-63. 
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Japan’s labour situation at the time, a situation in which some repatriates might have 
found new employment opportunities.  
Job opportunities at public offices also included vacancies for a significant 
number of part-time or temporary employees, who were hired to reduce 
unemployment among white-collar workers. Relevant information for Ibaraki, 
Hiroshima, and Kanagawa has not been available, but in Tokyo, at least 1,237 white -
collar workers, including 236 repatriates, were employed by various government 
agencies under the Tokyo metropolitan government. These white-collar workers were 
called chishikisō, which means educated workforce. Their previous occupations 
included office clerks who had worked for private companies and government 
agencies. It is not clear when this programme started, but it ended in Tokyo in 
September 1949.93 Some part-time staff members became full-time staff members 
after several years’ service.  For example, the number of the full-time staff members 
of the Relief Bureau under the Ministry of Health and Welfare was downsized to 271 
in 1954, but the agency employed an additional 1,501 part-time staff members. The 
number of part-time staff members was gradually reduced, and in 1961, most part-
time staff members became full-time.94  
The presence of part-time positions seems to have lowered the entry barrier 
and made it possible for the sector to absorb a large number of unemployed people 
including repatriates. Tables 4-15, 4-16 and 4-17 show that the largest number of new 
entrants came from the wartime public corporations, but wartime industrial workers, 
agricultural farmers and people in the tertiary sector also joined the postwar public 
                                                
93 Tokyo Labour Bureau, "Tokyoto Chishikisō Shitsugyō Ōkyū Jigyōshi," ed. Tokyo Labour Bureau 
(Tokyo: Tokyo Labour Bureau, 1949).  
94 Ministry of Health and Welfare, Zoku Zoku Hikiage Engo No Kiroku (Tokyo: Ministry of Health 
and Welfare, 1963), 298. 
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sector. Although it is difficult to obtain sufficient evidence, it seems likely that much 
of this employment process took place via personal networks at local offices, an 
important characteristic of the Japanese job market. Analysis of the samples in the 
databases also suggests that repatriates found employment at various semi-public 
associations, such as agricultural cooperatives and organisations promoting textile 
exports, as well as in tax collection for local governments or traffic safety. These semi-
public organizations were funded by local or central government agencies and worked 
as their outposts. Throughout the postwar period, these organisations have been used 
as new work places for retired public servants.95 It is therefore reasonable to assume 
that these semi-public associations were sometimes asked to employ repatriates, again 
usually via personal networks. 
As noted before, school teachers were also categorised as part of the public 
sector. Although there may have been some private school teachers, almost all the 
repatriated school teachers in the database responded that they had worked at state 
schools during the wartime, and were still working in state schools in 1956. There 
were a few exceptions: these include two wartime state school teachers who became 
private school teachers postwar (one each in Ibaraki and Hiroshima), as well as one 
new postwar private high school teacher in the Kanagawa database, who had been a 
staff member of Korean Railways. Since the number of such individuals is very small, 
and all had some involvement with the public sector, they have been included in the 
category of public sector teachers for consistency of analysis. Wartime state school 
teachers were allowed to transfer their licenses to postwar Japan.96 We therefore find 
that 12 out of 19 repatriate teachers in Ibaraki, 18 out of 25 repatriate teachers in 
                                                
95 Wataru Yokoyama, "Yokuwakaru Tokubetsu Kaikei No Shikumi," Shūkan Economist, 11 October 
2010. 
96 Dōhō Kyūen Giin Renmei, Hikiagesha Mondai (Tokyo1947), 35. 
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Hiroshima and eight out of 20 wartime teachers in Kanagawa continued to teach after 
the war. 
 According to a booklet published in November 1947 by a group of diet 
members supporting repatriates (Dohōkyūen Giin Renmei), as many as 49,389 
primary and secondary school teachers had been working in Japan’s overseas 
territories.97 By the time of the publication of the booklet, 43,292 (87.7 per cent) had 
been repatriated, while 6,097 (12.3 per cent) were yet to be repatriated, or had not yet 
reported to the authorities after their repatriation. In the booklet, the group of diet 
members reported that 16,899 teachers had already been re-employed by schools in 
Japan, and estimated that a further 10,758 teachers would return to schools. Many of 
these teachers had been educated and obtained teaching certificates in Japan before 
their emigration, but some others had been educated and obtained teaching licenses in 
the Kwantung Leased Territory, Korea, Manchuria, Sakhalin and Taiwan. The 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued them with proof of their teaching licenses,98 which 
seem to have been accepted by postwar Japanese state schools. 
Although they are not categorised as being in the public sector, but rather in 
the tertiary sector, medical professionals experienced transitions similar to those of 
public school teachers. In the database compiled for this research, seven individuals 
in Ibaraki, 15 individuals in Hiroshima, and 14 individuals in Kanagawa were medical 
professionals who transferred their foreign licenses to postwar Japan. The booklet 
published by diet members mentioned above stated that there had been two types of 
medical doctors in overseas territories: one was those who had obtained licenses issued 
by the Office of the Governor-General of Korea, the Office of the Governor-General 
                                                
97 Ibid. 
98 Ministry of Foreign Affairs, "Gaichi Seiri Jimu Annai " (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2014). 
http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/sosiki/gaichi/. Accessed on 4 September 2015. 
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of Taiwan, the Office of Kwantung Territory, or the Manchukuo government; the other 
was those who had worked as general practitioners with permission from local 
consular offices in the Republic of China. The first group of medical professionals 
were allowed to take exams in Japan after repatriation to convert their foreign licenses 
to Japanese ones. The booklet stated that as of July 1947, approximately 500 medical 
doctors and 450 dentists had obtained Japanese licenses, and estimated that 
approximately 400 more medical doctors and 100 dentists would take the exams in the 
near future. By the time of the publication of the booklet, the government had not 
decided whether it would offer opportunities to the second group of medical 
professionals (general practitioners repatriated from China) to take exams to become 
officially registered medical doctors in Japan.99 
No information is available to know whether the second group of medical 
doctors were allowed to take the exam and were continuing to practice by 1956. In my 
database, out of this group of medical professionals, all seven in the Ibaraki database, 
13 individuals out of 14 wartime medical professionals in the Hiroshima database and 
15 individuals out of 16 in the Kanagawa database continued their jobs in the medical 
sector.100 Overall, therefore, it appears that school teachers and medical professionals 
who possessed government licenses, may have experienced one of the most secure 
transitions among civilian repatriates. However, it should be noted that the proportion 
of school teachers who returned to the same job was lower than was the case for 
                                                
99 Dōhō Kyūen Giin Renmei, Hikiagesha Mondai, 38. 
100 In this group of medical professionals, for some reason, the number of those who were 
repatriated from China is small: none in the Ibaraki database; one dentist in the Hiroshima 
database; one medical doctor, one dentist and one nurse in the Kanagawa database. All of them, 
except a nurse in Kanagawa, continued to practice. The majority of repatriate medical 
professionals were in Korea or Manchuria during the wartime. It is not clear why the number 
returned from China is small. 
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medical professionals.101 It is not possible to know why many of these repatriate 
teachers decided not to teach in Japan in the postwar period, but for some wartime 
school teachers, it might have been difficult to return to a teaching job when the whole 
educational philosophy emphasising the importance of democracy was quite different 
from the wartime one which heavily valued the imperial system.102  
In postwar Japan, in addition to local public offices, American military bases 
in Kanagawa and the British Commonwealth Forces Korea (BCFK) stationed in 
Hiroshima (until November 1956 as part of United Nations Forces) employed a large 
number of Japanese civilians, including repatriates. According to official statistics 
published by the Japanese government and the Hiroshima prefectural government, the 
total number of Japanese workers in American bases was 58,564 in Kanagawa as of 
May 1952 103  and the BCFK in Hiroshima employed approximately 8,000 local 
Japanese people including repatriates as of February 1956.104 They were quasi-public 
employees, and their wages were paid by the US and British Commonwealth military 
and the Japanese government.105 In the Kanagawa database, in particular, we find that 
                                                
101 In each prefecture’s database, seven wartime school teachers in Ibaraki (out of 19), seven in 
Hiroshima (out of 26) and 12 in Kanagawa (out of 20) were not teaching in 1956. Their transitions 
were not necessarily smooth. In Ibaraki, one was in family farming, two were in the local public 
sector, one became a stationery shop owner, and one became a peddler, while two had already 
retired. In the Hiroshima database, one was in family farming, two were in the local public sector, 
one had already retired, one was a female who most likely got married and stopped working, but 
the other two were unemployed for reasons which cannot be specified. In the Kanagawa database, 
more than half of teachers did not go back to teach. One became a local public servant, two 
entered industry as a factory worker and a guard, one became a local newspaper reporter, one 
became a greengrocer, one became a signboard designer and one worked in an American military 
base although his job was not specified in the survey form. 
102  Ministry of Education, Gakusei Hyakunenshi (Tokyo: Teikoku Chihō Gyōsei Gakkai, 1972). 
http://www.mext.go.jp/b_menu/hakusho/html/others/detail/1317696.htm.http://www.mext.g
o.jp/b_menu/hakusho/html/others/detail/1317738.htm. Accessed on 13 March 2016.  
103 Senryō Chōtatsushi Hensan Iinkai, Senryō Chōtatsushi - Senryōgun Chōtatsu No Kichō (Tokyo: 
Special Procurement Agency, 1956), 758. 
104 Hiroshima Prefectural Archives, "Chūryūgun to Kengyōsei."  
https://www.pref.hiroshima.lg.jp/uploaded/attachment/41192.pdf. Accessed on 1 April 2015. 
105  Ministry of Defense, "Defense of Japan 2008," (Tokyo: Ministry of Defense, 2008), 261. 
http://www.mod.go.jp/e/publ/w_paper/2008.html. Accessed on 30 September 2015. 
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the American military was a major employer of repatriates, and 49 individuals (7.7 
per cent of the total number of individuals in the database) were working in American 
bases, while in the Hiroshima database we find that the BCFK in Hiroshima employed 
only seven individuals (1.1 per cent of the total number). Many Japanese members of 
this group did not include information on their exact responsibilities in the foreign 
military bases in the 1956 survey, but examples where we do have some information 
were a washing and cleaning specialist (who had been in the same position at the South 
Manchuria Railway’s Yamato Hotel), a translator, accountants, carpenters, car 
mechanics, a firefighter, electrical engineers, security guards and office clerks.  
 If we look at individuals in the American bases in Kanagawa, we find that 
65.3 per cent of them (32 individuals in the database) had worked in public 
corporations or for overseas offices of Japanese government agencies (including those 
under the Manchukuo government) during the wartime. It should also be noted that 
63.3 per cent of Japanese workers in American bases in the Kanagawa database had 
moved into the prefecture from other regions. These facts suggest that quasi-public 
servant positions in American bases had become accessible job opportunities for 
repatriates who had been in the public or semi-public sectors during the war. Working 
in this kind of foreign environment might well have been an attractive option for some 
of the repatriates who had been used to interacting with people of other nationalities. 
In this way, the postwar public sector absorbed a significant number of 
repatriates, including both wartime public servants and new entrants. It is worth 
mentioning that if these people are put together with the employees of postwar public 
corporations in the transport, communications and utilities sector, in total more than 
one-fifth of the repatriates were employed postwar in the public or semi-public sectors. 
A summary of the employment situation of repatriates in the public sector is shown in 
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Table 4-24. These data offer evidence that the government played a significant role in 
resettling repatriates. 
 
Table 4-24: Number of Repatriates employed in the public sector in 1956 106 
Government offices  
(including school teachers) 
Ibaraki Hiroshima Kanagawa 
          Reemployment  
  (wartime public servants) 
63 78 99 
          New employment 19 21 31 
Postwar public corporations (JNR, 
telecommunications and utilities) 
   
 Reemployment of repatriate staff members 19 35 43 
     New employment 4 5 5 
     Semi-public organisations (including 
agricultural cooperatives) 
14 11 6 
Total  
(Percentage figures in the total civilian 











Employment in the private sector: A new start as corporate employees or 
small business owners 
Table 4-25 summarises the findings discussed in this chapter up to this point: some 
repatriates entered the agricultural sector, mostly in family farming. Some were 
fortunate enough to continue their employment with their previous wartime employers, 
                                                
106  Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into 
Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)." Figures were taken from the database, created for this research. 
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and some others were employed postwar by the public sector. By 1956, some were 
still not in the labour force for various reasons. Some were unemployed in 1956 even 
though they were still of working age (between 15 and 60 years old). The remainder 
entered the private sector, either self-employed or as new employees of various 
companies. These repatriates entering the private sector can be categorised into two 
groups: those who were able to use their wartime skills and those who obtained new 
jobs in new sectors. In Table 4-25, they are categorised as ‘skilled employment,’ as 
well as ‘New sector: industry,’ and ‘New sector: tertiary’.  
 
Table 4-25: Repatriates’ postwar patterns107 
 Ibaraki Hiroshima Kanagawa 
Agriculture 27.6% 9.7% 2.5% 
Public sector 21.8% 20.1% 22.5% 
Reemployment by wartime employers 2.8% 5.5% 7.7% 
Skilled employment 13.2% 26.9% 31.3% 
New sector: industry 3.8% 8.1% 5.2% 
New sector: tertiary 20.2% 15.5% 14.1% 
Day labourers 1.8% 2.7% 1.4% 
Unemployed 7.8% 3.7% 6.1% 
Out of labour force 1.0% 7.9% 9.4% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
      *Percentage figures larger than 20 per cent are shaded in grey. 
 
                                                
107 Ibid. Figures were taken from the database, created for this research. 
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Repatriates who found skilled employment 
In the private sector, repatriates’ wartime skills and experiences were sometimes 
useful in their job search. Out of all civilian repatriates in the databases for each 
prefecture, it seems highly likely from their profiles that their previous experience or 
skills did play a role in their postwar employment positions; 13.2 per cent of repatriates 
in Ibaraki, 26.9 per cent in Hiroshima and 31.3 per cent in Kanagawa found the same 
or similar jobs in the private sector, thus making use of skills that they already 
possessed.108 This is in addition to those who were rehired by their wartime companies. 
This group finding similar jobs in the private sector can be further divided into three 
sub-categories — a) white-collar workers, b) technical skill holders in industry and c) 
individuals in retail or services. These are shown in Table 4-26. Both during the 
wartime and in the postwar period, white-collar workers and the majority of technical 
skill holders were employed by a range of companies. Those who were self-employed 
were a minority in industry as a whole, and were mostly likely to be engaged in small-
scale manufacturing. This group included a small number of rope manufacturers, 
wooden clog (geta) manufacturers, food processing factory owners, small-scale 
shipbuilders, carpenters, plasterers, and electricians. The dominance of corporate 
employees among those possessing technical skills contrasts with the fact that the 





                                                
108 Because many people in the database only provide the names of the companies for which they 
worked, their actual responsibilities are unknown. This author assumes that people who were in 
the same sectors in August 1945 and June 1956 were able to find employment that utilised their 




Table 4-26: Numbers in different types of skilled employment in each Prefecture, 
1956109  
 
Ibaraki Hiroshima Kanagawa 
White-collar workers 8 29 51 
Technical skill holders   
 
Corporate employees 51 50 97 
Self-employed 9 26 15 
Total 60 76 112 
Tertiary sector participants    
Corporate employees 4 12 16 
Self-employed 9 50 24 
Total 13 62 40 
 
 
Skilled employment in industry 
For the majority of repatriates who possessed technical job skills, seeking employment 
at major business establishments or SMEs in postwar Japan seems to have been the 
most natural option, and more likely to earn them higher wages than if they started 
their own small businesses. This was because large-scale mechanised production or 
the heavy industries had become increasingly more dominant and profitable, while 
many SMEs worked as sub-contractors of major businesses. The productivity gap 
                                                
109 Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into 
Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)."  Figures have been calculated from each prefecture’s database, 
created for this research. 
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between major industrial players and SMEs widened. According to the Economic 
White Paper in 1956, the average wage of small manufacturers employing 10-29 
workers was only 53.3 per cent of that of major firms with more than 1,000 
employees.110 Although it is difficult to clearly identify them in the 1956 survey, the 
most useful and transferable skill holders included carpenters, welders, plasters, 
architects, water works specialists, electrical engineers, car mechanics, and 
steelworkers, to name but a few. People with these kinds of skills had a better chance 
of finding jobs in major companies or promising SMEs, as they were able to make use 
of those skills after repatriation. 
Even though employment at major firms or SMEs seems to have been the most 
preferred option, some technical skill holders still became entrepreneurs in the postwar 
period. The databases include one electrical engineer at a coal mine in Manchuria who 
became the owner of a construction company in Hitachi city in Ibaraki, a technician 
who started a bicycle shop in Hiroshima city, a shipbuilder who became a furniture 
maker in Hiroshima city, as well as a civil engineer in the colonial government in 
Taiwan who became a land surveyor in Yokohama city. It is almost impossible to 
know with any accuracy why these people chose to become self-employed after their 
repatriation. However, if we compare the corporate employees and the self-employed 
in the postwar industrial sector included in the databases, we find that in August 1945 
the average age of small business owners was 40.5 years old in Ibaraki, 39.0 years old 
in Hiroshima and 39.6 years old in Kanagawa, while the equivalent figures for 
corporate employees were lower, at 34.2 years old (Ibaraki), 36.0 years old 
(Hiroshima) and 33.9 years old (Kanagawa). As can be observed in the previous 
                                                
110 Economic Planning Agency, Nenji Keizai Hōkoku (Tokyo: Economic Planning Agency, 1956). 
http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/keizaiwp/wp-je56/wp-je56-021003.html. Accessed on 5 
September 2015. The comparison of the average wage was for male employees. 
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analysis of those who were able to be re-employed by their wartime companies, which 
were usually major industrial players, younger candidates were generally preferred. 
This may have been one of the factors influencing repatriates’ job opportunities and 
forcing some repatriates to establish their own businesses where they had not been 
able to find promising jobs as employees.   
When seeking employment at business establishments, some of those with 
technical skills or those who searched for white-collar positions seem to have shown 
flexibility in moving to other sectors, for instance, moving between the manufacturing, 
construction, mining, transport, and communication sectors. In the database of the 
Hiroshima repatriates for this research, several repatriates from the South Manchurian 
Railway found employment in Mitsubishi Shipbuilding, Hitachi Shipbuilding and in 
small manufacturers. An employee who had worked for the construction company 
Sakakidanigumi in Manchuria was employed by the Chugoku Electric Company in 
Hiroshima after the war. Due to the small numbers of individuals in this group, the 
figures should be treated carefully, but if we simply calculate the proportion of each 
group that moved to other sectors, we find that 17.6 per cent of white-collar workers 
and people with technical skills in Ibaraki (12 individuals out of 68), 11.4 per cent in 
Hiroshima (12 individuals out of 105) and 20.2 per cent in Kanagawa (33 individuals 
out of 163) managed to become employed by major corporations such as Hitachi, 
Mitsubishi, the major steel pipe manufacturer NKK (Nihon Kōkan), or Tōyō Kōgyō 
(later renamed Matsuda). Such companies appear to have been attractive destinations 
for skilled repatriates.  
If the regional distribution of repatriates in the databases is compared, along 
with a comparison between those who found skilled employment in industry, 
corporate employees and the self-employed, it is apparent that each prefecture’s 
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situation is different. For example, in Ibaraki, only about 50 percent of both groups – 
50.0 per cent of corporate employees and 55.5 per cent of self-employed people – were 
living in the five largest cities in 1956, possibly reflecting the fact that many of the 
technical skills possessed by repatriates were being used in coal mines in rural areas. 
In Hiroshima, about 80 percent of both groups – 78.0 per cent of corporate employees 
and 80.8 per cent of self-employed people – lived in the five largest cities in 1956. In 
Kanagawa, about 74.2 per cent of corporate employees and 66.6 per cent of self-
employed people lived in the five largest cities in 1956. The proportions of those who 
remained in their hometowns were quite different. For corporate employees, the 
proportion of those living in their hometowns was very small: only 28.0 per cent in 
Ibaraki, 31.1 per cent in Hiroshima and 25.7 per cent in Kanagawa, while the 
proportion of self-employed people living in their hometowns was much higher, at 
44.4 per cent in Ibaraki, 70.0 per cent in Hiroshima and 60.0 per cent in Kanagawa. 
Therefore, it could be concluded that those who became employees were generally 
more willing to move to places where more job opportunities were available. For self-
employed individuals, family factors may have played critical roles in limiting their 
mobility, but it should also be noted that the majority of small business owners in 
industries were nevertheless living in the five major cities in all of the three prefectures 
(55.5 per cent of small business owners in the Ibaraki database, 80.8 per cent in the 
Hiroshima database and 66.6 per cent in the Kanagawa database). This may indicate 
that if technical skill holders did not find favourable employment either at major 
companies or at SMEs, they still had the option of becoming self-employed and using 
their existing skills, particularly if they lived in or could move to major cities. In fact, 
the findings of my research indicate that several SMEs established by repatriates in 
urban areas worked as subcontractors of major business entities or government 
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agencies, such as Mitsubishi Shipbuilding and Japan’s Defence Agency. One example 
was a manufacturer established by a South Manchuria Railway Company repatriate 
who specialised in electric motor drives in Kure city in Hiroshima.111 
Repatriates sometimes established businesses together. For example, the 
electric construction company Shinsei Dengyō Corporation was one example of this, 
founded in Tokyo by South Manchuria Railway Company repatriate engineers, and 
specialising in railway electrical engineering. The company was only one of the 125 
businesses started by SMR repatriates in postwar Japan.112 Many companies were 
short-lived, but Shinsei Dengyō was one of the examples which survived to be a 
sustainable business into the 21st century. More details about the SMR repatriates’ 
postwar transitions will be discussed in Chapter 5. 
 
Skilled employment in the tertiary sector 
Among those who made the postwar transition by using their skills or experiences, 
some were involved in retail and services. From the data in Table 4-26 we can see that 
the number of repatriates who found skilled employment in the tertiary sector was 
particularly large in Hiroshima prefecture, which seems to reflect the fact that many 
migrants from Hiroshima had been in Japan’s foreign territories for several decades 
running their own businesses. Some became small business owners in postwar Japan 
again. Unlike the industrial sector, the tertiary sector was dominated by self-employed 
people both during the wartime years and in the postwar period. Some former tertiary 
sector corporate employees also established their own businesses after the repatriation. 
The dominance of small businesses in the sector can be observed despite the fact that 
                                                
111 This company is still in business in 2015, but details cannot be included in this paper due to 
the requirement of the 2003 Personal Information Protection Law. 
112 Mantetsukai, Zaidan Hōjin Mantetsukai 60 Nen No Ayumi (Tokyo: Mantetsukai, 2006). 
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the gap in the wage levels between small businesses and larger firms in the sector was 
more significant than in industry. In 1956 the average wage in retail and wholesale 
businesses that employed one to four people was only 33.9 per cent of the average 
wage at companies which hired more than 30 employees. In the service sector, in 1956 
the average wage of small business owners who did not have any employees was only 
31.3 per cent of that of companies with more than 30 employees, while the figure for 
firms with two to four employees was 38.8 per cent, and the figure for businesses with 
five to nine employees was 52.2 per cent.113 Small businesses in the tertiary sector 
included groceries and other food stores, textiles and shoes shops, other fashion stores, 
tatami mat and antique shops, pharmacists, bath houses, restaurants and hotels. 
In the database compiled for this research, we can see that out of those who 
continued to be small business owners in commerce in the post war years, fewer than 
half114 re-established the same businesses as they had been involved in during the war. 
The majority started different types of businesses after repatriation. Examples of such 
transitions included a kimono merchant who became a hotel owner, a grocery shop 
owner who became a contract-based cook, and a cleaning shop owner who became a 
fishmonger.  
The largest proportion of this group in the tertiary sector were living in their 
hometowns in 1956. Once again, due to the small numbers of individuals in this group, 
the figures should be treated carefully, but if we simply calculate the percentage 
figures, we find that 55.6 per cent of experienced small business owners in Ibaraki 
                                                
113 Economic Planning Agency, Nenji Keizai Hōkoku  
http://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/keizaiwp/wp-je56/wp-je56-021003.html. 
 Accessed on 5 September 2015. The comparison of the average wage was for male employees. 
114 In the databases for this research, among wartime small business owners in the tertiary sector 
who established new businesses again, two out of 15 in the Ibaraki database, 16 out of 44 in the 




(five individuals out of nine individuals), 42.0 per cent in Hiroshima (21 individuals 
out of 50) and 50.0 per cent in Kanagawa (12 individuals out of 24) started their 
postwar small businesses in their hometowns. However, it is interesting to note that 
some others had also moved in from other prefectures. Two individuals out of nine 
experienced small business owners in the Ibaraki database, 19 individuals out of 50 in 
the Hiroshima database and 11 individuals out of 24 in the Kanagawa database had 
moved in to these prefectures and then founded their businesses there. Establishing 
small businesses in the tertiary sector is usually regarded as one of the most accessible 
options when people need to find a means of making a living in a new environment. 
When necessary, however, even experienced small business owners in the tertiary 
sector seem to have moved to other regions in search of new business opportunities 
and better locations.  
 
People who entered new sectors 
For civilian repatriates who were not employed by wartime companies, who did not 
find skilled jobs or who did not enter the agriculture sector, another option was to enter 
a new sector to take up a new job. An analysis of this group is also important because 
it can reveal characteristics of the Japanese economy in terms of how it absorbed new 
entrants who had to start from scratch.  
According to analysis of the databases created from the 1956 repatriate survey, 
about 25.8 per cent of the sample in the Ibaraki database, 26.3 per cent in the 
Hiroshima database and 20.7 per cent in the Kanagawa database found new jobs in 
sectors in which they had no previous experience. By using the 1956 national survey 
responses, it is possible to subdivide these people who entered new sectors to take up 
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new jobs into four categories roughly based on the level of significance of entry 
barriers. These can be summarised as shown in Table 4-27. 
Individuals in Level 1 obtained employment with minimum skills and capital. 
For example, they were day labourers, peddlers or had unskilled employment. 
Repatriates in the database with this kind of employment included a security guard, a 
handy man, a warehouse attendant and packing service workers at major firms or 
SMEs. The Level 2 group found occupations in which entry barriers were usually low 
but obtaining employment required more effort than was the case for Level 1. This 
category included small business owners in retail and services, white-collar workers 
(office clerks or sales representatives) in SMEs and semi-skilled workers (such as 
technicians in industries or contract-based construction workers). Level 3 consisted of 
employed managers in SMEs, self-employed small business owners who might have 
possessed or raised some capital (such as small factory owners), and those who used 
skills unrelated to their previous jobs during the war, including things such as 
carpentry or billboard design. Some individuals might have taken up jobs they had 
been interested in or which they knew they could be good at. Level 4 includes 
occupations which might have been difficult to obtain and required significant efforts, 






Table 4-27: Occupational categories of repatriates entering new sectors to take up 
new jobs115 
Levels Occupation categories Ibaraki Hiroshima Kanagawa 
Level 
1 










Small business owners in small–
scale retail and services 
86 71 27 
White-collar workers in SMEs 
(including sales staff members) 
11 7 41 
Semi-skilled workers in industry 4 28 14 









Employed executive managers of 
SMEs or owners of wholesale 
businesses 
5 2 5 
Entrepreneurs who used previously 
non-job related technical skills  
1 15 7 
Small business owners who 
established businesses which 
required some capital 
1 1 6 









Government licenses (certified 
accountants, etc.)  
1 2 3 
White-collar workers at major 
companies (often career track) 
2 11 9 














*Occupational groups which percentage figures in the prefectural total are larger 
than 30 per cent are shaded in grey. 
 
 
                                                
115 Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into 
Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)."  
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Table 4-27 indicates that the occupations in Level 1 and Level 2 were 
destinations for many repatriates who entered new sectors in all the prefectures. It is 
likely that immediately after repatriation, many civilian repatriates may have been 
involved in black market trades both as sellers and buyers, or alternatively took up 
unskilled jobs, including day labouring, that are categorised in Level 1. Some perhaps 
never moved to other jobs and ended up staying in these jobs, but many managed to 
find securer jobs by the mid-1950s, including those categorised in Level 2. While 
Level 1 absorbed approximately 12 to 15 per cent of those who entered new sectors to 
take up new jobs, the Level 2 group absorbed larger numbers of people, accounting 
for approximately 60 to 70 per cent of this group in each prefecture’s database.   
 The information obtained from each prefecture’s database makes it difficult 
to fully explain why certain people chose to take up new jobs in new sectors. This is 
especially true for the Level 1, Level 3 and Level 4 groups because of the small number 
of individuals categorised in these groups.  However, it seems the average age of those 
in Level 1 (unskilled labourers, peddlers and labourers) was generally higher than the 
average age of all civilian repatriates in each prefecture. Although the number of 
individuals in the samples is small, if we simply calculate the average in each group, 
the average age of Level 1 repatriates was 37.3 years old in Ibaraki, 41.3 years old in 
Hiroshima and 36.8 years old in Kanagawa, while the equivalent figures for all 
repatriates in each database were 34.4 years old in Ibaraki, 37.2 years old in Hiroshima 
and 36.2 years old in Kanagawa. This indicates that being older could have worked as 
a hurdle in entering the Japanese job market and some older repatriates might have 
been forced to take up one of the more accessible but less rewarding jobs. Individuals 
in the Level 1 group’s wartime occupations included an office clerk of the Manchuria 
Mining Company, reclamation farmers, a public servant of the Taiwan Colonial 
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Government, small business owners, staff members of the South Manchuria Railway 
and Korean Railway, and a police officer, to name but a few.  
This suggests that for many repatriates, finding postwar employment was not 
easy. It is difficult to fully explain their transitions by using factors available in the 
databases. For example, in order to make a successful occupational transition, in 
addition to skills, it might have been essential that repatriates should make efforts to 
search for job-related information, to market themselves to prospective employers, to 
improve their skills and performance, as well as having an ability to continue to 
motivate themselves.116 One repatriate wrote in his memoir that his neighbours in the 
immediate postwar period included repatriated public servants and police officers. 
Even though some of them were fortunate and were offered a job in postwar public 
offices, their new positions were usually much lower than those they had held during 
the wartime. Some people tried hard to increase their performance at their new work 
place and were promoted relatively smoothly. But others fell into self-pity and did not 
even make efforts to improve their positions. Those lacking these attributes or 
opportunities may well have ended up in Level 1 type occupations, or even became 
unemployed. 
According to Table 4-27, the proportion of individuals in the Level 2 group 
was the largest in all prefectures. The group of Level 2 individuals (consisting of semi-
skilled industrial workers, small shop owners and white-collar workers at SMEs) was 
the largest in all the prefectures, and seems to have represented one of the most 
common patterns of occupational transition of civilian repatriates. In Ibaraki and 
Hiroshima, entering retail and services, often as business owners, was an important 
                                                
116 Takanori Shimamura, "Hikiagesha Ga Umidashita Shakaikūkan to Bunka," in Hikiagesha No 
Sengo, ed. Takanori Shimamura (Tokyo: Shinyōsha, 2013), 47. 
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option, while in Kanagawa, taking up a job as a white-collar worker in small and 
medium-sized companies was a popular option. 
 Jobs in Level 2 absorbed a large number of repatriates who had been in the 
wartime utilities, communications and transport sector, as well as in industry and the 
public sector. It is difficult to judge whether these individuals felt their transitions were 
positive or negative. As the social status of those working in the commercial sector 
had traditionally been low in Japan, for those who had been public servants or 
employees of public corporations, becoming small retail shop owners or service 
providers may well have been regarded as a negative transition.117 However jobs in 
this category were relatively easy to obtain and did not require previous experience, 
and seem to have been one convenient option to enter if repatriates did not have any 
other way to obtain a job. 
The transitional pattern of civilian repatriates in the sample who were in the 
Level 2 group included a wartime section chief of the Manchuria Agriculture Public 
Corporation (Manshū Nōgyō Kōsha), who opened a stationery shop in his hometown 
Hitachi city in Ibaraki; a Manchuria reclamation farmer who became a mechanic at a 
coal mine within his home prefecture of Ibaraki; a wartime railway police officer who 
returned from Manchuria and became a factory worker at a small steel manufacturer 
in his hometown of Fuchū city in Hiroshima; a staff member of the North China 
Railway who became a gardener in Yokohama city; and a headmaster of an elementary 
school in wartime Korea who became a factory worker in Kawasaki city in Kanagawa. 
                                                
117 It is difficult to explain why the status of small businesses in retail and services is low. Although 
this argument has been refuted, one commonly used explanation is that during the Edo period, 
the Tokugawa government had a policy about the social status of the four classes. The most 
prestigious one was the Samurai class, followed by peasants (because they produced staple food) 
and craftsmen. Merchants, who dealt with money, were not respected and were placed fourth. 
This system was called Shi-nō-kō-shō. 
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The data used in this research are of very limited use in explaining the nature of many 
of these transitions, but they do at least provide some examples of how repatriates tried 
to start their new lives in postwar Japan.  
If many of those who took up jobs categorised in Level 1 and Level 2 did so 
due to low entry barriers, individuals in the Level 3 and Level 4 groups may have been 
different in the sense that they seem to have chosen their jobs based on their own 
inclinations. These groups were relatively small in number in all the prefectures’ 
databases, when compared to those who chose Level 2 jobs. The opportunities of 
obtaining these higher-level jobs were particularly limited in Ibaraki. This might have 
reflected the fact that Ibaraki was still an agrarian society and the options of finding a 
more promising job which could be categorised in Level 3 or Level 4 were limited. 
However, we do find the examples of a reclamation farmer who returned from 
Manchuria and became a postwar carpenter in Hitachiōta city in Ibaraki; a wartime 
police officer who became a human resource staff member of a coal mine in Ibaraki; 
a wartime executive member of the Tōa Marine and Fire Insurance Company who 
established  a trading firm in Fukuyama city; a wartime staff member of the Shanghai 
Consular Office who became a bamboo flute (shakuhachi) teacher in Mihara city of 
Hiroshima; an office clerk of the Mitsui Trading Company who established an 
electrical workshop in Yokohama city; a staff member of the Manchuria Development 
Corporation (Manshū Kaihatsu) who became a carpenter; and a railway police officer 
in Manchuria who became a cook in Yokohama city.  It is not possible to know how 
these individuals chose their postwar jobs, but there were clearly individuals who re-
established themselves in a creative way by using skills that were unrelated to their 
previous jobs, by acquiring some capital to start a new business, or by serving as 
employed managers in SMEs.  
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Level 4 comprises individuals who seem to have been in a better position to 
find secure and satisfying employment. Some of them possessed useful qualifications, 
such as that of a certified tax accountant, and the group included individuals who 
became employed by major business establishments. Examples of their transitions 
include a wartime public servant in Tianjin who was employed by the Hitachi Cement 
Company in Ibaraki; a staff member of the Manchurian Industrial Development 
Company who obtained a license as a judicial scrivener (shihō shoshi) in Ibaraki; a 
wartime farmer who had been repatriated from Texas and was employed by Tōyō 
Kōgyō (later renamed the Matsuda Motor Corporation); a staff member of North 
China Motors who was hired by the Hiroshima Electric Railway Company; a staff 
member of a mining company in Manchuria who obtained a license as a certified tax 
accountant in Hiroshima city; and a repatriated Korean Railway staff member who 
was employed by the Dai-ichi Mutual Life Insurance in Yokohama city. Many major 
company employees usually did not offer specific job information, and only responded 
in the 1956 national survey that they were 'staff’ (kaishain). These individuals are 
included in Level 4, because in the Japanese corporate system even at that time, career 
track positions and office clerks are not clearly distinguished, and quite often any 
kaishain could be a career track position.  
Civilian repatriates who entered new sectors and took up new jobs are often 
seen as exemplifying the most typical image of repatriates who managed to arrive in 
Japan and started their postwar lives from scratch. However, as we can see, they 
comprised approximately only a quarter of the repatriate samples in the database for 
each prefecture. Moreover, their postwar economic experiences were not 
homogeneous. Out of the four groups identified above, it seems that we can assume 
that those who had to take up new jobs in new sectors often started with the sort of 
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jobs that could be found in Level 1 as black market participants, or labourers in 
reconstruction projects or coal mines. Some remained in these jobs, but others tried to 
move to more secure occupations by setting up their own businesses or obtaining jobs 
as white-collar workers or skilled labourers in industries and the tertiary sector. Those 
in Level 3 and Level 4 would seem to have made further efforts or very particular 
decisions to improve their situations. However, these groups were a minority; the 
majority of repatriates moving into new occupations stayed in Level 2, which indicates 
that there were difficult transitions for a large number of repatriates. 
 
Analysis of Takatsuki city and Sennan county: Occupational 
transitions of civilian repatriates in two municipalities 
For Osaka prefecture, the information obtained from the databases for the two 
municipalities, Takatsuki city and Sennan county illuminates some interesting aspects 
of the resettlement patterns of civilian repatriates. In the 1955 population census, the 
total number of households (including both non-repatriate and repatriate ones) in 
Takatsuki city was 11,106, and that for Sennan county was 16,081.118 The number of 
survey forms available for this research is 325 for Takatsuki and 283 for Sennan 
respectively (see Chapter 2).  
 If we examine the family registration addresses of civilian repatriates in 
Takatsuki city and Sennan county, Table 4-28 shows that the majority of repatriates 
had their family registration addresses outside Osaka prefecture, which indicates that 
many of them were likely to have moved into Osaka after repatriation. The same 
                                                
118 Statistics Bureau of Japan, Population Census of 1955 (Osaka Prefecture), 5-27, 322-24. 
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figures in the databases for Ibaraki, Hiroshima and Kanagawa prefectures were 23.8 
per cent, 27.2 per cent and 58.4 per cent (see Table 4-11). In these three prefectures, 
only Kanagawa prefecture had similar figures, which may reflect the fact that urban 
prefectures such as Osaka and Kanagawa might have attracted a large number of 
domestic migrants by the mid-1950s. 
 
Table 4-28: Repatriates’ family registration addresses (Takatsuki city and Sennan 
county)119 
 Repatriates who were 
originally from Osaka 
prefecture 
Repatriates who had 




















 In order to show the economic characteristics of Takatsuki city and Sennan 
county, Table 4-29 compares the sectoral breakdown of all household heads for 
Takatsuki city and Sennan county (including repatriate households) with that for all 
of Osaka, reported in the 1955 population census. This table shows that in both 
Takatsuki and Sennan, agriculture was larger than for all of Osaka prefecture in terms 
of the proportion of the number of households. Accordingly, the proportion of 
households in industry and the tertiary sector were smaller in both municipalities. The 
size of the public sector was roughly four per cent for Osaka prefecture, as well as for 
                                                
119 Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into 
Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)." Figures have been calculated from each prefecture’s database, 
created for this research. 
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Takatsuki and Sennan. For Takatsuki city, the transport, communications and utilities 
was slightly larger compared to Osaka prefecture as a whole, as well as that in Sennan 
county.  
 
Table 4-29: Share of households in each sector in the 1955 Census (Osaka prefecture, 










Primary sector 6.9% 20.0% 25.2% 
Industry 35.9% 29.9% 30.6% 
Transport, communications and 
utilities 
7.8% 10.9% 7.9% 
Public sector 4.1% 4.6% 3.6% 
Tertiary sector 31.9% 23.1% 19.2% 
Unemployed 2.6% 2.1% 2.4% 
Not in labour force 10.8% 9.4% 11.1% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
 
In order to understand the characteristics of the repatriates’ occupations in the 
mid-1950s, Tables 4-30 and 4-31 compare the postwar sectors of occupation of 
repatriates in 1956 with the profile of the total population (including civilian 
repatriates) in Takatsuki and Sennan in the 1955 population census. For both 
                                                
120 Statistics Bureau of Japan, Population Census of 1955 (Osaka Prefecture), 5-27, 22, 312-29. 
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repatriates and the total prefectural population, the figures are for household heads. 
These tables show that the proportion of repatriates in the primary sector was much 
smaller than the figure for the total number of household heads in both municipalities, 
while a larger proportion of repatriates were employed in the public sector compared 
to the total population. In other sectors, repatriates and the total population had similar 
proportions, except for the group of unemployed individuals, which includes a larger 
proportion of repatriates compared to the total population for both Takatsuki and 
Sennan. 
Table 4-30: Postwar sectors of occupation of repatriate household heads compared 
to total population: Takatsuki city121 
 Total 
Household heads in 
Takatsuki city (1955) 
Civilian repatriates 
in Takatsuki city 
(1956) 
Primary sector 2,218 20.0% 5 1.5% 
Industry 3,321 29.9% 115 35.4% 
Transport, communications 
and utilities 
1,210 10.9% 48 14.8% 
Public sector 515 4.6% 37 11.4% 
Tertiary sector 2,560 23.1% 66 20.3% 
Other sectors 3 0.0% 9 2.8% 
Unemployed 236 2.1% 19 5.8% 
Not in labour force 1,043 9.4% 26 8.0% 
Total 11,106 100% 325 100% 
 
                                                
121 Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into 
Repatriates’ Postwar Lives)." Figures have been calculated from each prefecture’s database, 




Table 4-31: Postwar sectors of occupation of repatriate household heads compared 
to total population: Sennan county122 
 Total household heads 
in Sennan county 
(1955) 
Civilian repatriates in 
Sennan county 
(1956) 
Primary sector 4,051 25.2% 17 6.0% 
Industry 4,920 30.6% 96 33.9% 
Transport, communications 
and utilities 
1,270 7.9% 16 5.7% 
Public sector 576 3.6% 37 13.1% 
Tertiary sector 3,095 19.2% 65 23.0% 
Unemployed 379 2.4% 33 11.7% 
Not in labour force 1,790 11.1% 19 6.7% 
Total 16,081 100% 283 100% 
 
Table 4-32 compares the pattern of repatriates’ transitions for Takatsuki city 
and Sennan county with those for Ibaraki, Hiroshima and Kanagawa prefectures: some 
repatriates entered the agricultural sector, mostly in family farming. Some were able 
to continue their employment with their previous wartime employers, and some others 
were employed postwar by the public sector. The remainder entered the private sector 









Table 4-32: Repatriates’ postwar occupation, 1956 





Agriculture 27.6% 9.7% 2.5% 1.5% 6.0% 
Public sector 21.8% 20.1% 22.5% 11.4% 12.7% 
Reemployment by 
wartime employers 
2.8% 5.5% 7.7% 17.2% 4.6% 
Skilled employment 13.2% 26.9% 31.3% 39.7% 35.7% 
New sector: industry 3.8% 8.1% 5.2% 4.3% 8.1% 
New sector: tertiary 20.2% 15.5% 14.1% 11.4% 12.7% 
Day labourers 1.8% 2.7% 1.4% 0.6% 1.8% 
Unemployed 7.8% 3.7% 6.1% 5.8% 11.7% 
Out of labour force 1.0% 7.9% 9.4% 8.0% 6.7% 
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
*Figures for Ibaraki, Hiroshima and Kanagawa are taken from Table 4-25. Occupational 
groups where the figures are larger than 15 per cent are shaded in grey. 
 
 This table shows that both in Takatsuki city and Sennan county, the proportion 
of civilian repatriates who seem to have been able to use their wartime skills and 
experiences after repatriation accounted for more than 35% of the individuals in the 
databases. In Takatsuki city, the proportion of individuals who were re-employed by 
their wartime companies was particularly high, at 17.2 per cent. By contrast, the 
proportions of those who were in the postwar public sector in Takatsuki city and 
Sennan county were significantly smaller compared to those in the public sector in 
Ibaraki, Hiroshima and Kanagawa. These differences indicate that in both Takatsuki 
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and Sennan, the private sector’s role might have been more significant than in other 
databases. In order to examine the role of these companies, Table 4-33 lists companies 
which re-employed at least one civilian repatriates in the databases for Takatsuki and 
Sennan. 
Table 4-33: Companies which re-employed repatriates from their overseas branches 
or related companies (number of re-employed repatriate employees in parentheses) 
Takatsuki city (56 individuals) 
Sennan county (13 
individuals) 
Japan National Railways (27), Yuasa Battery (5), 
Japan Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation (3), 
Japan Travel Bureau (3), Kansai Electric Power 
Company (3), Dainichi Metal (2), Meiji Seika (2), 
Asahi Kasei (1), Sekisui Chemical (1), Dainihon 
Bōseki (1), Daiichi Bussan (1), Hitachi 
Shipbuilding (1), Inahata Sangyō (1), Kanegafuchi 
Chemical (1), Nippon Beer (1), Nichimen (1),  
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public 
Corporation (1), Takashimaya Department Store 
(1), Yamaguchigen (1) 
Kansai Electric Power 
Company (4), Ataka Sangyō 
(1), Daiichi Bussan (1), 
Dainihon Bōseki (1), Itōchū 
Shoji (1), Japan National 
Railways (1), Marubeni Iida 
(1), Postal services (1), 
Takashimaya Department 
Store (1), Tenri Kyōkai (1) 
 
 In both Takatsuki and Sennan, public corporations including the Japan 
National Railways and Kansai Electric Company, were among those who employed 
some of their wartime employees. The role of the Japan National Railways looks 
particularly significant, and in Takatsuki city, 26 individuals out of 325 civilian 
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repatriates were re-employed by the JNR. This is a significant number, but this also 
may reflect the fact that there was JNR corporate housing in Takatsuki and many might 
have commuted to various JNR work places in the Osaka region.123 Other public 
corporations such as the Kansai Electric Power Company, the Japan Tobacco and Salt 
Public Corporation, and the Japan Travel Bureau (JTB) also employed a part of their 
repatriate staff members. In the early postwar period, the JTB was involved in the 
repatriation of Japanese soldiers from Southeast Asia. The company also provided the 
Allied Occupation Forces members with travel agent services. In this process, some 
repatriates might have been re-employed for their experience.124 As shown in this 
section, the Tobacco and Salt Public Corporation also employed other repatriates. 
 One interesting characteristic of the resettlement pattern in both Takatsuki city 
and Sennan county is that there were several industrial clusters in these municipalities, 
which employed a group of repatriates. For example, in Sennan county, textiles was a 
major sector.  In the 1956 survey, 96 out of 283 civilian repatriates were in industry in 
Sennan county, of which approximately half (45 individuals) were working in the 
textile sector. The textile sector in Sennan consisted of not only textile manufacturers, 
but also dye and fashion accessory manufactures, and major trading companies, 
including Daiichi Bussan (Mitsui Corporation), Itōchū Shoji, Marubeni Iida and Ataka 
Sangyō. In the group of repatriates in Sennan, who were in the textile sector, roughly 
half had been in the textile sector during the war, mostly as technicians or office clerks. 
They were repatriated from Manchuria (10 individuals), Korea (four individuals), 
China (three individuals) and Southeast Asia (two individuals). In the mid-1950s, 
                                                
123 JR, "Takatsuki Shi Jōsaicho No Shataku Atochi Ni Hūzu Market Satake Ga Ōpun," news release, 
2012. 
124  Nihon Kōtsu Kōsha 50 Nenshi Hensan Iinkai, Sōhatsuteki Shinka Ni Mukete: Chōsakenkyū 
Senmonkikan 50 Nen No Rekishi (Tokyo: Japan Travel Bureau, 2014), 6-8. 
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textile was an important industrial sector in Japan and it seems the cluster in Sennan 
county attracted workers from outside of Osaka prefecture. In the group of 49 postwar 
textile workers, the family registration addresses of only 18 individuals were in Osaka, 
and the remaining 31 seem to have moved from other prefectures, mostly in western 
Japan, including some from Kyūshū island.  
 In addition to Sennan county, Takatsuki city was home to other types of 
industrial sectors including shipbuilding companies, battery manufacturers, chemical 
and pharmaceutical firms, tobacco manufacturers, cellophane manufacturers and 
textile companies. In these sectors, major companies re-employed some repatriate 
staff members and some firms also hired other repatriates as new staff members. For 
example, the Japan National Railways re-employed 28 from wartime public 
corporations in transport in the Japanese empire. Hitachi shipbuilding re-employed 
one and hired 14 new staff members. The figures for Yuasa Battery were five re-
employed and five new staff members and those for the Japan Tobacco and Salt Public 
Corporation were three re-employed and seven new staff members. Additionally, 
Dainihon Cellophane employed seven repatriates as new staff members, while this 
company did not have re-employed staff members. Table 4-34 shows a list of 
companies in Takatsuki city, which employed more than seven repatriates in the 








Table 4-34: Examples of repatriates’ new employment at major companies in 
Takatsuki city (Companies which employed more than seven repatriates) 
Company 
Repatriates’ wartime 
occupation or employer 
Postwar jobs (number of 
individuals in parentheses) 
Hitachi 
Shipbuilding 
Factory workers of steel 
manufacturers in Manchuria 
(2), an owner of a small 
trading company in China 
(1), an office clerk of a small 
transport company in Korea 
(1) 
Factory workers (4) 
 
Staff members of wartime 
railway public corporations 
(4) 
Security guards (3), unspecified 
staff member (1) 
Public servants in Korea and 
Taiwan (5), a hair dresser in 
China (1) 
White-collar workers (6) 
Yuasa Battery 
Staff member of a battery 
manufacturer in Manchuria 
(1) 
Factory worker (1) 
Public servants in Taiwan 
and Korea (2) 
Railway maintenance staff 
member of the SMR (1) 
Office clerks (3) 
 
Staff member of the Bank of 
Korea (1) 





Public servant (1) Warehouse staff member (1) 
Food shop owner (1) Security guard (1) 
Staff members of 
construction companies in 
China and Malaysia (2), staff 
member of a tobacco 
manufacturer in China (1), 
staff member of a wholesale 
firm in Manchuria (1) and 
office clerk of the South 






Factory worker of 
machinery manufacturer (1) 
Factory worker (1) 
Staff member of a chemist 
shop (1) 
Human resource department staff 
member (1) 
Staff member of oil 
company in Korea (1) 
Staff member of the product 
quality control section (1) 
Reclamation farmer in 
Manchuria (1), staff 
members of Manchuria Steel 
(2), South Manchuria 
Railway’s training school 
student (1) 
Unspecified (4) 
Total 33 repatriates 
* Repatriates who might have been able to use their wartime skills are typed in bold. 
 
Table 4-34 shows that the most common new jobs for repatriates at major employers 
in Takatsuki city were office clerks and factory workers. Some had previous 
experience (they are typed in bold in Table 4-34), but for the majority, these were new 
postwar jobs. In the previous analysis of new job opportunities in new sectors for the 
repatriates in Ibaraki, Hiroshima and Kanagawa, these were categorised as Level 2 
jobs (See Table 4-27).  
These companies’ businesses in Osaka are different from those observed in the 
databases of Ibaraki, Hiroshima and Kanagawa in the sense that in Osaka, light 
industry such as textiles and tobacco, occupied more significant positions. 
Furthermore, several industrial clusters co-existed, which included not only major 
firms but also medium or small-sized companies as important participants in each 
cluster. This sort of dynamism of economy in Osaka might have attracted a significant 
number of individuals, including repatriates, to the region. For example, out of 33 
individuals who were working for major employers, 16 repatriates had been moved 
from other prefectures. It is certainly difficult to know the full picture of the transition 
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in Osaka prefecture only from an analysis of two municipalities. However, this 
analysis shows us one aspect of repatriates’ resettlement patterns. 
Behind this dynamism, Table 4-32 also suggest that the unemployment rate of 
repatriates might have been higher than that for the total population for both Takatsuki 
and Sennan. It is certainly difficult to know with any accuracy the unemployment rate 
in this analysis. However, for Sennan county, it would be worth mentioning that there 
is one small town called Kumatori chō where 20 repatriates participated in the national 
survey into repatriates’ postwar lives in 1956. The number of unemployed repatriates 
(at working age) was particularly high and six out of 20 were unemployed in the 
database, of which five were reported as ‘a patient’. In Kumatori town, there were five 
other individuals who responded in the survey that they were nurses in a mental 
hospital. There is no way of knowing whether the five patients were in the same 
hospital, but self-reporting as ‘a patient,’ is quite unusual in the 1956 survey and no 
other individuals responded that they were patients in any other databases. Therefore, 
in the case of Kumatori town, it would be reasonable to assume that they were 
hospitalized in the same hospital, most likely, where the five nurses were working.  
The profile of these patients at the end of the war were a 29-year-old office 
clerk in Manchuria, a 31-year-old restaurant staff member in Saipan, a 20-year-old 
fireman of the South Manchuria Railway, a 37-year old actor in Manchuria and a 28-
year-old dancer in Shanghai. In this group of patients, only the actor was originally 
from Osaka (Osaka city), and the other four were from Tokyo, Niigata, Wakayama 
and Fukuoka respectively. The profile of the nurses in August 1945 were a 37-year 
old engine driver and a 31-year-old conductor, both repatriated from the South 
Manchuria Railway, a 47-year old office clerk who had worked for the Korean 
Railway and a 33-year old technician at a leather manufacturing company in Korea. 
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They were all male nurses and there was only one female nurse, who had been a 19-
year-old telephone operator of the Transport Department in the Seoul City 
Government. In the group of nurses, only one person (the office clerk of the Korean 
Railway) was originally from Osaka and the other individuals were from Ishikawa and 
Kagoshima prefectures. The profile of male nurses, who were more likely to be 
employed in mental hospitals, indicates that the patients’ conditions might have been 
serious. It is difficult to know more details about this hospital including how the nurses 
had been recruited, but repatriate patients and nurses who were living in Kumatori 
town in 1956 may reveal one shadowy aspect of the postwar lives of repatriates. 
    
Conclusion 
The findings identified in this chapter indicate that in all the prefectures chosen for 
research on the 1956 survey, repatriates’ job placements in the postwar period were 
influenced by a number of factors: the presence of the agriculture sector, 
reemployment by wartime employers or related companies, and the government’s 
employment policies (such as hiring at government offices). The role of the public and 
semi-public sectors in resettling the repatriates by absorbing approximately one-
quarter of the repatriates in my sample should be emphasised. By 1956, some were no 
longer in the labour force, or were unemployed. The remainder had to find their own 
employment mainly in the private sector. However, about half were able to make use 
of their skills in postwar Japan, working as white-collar workers, skilled or semiskilled 
workers in industry or experienced participants in the tertiary sector. The other half 
entered new sectors. 
These findings contrast sharply with some of the prevailing notions that 
repatriates were totally neglected by the state and society and unreasonably suffered 
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after their repatriation. Certainly, repatriates’ transitional experiences were different 
in each sector or occupational group, and some certainly experienced difficult 
transitions. This was particularly true for reclamation farmers who returned from 
Manchuria, and older repatriates who were not preferred by Japanese firms, especially 
major firms. However, by 1956, ten years after the defeat, the majority seem to have 
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Through much of its modern history, the Japanese government has used public 
corporations to secure funding from the private sector.1 During the Second World War, 
these public corporations were called kokusakugaisha2 or tokushugaisha. In Japan’s 
overseas territories, such public corporations played major roles in the development 
of industries and infrastructure. In terms of the number of employees and the scale of 
business operations, one of the largest and most influential public corporations outside 
Japan was the South Manchuria Railway Company (SMR).3 In this chapter, the SMR 
refers to the company as a whole, including railway operations and other related 
activities, such as the operation of coal mines, trading, and warehouse management. 
One of the findings in the analysis of the 1956 repatriate survey undertaken for 
this research is that many repatriates had worked for the SMR group during the war. 
For example, in Kanagawa, 18.9 per cent of the civilian repatriate sample in the 
database for this research had worked for the SMR group. The equivalent figure is 
19.0 per cent for the Ibaraki prefecture sample and 8.9 per cent for Hiroshima 
















of the sample in Takatsuki city and 9.9 per cent in Sennan county. This chapter will 
examine the postwar experiences of SMR returnees as one of the major groups among 
Japanese civilian repatriates. Regarding Osaka prefecture, due to the fact that survey 
forms have been collected only from two municipalities, this chapter omits the analysis 
of Osaka and will focus on the other three prefectures Ibaraki, Hiroshima and 
Kanagawa for which we have the most comprehensive data. 
The focus on the SMR certainly raises the issue of representativeness, but this 
case study also offers interesting insights due to the SMR’s large number of employees, 
and their diversified roles in the company, ranging from unskilled labourers and skilled 
technicians to top-notch engineers and executive managers.  Despite their importance, 
the postwar economic experiences of the SMR repatriates have not been fully 
researched. This was perhaps because in postwar Japan, the SMR became a symbol of 
Japanese wartime aggression, and it seems that many SMR repatriates may have 
concealed their wartime experiences in order to avoid unwanted accusations. 
Furthermore, scholars have been more interested in the company’s involvement in 
political and military activities, rather than its employment system or the activities of 
individual SMR employees. All of these facts seem to have contributed to the lack of 
scholarly attention to the postwar economic activities of the repatriate SMR employees. 
As will be shown later in this chapter, the repatriation of the SMR staff members was 









In this chapter, the 1956 repatriate survey into repatriates’ postwar lives is 
again used as a core source material. For the purposes of this chapter, however, this 
information was matched with SMR staff records kept at the Mantetsukai, a postwar 
organisation of the SMR established in Tokyo in December 1946 to assist repatriates’ 
job search, to collect information on staff members who had been detained in Siberia 
or were still in China, and to help retrieve the employees’ financial assets, including 
savings kept at the SMR’s financial department. 5  The Mantetsukai later became 
responsible for the payment of retirement benefits to former staff members,6 and it 
prepared a full set of records of approximately 100,000 employees (excluding 
employees of the SMR’s subsidiaries), which included name, date of birth, the date 
he/she joined the company, the rank, the dates of promotion, monthly or daily salary, 
and postwar addresses. It was possible to match 97.1 per cent of repatriate SMR 
members for whom individual personal information was available in the Hiroshima 
database (34 out of 35 SMR staff members) and 92.5% in Kanagawa (74 out of 80 
SMR staff members) with the information on individual SMR staff members collected 
by the Mantetsukai. This allows us to track these SMR staff members’ wartime and 
postwar transitions in detail. In addition to these primary source materials, the research 
has used various documents published by the Mantetsukai, including lists of 
Mantetsukai members published in 1948, 1956, 1961 and 1966 as well as its 










have been taken from Heisakikan to sono Tokushu Seisan,7 which was edited by the 
Japanese committee8   responsible for the closure of wartime public corporations, 
under the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. In addition to 
these source materials, this chapter also uses various other information, including two 
books about the SMR,9 both of which analyse the history of the SMR, including its 
political position in Manchuria, as well as its business operations and activities of its 
staff members. The first of these books were written by the current administration 
officer of the Mantetsukai, using the SMR’s original documents. The latter was 
authored by a scholar who has researched the repatriation problem in the context of 
northeast Asia’s post-World War II settlement. 
In English literature, there are several books written on the SMR or which 
touch on the company, although their focuses are not on its individual staff members’ 
wartime or postwar activities. Perhaps the most recent one is Significant Soil by 
O’Dwyer which focuses on the pre-war Kwantung Leased Territory and the railway 
zones administrator by the SMR.10 This book vividly depicts lives of Japanese and 
Chinese people, the administrative structure, and the role of the SMR in the city 
development. Although this book’s focus is on the period before the majority of 
Japanese repatriates had arrived to Manchuria, it is useful to understand the SMR’s 
activities before the war intensified. Empires of Profit11 by Daniel Litvin analyses the 
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imperialism, including the British East India Company. The subtitle of the SMR 
chapter in the book is Violent Acquisitions. It would be worth mentioning that these 
two books saw the SMR as an enormously powerful imperial corporation. This is 
certainly true, but truly politically influential staff members were only a handful of 
employees and the majority of the Japanese, as well as Chinese staff members, 
included numerous ordinary staff members, who are the main focus of this research. 

The South Manchuria Railway Company (SMR) was established in 1906. In the 
agreement in the Treaty of Portsmouth after the Russo-Japanese War, Russia handed 
over the southern branch line of the Chinese Eastern Railway connecting the 
Lyushunkou District and Changchun, including branch lines and areas along these 
railways (fuzokuchi) which were necessary for railway operation and coal mines.12
(O’Dwyer calls this region the Railway Zone). The SMR was responsible for not only 
the operation of railways but also coal mines, water services, electrical services, 
railway cargo services, warehousing, real estate services, as well as other associated 
services. The company was also authorised to administer infrastructure building, 
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 As of September 1944, the SMR (excluding subsidiaries) employed 398,301 
employees, consisting of 138,804 Japanese and 259,497 employees of other 
nationalities (Chinese, Manchurian and Russians).14 The number of Japanese staff 
members on leave for military service was 27,100 at this time. This number can be 
expected to have increased further toward the end of the war although no statistics are 
available. At the SMR, all employees were called shain (staff members), and the term 
included shokuin (career track personnel with degrees from higher professional 
schools or universities), junshokuin (skilled personnel with degrees from middle 
schools and equivalent educational institutions), koin (employees with degrees from 
higher elementary schools) and yin (unskilled employees). Among shokuin, a small 
number of section chiefs (sanji) and sub-section chiefs (fukusanji) were included, who 
were usually university or professional school graduates. In 1942, the SMR changed 
the job classification system and all Japanese yin were upgraded to koin, meaning 
that all yin were non-Japanese in 1944.  Table 5-1 shows the breakdown of employees 
in these ranks in order to show that approximately half of the Japanese staff members 
were koin, and that despite being koin they still had a higher rank than approximately 
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 ‘Non-Japanese’ in the statistics were mostly Chinese. Koreans and Taiwanese 
were categorised as ‘Japanese’ in the statistics and it is difficult to know how many 
Koreans and Taiwanese were employed by the SMR because they were registered with 
their Japanese names. Staff members could be promoted to higher ranks, often by 
taking promotion exams. Opportunities for non-Japanese people were limited, but 
there were some Chinese employees occupying important positions, such as station 
masters or engine drivers, and they were categorised as shokuin. The number of skilled 
Chinese staff members increased towards the end of the war due to shortages of 
Japanese employees because of military conscription, which forced the SMR to train 
a large number of Chinese staff members and promote them to more important 
positions. The number of Chinese staff members was larger in rural regions. This was 
specifically true in actual railway operations. For example, among five regional 
railway divisions at the SMR, it appears the Qiqihar Division had the highest 










where the majority of customers were Chinese and where the company was not able 
to allocate sufficient Japanese staff members. In the SMR’s employee statistics in 
September 1944, the engine depots in the Qiqihar Division employed 521 Japanese 
and 1,957 Chinese employees. The Japanese outnumbered the Chinese only in 
managerial positions, including station masters and section chiefs. (The figure for 
Japanese managers was 103, while that for Chinese mangers was 25). In all other 
positions, the number of Chinese was larger. Chinese employees worked as 523 engine 
drivers, 641 firemen and 768 technicians, while there were only 184 Japanese engine 
drivers, 163 firemen and 60 technicians.16
The SMR had tens of subsidiaries and related companies.17 Examples of these 
include the North China Railway (Kahoku Kts), the Manchuria Steel Company 
(Mansh Seitetsu), International Transport (Kokusai Un’yu), Japan-Manchuria 
Warehouse (Nichiman Sko), the Dalian Steamship Line Company (Dairen Kisen), 
the Dalian Urban Transport Company (Dairen Toshi Kts), the Manchuria Film 
Association (Mansh Eiga Kykai), the Japan Paraffin Wax Company (Nippon Seir), 
and Manchuria Mining (Mansh Kgy). 
The North China Railway (Kahoku Kts) was the largest subsidiary and the 
SMR transferred 15,600 Japanese and 3,000 Chinese staff members from various 
branches in Manchuria to Kahoku Kts when it was founded in 1939. The 
establishment of the North China Railway was a part of Japan’s effort to consolidate 
the economies of Japan-Manchuria-China, as the importance of the Chinese economy 









started in 1937.18 At the end of the war, the total of 195,502 Kahoku Kts staff 
members included 148,169 Chinese and 47,333 Japanese, including approximately 
10,000 Japanese SMR staff members who had been transferred from Manchuria to 
China.19   
Across a wide range of sections and subsidiaries, various sorts of SMR 
employees were working as unskilled blue collar workers at railway sections, factories 
and coalmines in addition to having jobs as semi-skilled technicians, experienced 
engineers, engine drivers, automobile drivers, conductors, researchers at the Social 
Science Research Department (Chsabu) and the Central Laboratory (Chu Shikenjo), 
managers, and office clerks, as well as being hotel staff. It is against this background, 
therefore, that this chapter examines the occupational transitions of a large number of 
SMR repatriates possessing diversified skills and experiences as a case study of 
Japanese civilian repatriates’ postwar economic experiences.  
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In the 1956 national survey into repatriates’ lives, one of the findings was that a large 
number of civilian repatriates had been affiliated with either the SMR or one of its 
subsidiaries. This makes the SMR repatriates an interesting case study in terms of the 
postwar occupational transitions of Japanese civilian repatriates. The proportion of 









per cent and 19.0 per cent responded that they had worked for the SMR group during 
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 This table shows that the SMR repatriates accounted for a significant part of 
the repatriate population. Although the SMR had various subsidiaries, due to the 
limited availability of source materials and possibly different experiences of affiliated 
repatriates, this chapter will only examine the occupational transitions of those who 
worked for the SMR including its railway operations and other sections, as well as 
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those who had temporarily been posted from the SMR to the North China Railway 
after the latter was established in 1939. The analysis here excludes the staff members 
of SMR subsidiary companies, focussing on its core railway activities, because 
detailed employment information is available only for the SMR staff members in the 
document kept at Mantetsukai, and similar information for employees of the SMR’s 








The SMR staff members had migrated to Manchuria for various reasons. Table 5-3 
summarises the timing of SMR repatriates’ arrival in Manchuria and their entry into 
the SMR. We can see that the figures are concentrated in the years between 1932 when 
Manchukuo was established and 1941, when the Pacific War broke out.  This suggests 
that their migration was decided in the context of Japan’s wartime aggression and that 
their length of overseas residence was generally short. In addition, many were 
technical skill holders and received training in their workplaces or training schools 
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In order to understand the characteristics of the migration of the SMR’s staff 
members, Table 5-4 shows the reasons for their migration to Manchuria. The largest 
group started working at the SMR within one year of their arrival in Manchuria. This 
group includes those who had been admitted to the company via recruitment within 






of their date of emigration. The original purposes of migration of the latter group are 
not clear, but it is possible that they had arrived in Manchuria to seek employment, 
and took and passed an entrance exam in Manchuria to join the company. These 
individuals’ overseas economic experiences were for the most part limited to their 
work experiences at the SMR, and their exposure to local society is likely to have been 
limited. The next largest group joined the company after they had spent more than one 
year in Manchuria after their date of emigration. The smallest group includes those 
who were born in Manchuria or some other place outside of Japan, or had emigrated 
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The length of these SMR repatriates’ overseas residence was generally shorter 
than that of non-SMR repatriates. The average length of stay for the SMR repatriates 
in the database for Ibaraki was 9.6 years, that for Hiroshima was 11.2 years and that 
for Kanagawa was 12.2 years. The corresponding figures for the total civilian 






10.7 years for Ibaraki, 15.0 years for Hiroshima and 12.7 years for Kanagawa, which 
supports the case that the SMR repatriates generally spent a slightly shorter time in 
Manchuria than other groups of the repatriate population did. In the SMR sample, as 
Table 5-5 shows, the average age of joining the company was in the mid-20s, 
indicating that many SMR employees had previous work experiences at other 









For SMR repatriates living in Kanagawa and Hiroshima prefectures, it is 
possible to know their initial rank and subsequent promotion dates to higher ranks, 
because the prefectural archives allow a researcher to see the names of the participants 
in the 1956 national survey, which can then be matched with the SMR’s employment 
records produced by the Mantetsukai. The majority of the Japanese SMR staff 
members appear to have been higher elementary school graduates, because many had 
started their career from the lowest rank of koin, a rank which was the starting point 
for higher elementary school graduates, as Table 5-6 shows. Out of the SMR 
repatriates in the Hiroshima and Kanagawa databases, we find that a minority (11.4 
per cent in Hiroshima and 11.2 per cent in Kanagawa) identified themselves as white-






in the Hiroshima database and 88.8 per cent in the Kanagawa database) were working 
in railway services or related sections, the majority of who seem to have been engaged 

























	  /  8 
*	     

	     
,	=     




	 0 9  / /
*	 /    

	 9  /   
,	=    9 9
	  8 8  / 8
N 
"     56 &	,#  C( &"	)&	   & 	""
.	%	%,	##		.	%	,	))("#
	4#  56	!4   56' %" &# )
 /"	"			#<&	,&"##!
During their service at the SMR, staff members were able to obtain promotion 
to the next rank after working for the company for several years if they could receive 








Kanagawa, we find that the majority of koin (26 out of 29 in Hiroshima and 42 out of 
51 in Kanagawa) were promoted to higher ranks. The minimum required service years 
was four years to be promoted from koin to junshokuin and two years to be promoted 
from junshokuin to the highest rank of shokuin. Another promotion path was to pass 
an exam, which included reading comprehension of the Japanese language, 
mathematics, the Chinese language, the English language and the Russian language.26   
The SMR also established various training schools within the company to 
develop the skills of young staff members. These schools specialised in a number of 
areas, including railway operations, railcar factory production, steel manufacturing, 
and general middle school education. In September 1944, a total of 5,128 Japanese 
staff members (3.7 per cent of the total of 138,804 Japanese staff members) and 3,027 
Chinese staff members (1.2 per cent) were on leave to attend these training schools.27
The educational opportunities would have been valuable in increasing the job-related 
knowledge of young staff members. This was specifically true of those who had only 
received elementary school education and had not had chances to attend upper schools. 
By the end of the war, the SMR employees had worked for the company for 
approximately 10 years, as Table 5-7 shows, and their average age ranged from 31.7 
(in the Ibaraki sample) to 34. 5 years old (Kanagawa sample). Overall, many were still 
young and relatively skilled as a result of basic school education as well as on the job 
training at the SMR. This suggests that SMR repatriates could be a valuable part of 
the Japanese labour force. 
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It is difficult to estimate the exact number of SMR employees in August 1945. 
As previously mentioned, the SMR had 138,804 Japanese staff members in 1944.29
The number of staff members who were able to return to work for the company in 
September 1945 was approximately 80,000.30 There is a reduction of approximately 
54,000 staff members between these two figures. We cannot know the detail of any 
changes in the numbers of SMR staff members, but several reasons may be suggested. 
Firstly, some may have died in the war and some others may have already been 
repatriated to Japan along with Japanese troops. Others were taken to Siberia to be 
detained by the U.S.S.R. Secondly, many Koreans and Taiwanese, who had been 
recorded as Japanese in the company’s wartime statistics, are likely to have left the 
company at the end of the war. 
It is not clear how many of the SMR employees were in the military at the end 
of the war. In the database created from the 1956 national survey, only five individuals 
in Ibaraki (out of 59 SMR repatriates in the database), two (out of 80 individuals) in 
Kanagawa, and two (out of 35) in Hiroshima responded that they had been drafted, 
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but for other individuals, it is not clear whether they were on leave from the company 
in order to be in the military or not. In addition, some former SMR repatriates resigned 
from the company when they were conscripted. As the war intensified, it became 
increasingly difficult for the SMR to keep recording who had been drafted, especially 
in the case of regional depots. This was particularly true after one of the last large-
scale emergency mobilisations (often called nekosogi din) was ordered in Manchuria 
on 10th July, 1945, in which approximately 200,000 individuals were drafted, 





After the war, the SMR was taken over by the Soviet Union on 22 September 1945. 
The company continued its operation as the China Changchun Railway,32  a joint 
company of the U.S.S.R. and the Republic of China established under the agreement 
of the Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship and Alliance concluded on 14th August 1945. 
The U.S.S.R. controlled the new company until the Soviet military started to withdraw 
from Manchuria in March 1946 based on the agreement in the treaty.33 During the 
period of transition immediately after the war, approximately 80,000 Japanese SMR 
employees were instructed to remain at the company to continue their jobs, now at the 
China Changchun Railway. The operation of the SMR was gradually transferred to the 
Soviet military and the number of Japanese staff members was reduced to 
approximately 53,000 by February 1946.34  Some SMR staff members started to return 
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to Japan after May 1946 when official repatriation started, while hundreds of others 
continued to work in Manchuria until 1948, and in some cases, up until 1955. The 
number of Japanese detainees (ryysha) in Manchuria working for theGuomindang 
in December 1946 was reported to be 9,654, with 21,428 family members. This figure 
included SMR staff members. The number of Japanese detainees (including former 
SMR staff members) on the Communist side has been estimated to be approximately 
8,000, but official reports do not exist.35   
For these reasons, the repatriation of SMR staff members was generally 
delayed. In the database compiled for this research, for example, we find that of the 
total civilian repatriate population which includes the SMR repatriates, 73.5 per cent 
in Ibaraki, 81.3 per cent in Hiroshima and 82.7 per cent in Kanagawa had been 
repatriated by the end of 1946. However, the equivalent figures for SMR repatriates 
alone were significantly lower: only 61.0 per cent of the SMR repatriates in Ibaraki, 
74.3 per cent in Hiroshima and 72.5 per cent in Kanagawa had returned to Japan by 
the end of 1946. Table 5-8 shows the timing of repatriation of the SMR repatriates in 
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A number of scholars have suggested that individuals who returned late 
experienced difficulty in finding a job because promising jobs had already been taken 
when they arrived into Japan and the Japanese general public viewed the repatriates 
who had been detained in the U.S.S.R. and China with some suspicion, thinking that 
these repatriates might have been influenced by communism. However, regarding 
SMR repatriates, very little evidence has been provided in support of this claim, which 
has also been taken up by the media.37 Despite their generally slower repatriation, not 
all SMR repatriates experienced negative transitions as will be discussed later in this 
chapter. Rather, postwar settlement was affected not only by the timing of repatriation, 
but also by factors such as age, skills and the ability to move to places where jobs were 
available. Specifically, if repatriates were skilled and more mobile, the likelihood of 
an individual obtaining a favourable job could increase, and this was what happened 
to some SMR repatriates. 
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As Table 5-9 shows, a majority of SMR repatriates in the database settled in 
their hometowns after their repatriation. We find that 78.0 per cent of the SMR 
repatriates in Ibaraki, 85.7 per cent in Hiroshima and 60.0 per cent in Kanagawa 
prefecture responded that on returning to Japan they had first settled in their 
hometowns. If we compare this with all civilian repatriates in each prefecture, we can 
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 If the place of initial settlement and the 1956 (ten years after the war) place of 
residence of SMR repatriates are compared with those of all repatriates in each 
prefecture, the SMR repatriates show greater mobility, and the proportion of the SMR 
repatriates living in their hometowns declined faster than that of the repatriate 
population as a whole. It should also be noted that 27.1 per cent of SMR repatriates 
living in Ibaraki in 1956 had moved in from other prefectures since the time of their 
repatriation. The equivalent figure for Hiroshima was 34.3 per cent, and for Kanagawa 
58.8 per cent. This indicates that while the majority of SMR repatriates initially 
returned to their hometowns, they were more willing to move to other places than 
seems to have been the case with other civilian repatriates, often moving across 
prefectural borders.  
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This section analyses job experiences of SMR repatriates shown in the 1956 survey 
into repatriates’ postwar lives. When they started thinking about postwar occupations, 
entering the Japan National Railways seems to have been the most favoured option for 
many SMR repatriates. In addition to the JNR, the public sector also employed 
repatriates and other war-affected individuals as part of policies to reduce 
unemployment. Some others found employment using their skills in the private sector, 
while others took up new jobs in sectors in which they had no previous experience. 
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For many SMR repatriates, postwar employment at the JNR was the most favoured 
option. According to the documents of a support association for repatriate railway 
workers (Tairiku Tetsud Jjiin Engokai) in Tokyo, the total number of repatriates 
who had worked for wartime railways in the Japanese empire was estimated to be 
approximately 180,000.41 According to the organisation’s annual report for the fiscal 
year of 1948, approximately 20 per cent of the railway repatriates, including those 
from the SMR, were offered a place by the JNR. If this statement is correct, it means 
that approximately 36,000 railway repatriates were employed by the JNR by 1948 (the 
month is not known). In the fiscal year of 1947, the total number of JNR staff members 
was approximately 600,000. 42  If these two figures are compared, we find that 
approximately 6 per cent of the total JNR staff members were repatriate railway 
workers, including SMR repatriates, around the years of 1947 and 1948. The 1956 
survey database shows that 6.8 per cent of SMR repatriates in Ibaraki (4 out of 59 
individuals), 17.1 per cent (6 out of 35 individuals) in Hiroshima and 16.3 per cent (13 
individuals out of 80) in Kanagawa were working for the Japan National Railways. 
Employment at the JNR was partly a result of the petition submitted by the association 
of repatriated foreign railway staff members, details of which will be included later in 
this chapter. In order to understand who might be employed by the JNR, Table 5-12 
shows the list of the SMR repatriates in the database who were working for the JNR 
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in 1956, and their wartime sections, age, rank at the SMR in August 1945, educational 
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Table 5-12 indicates that many SMR repatriates who entered the JNR were 
relatively young or had specific skills, including those related to electrical engineering or 
train driving. However, the JNR’s hiring policies seem to have been different in each 
prefecture. For example, all four individuals in the Ibaraki database who were working 
for the JNR in 1956, were in their 20s in 1945. By contrast, the JNR in Hiroshima 
employed skilled repatriates who seem to have had experience in electrical engineering, 
train driving and maintenance. They were not necessarily young; four out of six SMR 
repatriates were in their mid-30s or older at the end of the war. The JNR in Kanagawa 
employed both young SMR repatriates and skilled individuals who had experience of 
electrical work as well as train operation and maintenance. In addition, possibly due to 
the expansion of railway services in the early postwar period, the four individuals in the 
Kanagawa database had been employed as station staff members. It should also be noted 
that in all the prefectures the majority who found employment at the JNR had been 
repatriated by the end of 1946. Many changed addresses after repatriation and often 
moved from other prefectures, possibly to seize job opportunities at the JNR.   
According to the employees’ records kept at the Mantetsukai, the majority of 
individuals in this table started their career as koin but had been promoted to shokuin by 
the end of the war. This means that the individuals in this table had been higher 
elementary school graduates, but managed to get promoted by acquiring useful skills, 
obtaining references from their supervisors, or by passing promotion exams. In addition, 
it should be noted that all individuals included in this table were technical skill holders or 
individuals who had worked in the SMR’s railway related sections, and that no white-
collar workers appear in the table despite the fact that a large number of white-collar 
workers had worked at the SMR as managers and office clerks. It appears that the JNR 
preferred to reemploy technical skill holders rather than white-collar workers. This 
indicates that hiring by the JNR was not merely a result of the government’s employment 
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policies, but that the JNR might have attempted to employ individuals who were useful 
for its operations. In any case, however, it is clear that the JNR was one of the most 
important employers for the SMR repatriates after repatriation. The number of SMR 
repatriates employed by the JNR might have been lower than the SMR repatriates’ 




In addition to the JNR, the public sector was an important destination for the SMR 
repatriates. The proportion of SMR repatriates in the public and the semi-public sector in 
each prefecture’s database was 13.6 per cent in Ibaraki, 17.1 per cent in Hiroshima and 
25.0 per cent in Kanagawa. The proportion of the SMR repatriates in the public sector 
was actually lower compared to the figure for all civilian repatriates (including the SMR 
repatriates) in Ibaraki and Hiroshima, but higher than that of all civilian repatriates in 
Kanagawa, because a larger number of SMR repatriates were employed in American 
military bases as quasi-public servants (jun kmuin) in Kanagawa prefecture. If we 
analyse this further, SMR repatriates in the postwar public sector can be categorised into 
three groups: a) those who found employment at local government offices in their 
hometowns; b) a small number of individuals who moved to other places to find a better 
job in the public sector, which might have met their skill levels or interests and c) those 
who worked for foreign military bases.  
Individuals in the first group (labelled (a) above) were the majority of all former 
SMR employees moving into the public sector. They were generally older than other 
SMR repatriates, and the proportion who had been repatriated in 1947 or after was larger 
than was the case for other SMR repatriates. This indicates that public employment of 
this type might have been a result of the government’s employment policies to help 
repatriates to settle in the new postwar society. The second group (group (b) above) 
consisted of a small number of individuals who had been educated at universities or 
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higher professional schools. Some of them had been senior managers at the SMR. This 
group included older repatriates and those who experienced delayed repatriation, but they 
nevertheless managed to find employment in the public sector. The third group (group (c) 
above) were those who worked for foreign military bases. They were generally older than 
other SMR repatriates and included a number who arrived back in Japan in 1947 or after. 
It appears that foreign military bases offered a convenient choice to individuals of this 
kind, because the employers perhaps did not question the repatriates’ age. The timing of 
repatriation also mattered to a lesser degree because many local employees in foreign 
military bases worked as temporary staff members and the turnover rate is likely to have 
been high. This could have led to frequent job vacancies that became available even to 
repatriates who returned to Japan relatively later than most others. But job opportunities 
in the service of the foreign military were limited to certain places, such as urban areas in 
Kanagawa. 
In the Ibaraki database, out of 59 SMR repatriates, seven were in the public or 
semi-public sector and all can be categorised in Group A; they lived in their hometowns 
and worked as staff member(s) at post offices (two individuals), at the power plant 
construction division of Yamagata prefecture (though it is not clear whether this person 
had temporarily been transferred to Yamagata), at a local office of the Food Agency, 
agricultural cooperatives (two individuals) and at an accommodation owned by a school 
teacher’s mutual aid association. These individual's average age (31.8 years old) was 
approximately the same as that of other SMR repatriates in the Ibaraki database. However, 
this group tended to be repatriated later than other SMR repatriates, with five out of the 
seven returning after January 1947. In addition, all seven individuals were living in their 
hometowns in 1956. One exception in the public sector in Ibaraki prefecture was an 
individual who was working for the Self Defence Forces as an accountant, who had 
moved into Ibaraki from Niigata, and who can be categorised as belonging to Group B. 
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In Ibaraki, the proportion of the SMR repatriates who were in the public sector in 1956 
was lower than that of the prefecture’s repatriate population as a whole, but public sector 
employment still appears to have been a convenient option for the SMR repatriates who 
experienced delayed repatriation or who were living in their hometowns in 1956. 
In the Hiroshima database, six individuals out of 35 SMR repatriates were in the 
public sector, and all of them can be categorized as belonging to Group A. This group of 
six worked at the waterworks division of Hiroshima city (an SMR engineering specialist), 
at a high school as a teacher (SMR accountant), as an office clerk (SMR office clerk), at 
a tax office (SMR office clerk), at the prefecture’s board of education (SMR office clerk) 
and at the British Commonwealth Forces base in Kure city as an ironer of laundry (SMR 
hotel staff member). All the individuals in this group were living in their hometowns in 
1956. Their average age at the end of the war was 34.8 years old, slightly older than that 
of all SMR repatriates in Hiroshima, which was 32. 8 years old. This can be explained by 
the fact that this group included three senior individuals (a 36-year-old high school 
teacher, a 37-year-old ironer of laundry and a 45-year-old prefectural Board of Education 
staff member). The 37-year-old ironer was repatriated in March 1947, and the waterworks 
specialist was not repatriated until October 1949. These facts suggest that the public 
sector offered employment for those who decided to stay in their hometowns and those 
who might have faced difficulty in finding jobs due to their older age and delayed 
repatriation.  
The pattern of public sector employment shown in the Kanagawa database is 
different. In the Kanagawa database, we find that nine out of 80 SMR repatriates in the 
prefecture were in the Japanese public sector. Additionally, 11 individuals were working 
in American military bases. In the case of the first group, the majority (five out of nine) 
had moved into Kanagawa from neighbouring prefectures (Saitama, Tokyo and 


Yamanashi) to take up jobs at the Ministry of Transport, the Special Procurement Agency, 
the Economic Planning Agency, the Hiratsuka City Government in Kanagawa, and the 
Tax Bureau of the Tokyo Metropolitan Government. These agencies were large 
establishments and seem to have been popular destinations for repatriates in general. 
These individuals can be categorized as being in Group B. All of them were 33 years old 
or younger and seem to have experienced a smooth repatriation. Four of the individuals 
had been repatriated by 1946 and two returned in 1947.  
The other four individuals in this group can be categorised in Group A. They were 
living in their hometowns in 1956 and working respectively as an office clerk, a caretaker 
at public schools, a waterworks specialist, and a transport technician in the Yokohama 
City Government. These four individuals were in a disadvantageous position in the labour 
market; the 19-year-old office clerk was repatriated in September 1949 and the other three 
individuals were already 41 years old, 43 years old and 53 years old respectively in 1956. 
It can be suggested again that these individuals who were older or experienced delayed 
repatriation might have been helped by the government’s employment policies to hire 
repatriates and war-affected individuals to reduce unemployment. 
Eleven SMR repatriates in the Kanagawa database were working at American 
bases in Kanagawa. This group has two distinctive characteristics. Firstly, they were 
much older than other SMR repatriates; their average age was 40.0 years old at the end 
of the war. Secondly, seven out of 11 had been moved in to Kanagawa from various 
prefectures, including prefectures located on Kysh and Shikoku islands. Only half of 
them included any information on their responsibilities at the bases in the 1956 national 
survey, but the individuals who did provide information worked as technicians, a security 
guard and a translator. These individuals worked at the military bases as quasi-public 
servants of the Japanese government, and it appears that employment at the American 
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bases was an important option for repatriates who were older and who were able to move 
to places where job opportunities were available.  
In summary, the public sector offered a convenient option for some SMR 
repatriates. Even for SMR repatriates with limited geographical mobility, who 
experienced delayed repatriation or who were older than other repatriates, this sector 
offered employment opportunities, often in their hometowns.  If they were young or 
mobile, it was also possible to obtain employment at central government agencies. For 
older SMR repatriates who were mobile, American military bases offered unique job 
opportunities. In this way, the public sector played an important role in settling some 
portion of the SMR repatriates. 
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For SMR repatriates who did not find employment at the Japan National Railways and in 
the public sector, the next option seems to have been skilled employment of some kind. 
In the Ibaraki database, nine SMR repatriates (out of 59 total SMR repatriates) found 
skilled employment, with more than half of them (five individuals out of nine) finding 
employment in one company, Nihon Kgy, a related company of Nissan which had been 
a key player in Manchukuo’s five year industrial development plan after 1937 as 
discussed in Chapter 4.45 Others were working for a local construction company, a small 
manufacturer (details unknown), a concrete manufacturing company and a local bus 
service company.  
The hiring process of Nihon Kgy is not documented, but it would be reasonable 
to assume that the postwar Nihon Kgy employed individuals who had skills that could 






repatriates. If we look at the postwar positions of these workers at Nihon Kgy, we find 
that they included a worker in a mineral refinery (whose job at the SMR is not known), a 
miner (a former SMR driver), a construction worker (who had worked in the SMR’s 
inspection division), and two individuals whose responsibilities at Nihon Kgy are not 
known (one had been a staff member of the mining department of the SMR, and the other 
one’s wartime job is not known).  
The nine SMR repatriates in the Ibaraki database who found skilled employment 
were generally young and their average age was 31.8 years old, approximately the same 
as the average of all SMR repatriates in the Ibaraki database, which was 31.7 years old. 
The majority (six out of nine individuals) had moved into Ibaraki prefecture from other 
prefectures (Tokyo, Yamagata, Fukushima, Ehime as well as Nagasaki and Kumamoto 
in Kysh). Only one out of the nine individuals in this group remained in his hometown 
in 1956, while two other individuals had changed their addresses within Ibaraki prefecture. 
Regarding the timing of repatriation, four out of nine individuals in this group (44.4 per 
cent) had been repatriated after January 1947. The experiences of the SMR repatriates in 
this group can be summarised by stating that although their repatriations tended to have 
been delayed, they were still sufficiently young and had skills that could be used in 
postwar industries. They were mobile and obtained employment postwar by moving into 
Ibaraki prefecture. 
In the Hiroshima database, we find that 12 SMR repatriates (out of 35 total SMR 
repatriates in the database) found skilled employment. Four individuals were white-collar 
workers and eight were technical skill holders: two SMR office clerks became office 
clerks of Nippon Express and a construction company, one of the SMR’s Yamato Hotel 
staff members found employment at a beverage company, and an SMR accountant found 
employment at Dents, a major advertising company. Regarding Dents, it would be 
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worth noting that it appears that Dents employed several repatriates who had been senior 
managers at the SMR and Manchuria Newspaper (the SMR’s related company, Mansh
Nichinichi Shimbun) both at its postwar head office in Tokyo and other regional bureaus. 
According to an essay in Dents’s corporate history, the skill levels of its employees were 
not very high at the end of the war. This was because the public sector, zaibatsu companies, 
major banks and public corporations such as the SMR had absorbed talented individuals 
as their employees, and advertising companies, including Dents, were not able to employ 
promising individuals. The young president of Dents, who took the position in 1947, 
started to recruit skilled repatriates who had experience in public relations or management. 
From the SMR, Dents invited the former public relations section chief in the President’s 
Office, and a section chief of the the Administrative and Coordination Division (Bunsho 
ka). It seems that these people invited younger SMR staff members to join Dents. The 
head office of Dents in postwar Tokyo was called ‘the second SMR building’ (Daini 
Mantetsu building) because the company employed a large number of SMR repatriates. 
(The exact number is unknown).46  
Among other technical skill holders, a former SMR automobile driver became a 
taxi driver, while three SMR factory workers found similar employment at a factory of 
the Hiroshima Electric Railway, at Hitachi Shipbuilding and at another manufacturer. 
Another former SMR factory worker became a welder for a machinery manufacturer, a 
staff member of the SMR’s coal mine found employment at Ty Kgy (later renamed 
Matsuda), and a staff member of the SMR’s supply department founded a machinery 
manufacturer. In 1956, almost all 12 individuals in this group were living in large cities 
in Hiroshima prefecture (Hiroshima, Kure and Onomichi cities), except for one individual 






cities. Their mobility was about the same as that of other SMR repatriates in the 
Hiroshima database; five individuals living in their hometowns, four individuals moving 
in from other prefectures (Okayama, Ehime, Ibaraki and Nagasaki) and three individuals 
who had changed their addresses within the prefecture. Their average age was 31.4 years 
old, approximately the same as the average age of the SMR repatriates in the Hiroshima 
database (31.7 years old), but their repatriation tended to have been delayed and four out 
of 12 individuals in this group had been repatriated after January 1947.   
In the Kanagawa database, 32 SMR repatriates (out of 80 total SMR repatriates in 
the database) found skilled employment. They included six white-collar workers, one 
cook and 25 technical skills holders. In the postwar transition, the six white-collar workers 
found similar jobs at a construction company, a paint company, a retail company 
Nagasakiya, the People's Finance Corporation (Kokumin Kin’y Kko) as a researcher, 
an electric company and a hospital. One cook from the SMR’s restaurant found 
employment at Mitsui Corporation as a cook in the staff members’ cafeteria. Out of 25 
technical skill holders who found skilled employment, approximately half (14 
individuals) were working for small or medium-sized enterprises and 11 individuals for 
major firms. Employees of postwar small businesses included employees of an import 
product checker (former SMR staff members of a station and a wharf department); a 
welder (former SMR factory worker); two construction technicians and a certified 
architect (all SMR construction technicians); a painter (SMR mechanic); a plasterer 
(former SMR wharf department staff member); a plumber (an SMR waterworks 
technician; a postwar woodwork factory owner (a former SMR bus service section staff 
member); and two automobile drivers who continued their same jobs.  
Among the other 11 technical skill holders who were working for major 




Their jobs at the SMR had been an electrical technician, two staff members of engine 
depots and two mechanics. Although information on the hiring policies of Nihon Kkan 
is not available, it appears that this firm also employed many skilled SMR repatriates at 
some point between 1945 and 1956, when the company’s business was expanding in the 
postwar growth, similar to the situation of Nihon Kgy in Ibaraki. The employers of the 
other eight individuals who found skilled employment at major companies in Kanagawa 
were Nippon Express (a driver both at the SMR and Nippon Express);  Mitsubishi Heavy 
Industries and Komatsu (former SMR staff members of railway operation controlling 
sections);  the Dainihon Sugar Company (an electrical technician); Tokyo Gas;  aircraft 
manufacturer Nippi (SMR engine depot staff members); and Haneda Airport (a boiler 
man who had been a staff member of the SMR’s warehouse department).  
Almost all 32 individuals in the Kanagawa database who found skilled 
employment were living in large cities such as Yokohama and Kawasaki, except for one 
who was living in Ashigara county, which was still within commuting distance of these 
cities. Among the individuals in this group, 14 individuals who were employed by major 
companies (including white-collar workers and technical skill holders) showed greater 
geographical mobility, and 11 individuals had moved from other prefectures (one from 
each of Tokyo, Chiba, Gunma, Nagano, Yamagata, Fukui, Ehime, Yamaguchi and 
Kagoshima, and two from Niigata), while one had moved within the prefecture and only 
two individuals were living in their hometowns. SMR repatriates who were employed by 
postwar major Japanese firms seem to have been young; their average age was 29.2 years 
old at the end of the war, which was much lower than the average of all SMR repatriates 
in Kanagawa prefecture at 34.3 years old. Their repatriation was relatively smooth and 
14 individuals (87.5 per cent) had been repatriated by the end of 1946.  
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The other group of 16 SMR repatriates who found skilled employment in small 
and medium-sized companies in Kanagawa show different stories. Firstly, they seem to 
have been less mobile. While ten individuals (62.5 per cent) had moved into Kanagawa 
from different prefectures (Fukui, Okayama, Tokyo (2 individuals), Oita, Kagoshima, 
Niigata and Tokushima), five individuals (31.2 per cent) were living in their hometowns 
and just one person had changed his address within the prefecture. Secondly, they were 
older. Their average age in 1945 was 37.3 years old, approximately 8.5 years older than 
the average age of the former group of major corporate employees. Moreover, eight 
individuals (50.0 per cent) had been repatriated after January 1947. This suggests that for 
older but skilled SMR repatriates, small or medium-sized companies, rather than major 
companies, might have offered more accessible employment. 
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For SMR repatriates who did not find employment at the Japan National Railways or in 
the public sector, or who did not find skilled employment, one of the remaining options 
was to enter a new sector. In Ibaraki and Kanagawa, it appears that retail and services 
became an important option for repatriates, but in Hiroshima, more than half of this group 
found new employment in industry. Entering a new sector might have been the SMR 
repatriates’ least favourite option, particularly for those who became postwar small 
business owners in retail and services, whose social status was relatively low in Japanese 
society. However, new employment, often at small businesses, offered the SMR 
repatriates a convenient way of making a living due to lower entry barriers. 
In Ibaraki, 13 SMR repatriates (out of 59 total SMR repatriates in the database) 
found employment in new sectors, and the majority (11 individuals out of 13) became 
small business owners in retail and services. They ran a sweet shop, a grocery, a 
greengrocery, a fashion store, an antique shop, and a tea shop, as well as restaurants and 
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other shops whose details were not included in the 1956 survey. Additionally, one became 
an independent agent for an insurance company. In addition to these 11 small business 
owners, one person was employed in a small trading company in Tokyo, which seems to 
be a new job for this person, (this person possibly commuted from Furukawa city in 
Ibaraki), and another person became a day labourer in Takahagi city in Ibaraki prefecture.   
These 13 individuals’ previous positions at the SMR included two technicians in 
the maintenance section, a station staff member, staff member in the railway operational 
sections (four individuals), a staff member of an engine depot, and a staff member of a 
bus service section; some others did not include information on their wartime 
responsibilities. Out of those who entered new sectors, five out of 13 individuals were 
living in their hometowns in various places within Ibaraki prefecture. This means that 
38.5 per cent were living in their hometowns in 1956, which was clearly a smaller 
proportion than that of all SMR repatriates in Ibaraki prefecture, at 59.0 per cent. The 
other eight individuals had changed their addresses within Ibaraki prefecture or had 
moved into Ibaraki from other prefectures (two individuals from Fukushima and two 
others from Tokyo). Among these 13 individuals, only three were living in the three 
largest cities in the prefecture (Mito, Hitachi and Tsuchiura cities); the others were living 
in smaller towns or villages. Their average age was 32.3 years old, slightly higher than 
the average age of the SMR repatriates in the Ibaraki database (31.7 years old), but their 
repatriation tended to have been delayed, and about half (six out of 13 individuals) in this 
group had been repatriated after January 1947. These trends can be summarized by saying 
that in Ibaraki, many individuals who entered new sectors seem to have experienced 
delayed repatriation, lived in rural regions which were not necessarily their hometowns 
and established small businesses in retail and services.  


In the Hiroshima database, only six SMR repatriates (out of 35 total SMR 
repatriates in the database) found new employment in new sectors. In this group, only one 
individual became a small business owner, and he ran a bean curd (tfu) shop. He had 
been an assistant station master at the SMR, who had first returned to his home prefecture 
Shimane, then moved to Hiroshima city and became the owner of a bean curd shop. The 
other five individuals worked as employees of various postwar companies in Hiroshima 
prefecture, whose business activities were not related to the SMR repatriates’ wartime 
experiences. Their postwar jobs were a staff writer of a local newspaper, an employee of 
a real estate agent, a furniture manufacturer at Teijin Corporation (a major textile 
company), an office clerk at a small manufacturer and a day labourer at Ty Kgy (later 
renamed Matsuda). Their respective previous positions at the SMR had been technician 
at a maintenance department, an assistant station master, a coal miner, a staff member of 
a railway operation control centre, and an office clerk. In postwar Hiroshima, only one 
individual in this sample was living in his hometown (the furniture manufacturer at Teijin 
working in Mihara city) and the five other individuals had either changed addresses within 
Hiroshima prefecture (two individuals) or had moved in from other prefectures (three 
individuals, one each from Yamaguchi, Kagoshima and Shimane prefectures). Four out 
of these five individuals who had changed their addresses by 1956 were living in 
Hiroshima city or Kure city. All six individuals had been repatriated before the end of 
1946. The average age of this group was 34.5 years old, somewhat older than the average 
age of the SMR repatriates in the Hiroshima database (32.3 years old).  Overall, the 
repatriation experiences of those who entered new sectors show that they had been 
repatriated early, by 1946, but that they were older than other repatriates and might have 
had difficulty in finding a job. As a solution, they may have moved to larger cities where 
more jobs were available and took up new jobs in new sectors.  
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The situation in Kanagawa prefecture was similar. In the Kanagawa database, nine 
SMR repatriates (out of 80 total SMR repatriates in the database) found new employment 
in new sectors. About half (five individuals out of nine) became small business owners in 
retail and services. They ran a greengrocer, a paper product shop, a fashion store, a 
restaurant and a retail store for which details were not included. Others became corporate 
employees at a publisher, a fish net manufacturer (as a security guard), a health insurance 
company and another company whose business activities are not known. Their previous 
positions at the SMR included a staff member of a bus service section, two staff members 
of railway operation control centres, a staff member of a real estate division, a railway 
construction technician, an electrical engineer, a station staff member, a staff member of 
an engine depot and one other individual whose wartime section is unknown. A 
comparison of the mobility of the five postwar small business owners and four corporate 
employees in this group suggests that the mobility of postwar small business owners 
tended to be lower than that of corporate employees. Two of the small business owners 
were living in their hometowns in 1956, and the other two had changed addresses within 
Kanagawa prefecture, while another individual had moved into Kanagawa from 
Yamanashi and started a fashion store in Yokohama. By contrast, all four corporate 
employees had moved into Kanagawa from other prefectures, including Yamanashi and 
Niigata as well as Kagoshima and Miyazaki on Kysh island.  Almost all of these nine 
individuals (both small business owners and corporate employees who entered new 
sectors) had been repatriated by the end of 1946, except for one SMR railway operation 
control centre staff member repatriated in May 1949 who became an employee of a 
postwar publisher. The average age of this group was 31.8 years old, younger than the 
average age of SMR repatriates in the Kanagawa database (34.3 years old). 
In summary, therefore, it is clear that those individuals who entered new sectors 
included small business owners in retail and services as well as corporate employees in 
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small businesses in both the tertiary sector and industry. Jobs available in this category 
were usually very different from the SMR repatriates’ wartime experiences. However, 
because entry barriers were usually low, entering new sectors to take up new jobs appears 
to have offered important and convenient options. Together with employment in the 
agricultural sector, which will be discussed in the next section, job opportunities in new 






In the database compiled for this research, the proportion of SMR repatriates in the 
agriculture sector varies in each prefecture. Ibaraki prefecture, still an agricultural 
prefecture in the mid-1950s, had the largest proportion of the SMR repatriates in 
agriculture (20.3 per cent, 12 out of 59 individuals in the database). All of them had 
returned to their hometowns and became farmers there. Their average age in August 1945 
was 32.0 years old, slightly older than that of all SMR repatriates in the Ibaraki sample, 
which was 31.7 years old. However, their repatriation had been relatively smooth. Nine 
individuals (75.0 per cent) had been repatriated by the end of 1946, compared to the figure 
for all SMR repatriates in Ibaraki of 61.0 per cent. This group included SMR electrical 
technicians and staff members of engine depots and engine drivers, all of whose skills 
could have been used by postwar Japanese companies. However, for whatever reason the 
SMR repatriates in this group decided to stay in their hometowns and enter family farming. 
In the Hiroshima database, only three out of 35 SMR repatriates were in 
agriculture in 1956. All three were living in their hometowns in 1956 and were engaged 
in family farming. They were all young, at 18 years old, 19 years old and 25 years old 
respectively. One individual had been repatriated in August 1946, but the other two 
individuals were detained in Siberia and returned only in May 1947 and July 1949. One 
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of these individuals’ employment information at the SMR is not known, but the other two 
individuals were a former SMR station staff member (18 years old in 1945) and a staff 
member of a forestry (zrin) section (25 years old in 1945). Both were koin and had not 
been promoted during their service at the SMR. 
The situation in Kanagawa was similar to that of Hiroshima; only three SMR 
repatriates in the database were in the agricultural sector in 1956. Two individuals were 
living in their hometowns and one individual had moved from Kobe city in western Japan. 
They were respectively 37 years old, 39 years old and 42 years old, and had been an 
assistant station master, a staff member of the SMR’s bus service department and an 
engine driver. All three individuals had been repatriated by August 1946. Information on 
rank is only available for the engine driver, who was a 42-year-old shokuin in 1945. 
Although it is difficult to know the reasons why these individuals decided to enter 
agriculture and not to use their skills in the postwar economy, it is possible that for older 
repatriates in this group, their age might have worked as a barrier to finding employment. 
Alternatively, desire of their family members (including parents) to keep them at home 
would also have influenced their decisions to join family farming. 

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In each prefecture’s database, we find that some former SMR repatriates were 
unemployed even though they were still of working age. Among the prefectures chosen 
for this research, the unemployment rate of SMR repatriates was the highest in Ibaraki, 
while the unemployment level in Hiroshima and Kanagawa was lower. In the Ibaraki 
database, the repatriation experiences of these individuals were not very different from 
those of other SMR repatriates, and it is difficult to know why some became unemployed 
given the limits on available information. However, it would seem sensible to assume that 
job opportunities, especially skilled employment opportunities, were generally more 
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limited in Ibaraki, and there were fewer possibilities for older individuals or those who 
were repatriated later than others. By contrast, in Hiroshima and Kanagawa, more skilled 
jobs were available, specifically at small or medium-sized companies, and it was 
relatively easy to find employment which could be matched with their skills.  
For example, in the Ibaraki database, seven (out of the total of 59 SMR repatriates) 
were not employed, of whom six were still of working age in 1956. This means that 
approximately 10 per cent of the SMR repatriates in the Ibaraki database were 
unemployed.  The six unemployed SMR repatriates were a 28-year-old (in 1945) former 
engine depot staff member, a 28-year-old staff member at the SMR’s coal mine, a 31-
year-old former mechanical technician, a 34-year-old railway staff member, a 40-year-
old SMR staff member (detailed information is not available) and a 52-year-old staff 
member. Half of them (three individuals) had been repatriated by the end of 1946, while 
the other half (three individuals) experienced a delayed repatriation and were repatriated 
in 1947 or in one case as late as 1953. In the Hiroshima database, only one individual (out 
of 35 SMR repatriates in the database) was unemployed. He was a 49-year-old former 
railway maintenance staff member at the SMR, who was repatriated in September 1946. 
After repatriation, he first settled in his hometown in Shiga prefecture, but by 1956 he 
was unemployed in Hiroshima city.  
In the Kanagawa database, only two individuals out of the 80 SMR repatriates 
were not employed at the time of the survey. One of these individuals was 58 years old 
in 1956 and may well have been retired by then. The other individual was 38 years old in 
August 1945. This man had been detained in Siberia and was only repatriated in 
December 1956. He had been a sub-section chief of the SMR’s research department and 
his translation of academic essays on agriculture (on the effects of the climate on 
agriculture and on soil erosion) originally written by Soviet scholars had been published 
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by the SMR’s research department during the war.47 Although he was unemployed in 
1956 right after his repatriation, it seems he became a Russian translator again. In fact, 
his name appeared in the 1960s as a translator of Soviet academic reports on agriculture, 
which were included in a monthly publication on political and social trends in the 
Communist Block (Gekkan Kysanken Mondai).48 This shows that he was actually able 
to obtain a skilled job as a translator, although he had participated in the survey as an 
unemployed person right after the repatriation. 
The analysis of unemployed SMR repatriates indicates that the postwar transition 
was not always easy for some SMR repatriates and they may have faced higher chances 
of becoming unemployed, as seen in the case of Ibaraki where skilled jobs were limited. 
For the SMR repatriates, it does not seem to have been particularly difficult to find some 
sort of job, especially if they were young and mobile, and had been repatriated by 1946. 










An analysis of the 1956 survey into repatriates’ postwar lives offers information on 
general trends of the SMR repatriates. However, for some groups of repatriates, it is 
possible to know in more detail about their background by looking at documents which 
can be obtained from other sources.  
As previously mentioned, analysis of the 1956 national survey indicates that some 
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provided by the JNR were part of the government’s policies to settle repatriates and also 
the result of a petition from an association set up to support the repatriated railway 
workers. In May 1946, the leaders of four wartime foreign railway companies (the SMR, 
the North China Railway, the Central China Railway and the Korean Railway) established 
a support association for repatriate railway workers (Tairiku Tetsud Jjiin Engokai) in 
Tokyo. The documents prepared between March 1947 and the spring of 1955 (the exact 
date is unknown) offer some important insights into the provision of employment 
opportunities in this area.49   
According to these documents, the organisation for the support of former railway 
workers on the Asian mainland was founded in January 1946. It was funded by the 
Transport Minister and also received support from the Japan Tourist Bureau (Nihon Kts
Ksha), Nippon Express and 162 regional railway companies and transport departments 
of local governments. The chairman of this association was Murakami Giichi, a board 
member of the SMR between 1930 and 1934 and Transport Minister in the Shidehara 
Cabinet between January and May 1946.50 The presence of Murakami as the head of the 
organisation indicates the organisation’s close relationship with the Japanese government 
as well as the networks between the SMR repatriates who returned to Japan after the war 
and the company’s former staff members who had already been in Japan at the end of the 
war. According to a report on the activities of the railway repatriates’ organisation dated 
November 1948, the total number of repatriates who returned from the above four railway 












The organisation attempted to have as many as possible of its members employed 
by the national railway agency under the Ministry of Transport.52 Several former SMR 
employees and their family members testified in interviews with me that for SMR 
repatriates, employment by Japan’s National Railway agency under the Transport 
Ministry was the most favoured postwar employment option.53 Unfortunately, the total 
number of the SMR repatriates who were employed by the Ministry after the war was not 
recorded in this collection of documents. However, an annual report of the organisation 
for the fiscal year 1946 (ending in March 1947) stated that by June 1947, 11,200 
repatriated railway workers (including the SMR repatriates) had been employed by the 
Transport Ministry.  
The ministry, however, was not able to hire as many repatriate railway workers as 
expected because the National Railways itself had excess staff members as a result of the 
return of demobilised staff members. As a result, the number of employees of the National 
Railways increased from 455,000 in 1944 to 610,000 in 1947, and their salaries and wages 
became a significant burden for the agency.54 For this reason, the official re-employment 
programme for the railway repatriates ended in June 1947.55 Even after June 1947, there 
were several attempts made by the repatriate organisation to have railway repatriates hired 
by the ministry. For example, Chairman Murakami wrote a letter to the Ministry of 
Transport on 8th December 1947. The letter stated that as agreed between the organisation 
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ministry to be considered for potential employment. With his letter, Murakami enclosed 
a list of 48 applicants with information on their name, age, school where the applicant 
received a degree, major, year of graduation, and the section in the SMR at the end of the 
war, as well as the current address and the cities where the individual wished to work. All 
of these 48 people had worked for the SMR and it seems that Murakami tried to find 
employment for former SMR staff members who arrived in Japan after the re-
employment programme was terminated. The outcome of this application round shows 
that nine among the 48 applicants were accepted by the ministry. Another document 
stated that between April and November 1948, the JNR took in 17 railway repatriates who 
had returned that year. Although the number of SMR repatriates employed by the JNR in 
this process is not known, this organisation’s attempts clearly helped some of them to 









For individual members who were not employed by the Transport Ministry, the repatriate 
organisation supported the members’ new businesses. According to the organisation’s 
documentation, in the fiscal years of 1946 – 1947 and 1947 – 1948, 14 businesses were 
set up, as Table 5-13 shows. The organisation acted as a guarantor for a government loan 
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These businesses can be categorised into two groups: subcontracting works for 
the Transport Ministry, and distribution services of food stuffs or daily goods for 
members of the organisation. The last record of this repatriate organisation was an 
annual report for the fiscal year 1955, in which only half of these initiatives (seven out 
of 14 in Table 5-13) had survived. It indicates that many of these businesses served as 
temporary solutions for railway repatriates and did not last for a long time. But four 
of the firms in Table 5-13 (Shinnihon Gikdan, Fuso Kgy, Asahi Kmusho and 
Shinsei Electrical Engineering) became full-fledged companies. Shinnihon Gikdan 
and Shinsei Electrical Engineering are still in business as of 2016. ?
The Tairiku Tetsud Jjiin Engokai thus helped a portion of railway repatriates 
find employment in postwar Japan. However, the majority of individuals who were 
not offered places at the Transport Ministry or did not participate in businesses 
activities supported by the repatriate organisation had to find a job in the public sector, 
skilled employment, new sectors or in agriculture, as this chapter has examined. 
The SMR’s postwar self-help organisation Mantetsukai was established in 
December 1946, seven months after the Tairiku Tetsud Jjiin Engokai was founded. 
The Mantetsukai’s goal was to secure a successful outcome for the employees’ 
financial claims, including their personal savings within the SMR (shanaiyokin) and 
retirement benefits, to support former employees’ job searches, and to petition the 
government for the repatriation of detained SMR staff members in China and 
Siberia.58 The Mantetsukai also supported approximately 125 start-ups in the same 
way as did the Tairiku Tetsud Jjiin Engokai for all repatriated railway workers 





repatriates included construction companies, manufacturing companies and small 
businesses in retail and services.59  
A newsletter of the SMR Hirono Club (a postwar organization of the SMR 
repatriate electrical engineers) included a testimony that ‘in around 1947 and 1948, 
the SMR electrical engineers in Osaka formed a large number of businesses 
specializing in electric communication, electric signals and electric power 
technologies'. 60  However, setting up new businesses was not easy for the SMR 
repatriates. One of the directors of Shinsei Electrical Engineering (Shinsei Dengy),61
Hirai Tamaki, recalled the early days of the company in an essay written around 1977. 
He stated that many companies established by repatriates in the early postwar period 
did not have good reputations. Some companies failed to complete a project due to the 
lack of working capital and others cheated clients on various occasions. Hirai said that 
Shinsei Electrical Engineering tried to carefully and sincerely complete a project to 
establish its reputation. The company gradually accumulated business-related 
knowledge and experience. However, this learning process took time, as is likely to 
have been the case with many other repatriates’ companies. For example, the company 
failed to pay some portion of the required taxes in 1957 and received an order from 
the revenue office to make an immediate payment.62 The company went through a 










participation in the JNR’s first Five-year plan to upgrade existing railway 
infrastructure started in 1957.63
SMR repatriates’ mind-sets which inevitably came from their previous 
experiences as employees of a prestigious public corporation also had the potential to 
work as a hurdle for their postwar economic lives. An essay written by Oka Yjir, 
who was president of the Taihei Electric Company (Taihei Dengy), a company 
founded by the Manchuria Electric Company repatriates and employing a large 
number of SMR repatriates, stated that for some repatriates, doing business in a 
customer-oriented manner was a completely new idea.64 This may not be surprising 
for wartime public employees who did not have to deal with customers with courtesy 
and fairness, and it seems that many SMR repatriates may have had to learn how to 
behave as business people in the very different postwar market economy.  
Different from common start-ups, these companies were set up to hire 
repatriate engineers and received support from the government or related companies 
(such as JNR and major electric firms) in terms of funding and public works project 
contracts. Although successful companies gradually expanded their business activities 
into non-government sectors, the public works projects, such as the construction of 
railroads, roads and power plants, were important sources of revenue. Leaders of these 
start-ups were also active in repatriates’ organizations and their networks. With strong 
leadership in key repatriate start-up companies, the repatriates maintained a loose 
network involving former colleagues in government agencies, JNR, electric 
companies and various SMEs, and occasionally participated in public projects together. 






in the public sector or major companies, were helpful in winning contract awards.65
Although this type of business was only one of the examples of the SMR’s postwar 
economic activities, and the majority of the SMR repatriates might not been able to 
participate in these activities or SMR repatriates’ network, their experiences could 
offer some insights into one major group of repatriates. 
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
It seems likely that most SMR repatriates probably regarded the transition process in 
a somewhat negative light. This might have been especially true of those who returned 
to family farming, who entered retail and services as small business owners, or who 
became unemployed for various reasons. However, their generally negative transitions 
were probably inevitable. This was because many SMR repatriates, including those 
who had occupied lower positions as a koin, had occupied elite positions in Manchuria, 
where non-skilled and low paid jobs were done by non-Japanese people, specifically 
the Chinese. In postwar Japan, the SMR repatriates lost their prestigious positions and 
they had to re-enter the labour market as ordinary citizens.  
The first newsletter of the Mantetsukai, published in 1954, included a 
testimony stating that some SMR repatriates were able to find employment in public 
offices or major companies and continue similar jobs as their wartime ones, but that 
the majority had a difficult time in re-establishing themselves. The author of this 
testimony continued by saying that ‘During the war, we worked under the prestigious 
name of the SMR, but after the war, we had to start new lives on our own. When we 






clients and all other stakeholders. It was not easy to do this and took many years to 
make a business take off’.66   
The findings of this chapter have confirmed that the proportion of the SMR 
repatriates who were able to be re-employed by wartime employers or related agencies 
(in case of the SMR repatriates, it was Japan National Railways) was larger than that 
of all civilian repatriates (including the SMR repatriates). Some others found skilled 
employment and others entered new sectors to take up new jobs. In this process, some 
were fortunate in finding secure employment at major Japanese companies, but many 
entered small and medium-sized companies. Some set up new companies based on 
their technical skills and occasionally worked as subcontractors for government 
agencies or public corporations, and made use of networks with their former 
colleagues who were working in the public sector. There were exceptions in their 
transitions and some individuals managed to maintain prestigious positions. For 
example, 18 SMR repatriates were elected as diet members. 67  The Economic 
Stabilisation Board also employed several former SMR staff members (some from the 
SMR’s Research Department (Chsabu),68 who might have participated in the creation 
of postwar economic policies. In addition, it is also true that some elite members 
became university faculty members.69 These successful examples were certainly a part 
of SMR repatriates’ transitions, and became a source of pride for the rest of the SMR 
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repatriates. In fact, these successful people’s stories often appear in the Mantetsukai’s 
newsletters.  
However, in reality, only a fraction of SMR repatriates were able to seize these 
sorts of opportunities and many ordinary SMR staff members experienced less 
positive transitions. Their age, wartime skills, ranks and the timing of repatriation can 
help explain the patterns of their transitions to some extent, but even former SMR staff 
members who had occupied higher ranks sometimes became unemployed or took up 
new jobs, in which their social status was not high and financial rewards could be low. 
It is difficult to clearly understand what explains their transitions, because other than 
the factors mentioned above, motivation, interpersonal skills and networks might have 
made a difference.  
Although many SMR repatriates experienced difficult transitions, there is one 
group of individuals who are more likely to have benefited from the transition from 
wartime to the postwar economy. This was younger SMR staff members who had not 
had the chance of receiving a school education before they entered the SMR. At the 
SMR, approximately half of the SMR’s staff members joined the company with 
qualifications only from higher elementary school. Many received on the job training 
at the SMR and a small number of capable young staff members had opportunities to 
attend job training schools as full time students. Of course, some of them were sent to 
the battle fields at the end of the war, in some cases losing their lives, but some others 
were repatriated to postwar Japan and gained opportunities to use their skills in the 
postwar economy. In this sense, it may be possible to say that the SMR worked as a 
sort of an educational institution for young and capable individuals and made them 




In the postwar transitions, therefore, some individuals lost the opportunity of 
using their skills, but some others managed to make the transition in a way that meant 
they could apply their expertise in the postwar economy. The SMR was one example 
of the failed projects of imperial Japan, but, given its scale, the company nevertheless 
offers an interesting case study as to how those involved with the company made their 




Chapter 6  Conclusion 
The Second World War ended in Asia in August 1945 with Japan’s defeat. For 
repatriates, the defeat brought about the loss of assets, loss of jobs, and in many cases 
loss of community and network. Some also lost their family members. But repatriates 
had no choice but to restart their lives in postwar Japan.  
The findings in this research indicate that the Japanese overseas residents can 
roughly be divided into two groups: colonial settlers who had migrated mostly for 
economic reasons before or in 1931 and individuals who migrated as part of Japan’s 
war effort in or after 1932. Japanese migrants’ early major destinations were Taiwan, 
Korea and China. In the 1930s, the major destination was Manchuria. If we examine 
individual repatriates in the database created for this research, based on the 1956 
national survey into repatriates’ postwar lives, the majority falls in the second group: 
first generation immigrants who spent less than 15 years outside of Japan. They were 
also generally young and many were in their 30s when the Second World War ended 
in 1945.  
It appears that, in the immediate postwar period, the government saw the influx 
of more than six million individuals – the total civilian repatriates and demobilised 
soldiers – as something of a national crisis. With the war economy broken and an 
uncertain future under Occupation-led political and economic reforms, repatriation on 
such a scale was seen as potentially leading to greater shortages in food and materials, 
and ultimately a threat to social order. In this context, bringing about stability, 
including the repatriates’ settlement, became one of the government’s vital tasks. 
Although this concern has rarely been articulated, the many policies created to support 
repatriates speak to its importance. Provision of aid materials and public housing, job 
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training and employment support, and provision of businesses loans – with all these 
measures in place the repatriates were, in the end, resettled and the stability was 
regained. The government acted to address the problems of repatriation through 
numerous interventions, and it can be seen to have overseen a broadly successful 
transition. Yet this research shows that there were in fact several factors involved in 
determining any success, of which government policies played only a part. 
Based on the analysis in this research, this thesis concludes that repatriates’ 
postwar job placement was supported by four economic characteristics: a) the 
presence of agriculture and the tertiary sector, which had the capacity to absorb excess 
population, b) the government’s direct employment policies (such as hiring at 
government offices and the transfer of foreign medical and educational licenses), c) 
the reemployment opportunities by some wartime employers in the private sector, and 
d) repatriates’ transferable skills. 
Firstly, Japan was still an agrarian country in the immediate postwar period. In 
1950, more than one-third of total Japanese households including repatriates were still 
in the primary sector. As previously mentioned, more than half of repatriates first 
settled in their hometowns. It is not clear how many were actually engaged in farming 
there, but it would be reasonable to assume many did. Many might have left family 
farming soon after in order to take up another job. However, in the 1956 survey, still 
approximately one-quarter of repatriate household heads in Ibaraki prefecture and 10 
per cent in Hiroshima prefecture were in agriculture, while the figure for more 
industrialised Kanagawa prefecture was much lower at 2.5 per cent. This indicates that 
in the early postwar period, agriculture was still an important settlement place for 
civilian repatriates, specifically in rural prefectures. 
In addition to family farming, small businesses in the tertiary sector played a 
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similar role. The majority were family-owned small businesses. It appears that these 
businesses also absorbed their repatriate family members in the immediate postwar 
period. As with the case of family farming, some repatriates stayed in the tertiary 
sector permanently, while others left retail and services soon to take up a new job. Due 
to its usually low entry barriers and low levels of capital required, it seems that the 
tertiary sector, as was the case with the agricultural sector, became an easily accessible 
destination for repatriates who had failed to gain employment in other sectors. It is 
particularly worth emphasising this point given that the role of the economic structure 
has largely been overlooked in the literature on the Japanese repatriation, but in fact, 
traditional sectors such as agriculture and small family businesses in the tertiary sector 
played critical roles in temporarily or permanently providing a livelihood for the 
excess population and giving flexibility to the economy.  
Secondly, as previously mentioned, the government also took actions to 
mitigate a shock which could come from a large-scale repatriation. However, ordinary 
repatriation policies, including the provision of aid materials and public housing, as 
well as job training, support for job placement and loans to help to start new businesses 
seem to have had only limited effects. In addition to these general repatriation policies, 
the government employed a large number of repatriates (perhaps together with other 
war-affected people) in various central and local government agencies. Semi-public 
corporations and associations, such as the Japan National Railways and agricultural 
cooperatives, also became critical destinations for repatriates. The government’s 
employment policies were introduced to fill vacancies created by drafted staff 
members, the war-dead, and those who vacated positions for various reasons in the 
early postwar period. Newly created agencies, semi-public organisations such as 
agricultural cooperatives, or foreign military bases, including American bases in 
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Kanagawa or those of the British Commonwealth Force as part of the United Nations 
Army in Hiroshima, became important destinations for repatriates. Employment at 
public corporations was also a part of broader employment policies. For example, the 
Japan National Railways (JNR) absorbed repatriate railway workers, despite the fact 
that the JNR had to reemploy a large number of demobilised staff members and such 
a large employee population could not have been sustainable for the long run. In any 
case, approximately one-quarter of civilian repatriates found employment in the public 
or semi-public sectors. It should also be emphasised that the public or semi-public 
sectors indirectly helped some other repatriates who were in the private sector by 
favourably offering public works or purchasing contracts, as we saw in Chapter 5. In 
the early postwar period, this kind of arrangement was intentionally made with tacit 
approval from government agencies to resettle repatriates.  
Thirdly, in addition to semi-public sector corporations, some major private 
corporations also re-employed selected repatriates who had worked for their wartime 
overseas branches. The number of repatriates able to return to their wartime employers 
was small, but there were some able to restart their lives in this way.  
Fourthly, some other repatriates who did not enter agriculture and postwar 
public and semi-public sectors found skilled employment as white-collar workers or 
technical skill holders working in industry or in the tertiary sector. Individuals in this 
group included office clerks, accountants, electrical technicians, architects, builders, 
welders, plasters, painters, waterworks specialists, and engineers, to name but a few. 
Many were employed by small or medium-sized companies, but some joined major 
Japanese companies. It is interesting to note that some major companies seem to have 
seen civilian repatriates as a resource pool of technical skill holders and employed a 
large number of repatriates, most of whom had worked for wartime public 
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corporations such as the South Manchuria Railway Company. Those major companies 
to recruit large numbers of repatriates included the steel pipe manufacturer Nihon 
Kōkan in Kanagawa, the mining company Nihon Kōgyō in Ibaraki, Mitsubishi 
Shipbuilding in Hiroshima and Yuasa Battery in Osaka. These civilian repatriates who 
were able to find skilled employment were part of a fortunate group because they were 
well placed to take advantage of the opportunities afforded by a newly liberalised and 
growing economy. 
The remaining civilian repatriates had little choice but to enter new sectors, 
taking up jobs in which they had limited or no experience. For this group, postwar 
transitions must have been significantly challenging. The largest group became 
owners or employees of small businesses, mostly in the tertiary sector as mentioned 
in the earlier part of this conclusion. Some others made more creative transitions to 
use previously non-job related skills, by obtaining new qualifications, for example, as 
certified accountants, or by securing a position in major companies in sectors where 
they had not had previous job experiences. Some ended up as peddlers or day labours, 
or became unemployed while they were still of working age, for reasons which could 
not be specified in this research. These people’s struggles should not be ignored, but, 
if we look at the total repatriate population, the majority of repatriates seem to have 
managed to find some ways to make a living by the mid-1950s. This was because the 
capacity of the economy to absorb an excess population, the employment in the public 
and semi-public sectors, various opportunities for skilled employment, and growing 
economy which offered new job opportunities were large enough to settle the majority. 
If the majority of repatriates were resettled, the question of how we should 
evaluate that resettlement process still remains. In the economics of migration, 
conclusions of this type are usually based on measuring two things – the degree of 
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integration, and the economic impact. We tend to measure the degree of resettlement 
by looking at differences in wage levels between migrants and individuals in a 
receiving community. The impact of migration can be measured by comparing costs 
incurred by the receiving community to support migrants (such as the government’s 
budget for aid programmes) with the migrants’ economic contribution (including 
increased tax revenues from economic activities of newcomers). However, in the case 
of Japanese postwar repatriates, these two methods cannot be used because of a lack 
of relevant statistics. So in order to draw any conclusions about the success of the 
resettlement we must approach the question from different angles – one from the 
perspective of the government and one from the perspective of repatriates. 
Firstly, in the early postwar period, for the government, the goal of the 
repatriation policy seems to have been to resettle the large number of repatriates 
without destabilising society – shortages in housing and food as well as large scale 
unemployment were all things which could have led to unrest, and let us not forget 
that these problems not only related to repatriates but also to other war-affected 
Japanese people. For repatriates, the government provided aid materials, a limited 
amount of public housing, support for job placement and job training and loans to start 
new businesses. Postwar reclamation projects were also introduced to increase food 
production and to absorb displaced individuals including repatriates. However, despite 
significant fiscal costs for the central and local governments, these policies appear to 
have played only limited roles. As we examined in this research, repatriates were 
eventually resettled and stability was regained, but the goal of stability was achieved 
not by these government’s general repatriation policies, but rather via other channels 
as we have just reviewed. 
In order to analyse additional reasons for the relatively smooth resettlement, 
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reviewing Yasuo Wakatsuki’s hypotheses 1  (which we examined in the literature 
review section) might be useful.  Wakatsuki listed up the following points:   
· The history of Japanese colonial expansion started in the late 19th century and 
many returnees were first generation migrants who were familiar with 
Japanese culture. 
· A large number of returnees had been sent overseas by Japanese companies or 
the government and had places which to return. 
· The majority of the returnees were merchants, engineers and white-collar 
workers who had transferable skills.  
· Discounting those from Manchuria, there were relatively few farmers amongst 
the total repatriates, so that conflicts over farmland in postwar Japan were 
limited.  
 
Wakatsuki’s arguments are consistent with the findings in this research. 
Japan’s overseas expansion lasted approximately 50 years between 1895, when Japan 
colonised Taiwan, and 1945. Many of the Japanese overseas residents were the first 
generation of migrants, who spent less than 15 years on average in Japan’s overseas 
territories. In these regions, it was possible to continue to live in the Japanese political 
and social systems, specifically after the early 1930s when Japan’s war effort was 
intensified and the country extended its control in its overseas territories. They mainly 
spoke Japanese, and Japanese children, who were born outside of Japan, were mostly 
educated in the Japanese educational system. Japanese culture was maintained in 
households, schools and work places. 
In addition, roughly half of Japanese overseas residents worked in the public 
                                                
1 Wakatsuki, Sengo Hikiage No Kiroku 278-79. 
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or semi-public sectors or for Japanese companies of various sizes. The civilian 
repatriates also included a large number of merchants, engineers and technicians and 
white-collar workers, whose skills could have been transferred to postwar Japan. 
Moreover, farmers were in a minority in the total repatriate population, as Wakatsuki 
pointed out, which certainly reduced the chances of legal conflicts over land. In this 
way, the shock brought by a large scale of population influx was absorbed in a few 
years and stability was regained. But this was achieved largely by the economic 
structure, the large scale employment policies in the public sector, reemployment 
opportunities by private companies, as well as the characteristics of the Japanese 
migrants who included a large number of skilled individuals, rather than by the 
government’s overall repatriation policy. 
However, if the question, ‘how should we evaluate the process of the 
repatriates’ resettlement?’ is asked from the view point of repatriates, the answer 
would be different. In Japan’s overseas territories, the Japanese people had generally 
occupied higher positions in the social hierarchy and enjoyed higher standards of 
living than local people. But after the war, they were stripped of their privileges and 
had to re-enter Japanese society as ordinary citizens. Many repatriates would have felt 
they had lost their ‘good lives’. This would have been particularly true in the case of 
those who had occupied prestigious jobs during the war, as staff members of major 
public corporations or government agencies, for example. If, upon their return, they 
took up employment in small businesses, local village offices or even as day labours, 
the government might see them as employed and therefore see their resettlement as an 
absolute success; yet with their loss in status and overseas assets they themselves are 
likely to have viewed their transition as largely negative. It is certainly difficult to 
measure the repatriates’ satisfaction levels, but in the analysis for this research, it 
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seems only a minority in the repatriate total population managed to find employment 
which could have met their expectations and could have satisfied their pride, for 
example, employment with influential government agencies or major business 
establishments. 
Even if repatriates were able to obtain jobs of the kind that they had wished, 
their satisfaction in their postwar careers would not have been guaranteed. One 
example is provided by the daughter of a South Manchuria Railway repatriate, who 
described her father’s struggles upon returning to Japan. Though he had been given a 
post with Japan National Railways he and other returning workers were dissatisfied 
with having opportunities closed to them. Specifically, they felt themselves excluded 
from a career track which was tacitly open only to individuals who had spent longer 
years at the JNR. The daughter believes that there were few senior promotion 
prospects for repatriates (who were already middle aged by the time they joined the 
company).2  
Among the total Japanese repatriate population, the group of individuals who 
seem to have suffered the most were repatriate farmers who came back from 
Manchuria. Many of them were recruited and sent to Manchuria in the late 1930s or 
1940s to participate in reclamation projects. Some younger sons of poor farmers in 
Japan went to Manchuria with a dream to have their own land for the first time in their 
lives. Others were persuaded by the leaders of their local communities to participate 
in Japan’s effort to control the remote areas of Manchuria. Adult farmers were also 
joined by teenagers, often persuaded by their school teachers to join the reclamation 
projects.3 Towards the end of the war, most Japanese men in Manchuria aged between 
                                                
2 An interview with a daughter of the South Manchuria Railway repatriate on 12 October, 2012.  
3 Shinsuke Kobayashi, "Hitobito Wa Naze Manshū He Watattanoka," Minten, no. 30 (2013): 26. 
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15 and 45, including reclamation farmers, were drafted by the military.4 Some were 
killed in the war and some others were taken to Siberia or Central Asia to work as 
physical labourers. For other reclamation farmers, including women, the repatriation 
from the remote areas was enormously difficult and many lost their lives before being 
able to return to Japan. Out of 270,000 Japanese reclamation farmers and their family 
members, more than one-third died and only 160,000 managed to return to Japan.5 
Even after their repatriation, their lives were not easy. Due to their limited access to 
land in Japan and the difficulty in transferring their skills to other sectors, the 
occupational transition of wartime farmers appears to have been particularly difficult 
as Lori Watt discussed in When Empire Comes Home.6 
In order to offset the loss of foreign assets incurred by Japan’s defeat and 
repatriation, from the early days of repatriation, some repatriates attempted to obtain 
compensation from the Japanese government. Their logic was that their assets were 
taken by victor countries as part of reparations from Japan for damages and losses 
incurred in the Japanese War. They insisted, however, these reparations should have 
been paid by the government and not by individual citizens. Therefore, the government 
should have an obligation to compensate repatriates for the value of their lost assets. 
However, the government was reluctant to compensate due to the significant values of 
lost assets and due to the difficulty in estimating the actual value, given the fact that 
most repatriates were not able to offer evidence to support their claims. In addition, 
the government also feared that if it compensated repatriates, this could lead to other 
claims, for example, from the Japanese people who had lost their assets in air raids, 
                                                
4 Mantetsukai, Mantetsu 40 Nenshi, 209. 
5  Sengo Kaitakushi Hensan Iinkai, Sengo Kaitakushi (Tokyo: Zenkoku Kaitaku Nōgyō Kumiai 
Rengōkai, 1977), 31. 
6 Lori Watt, When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan, Harvard 
East Asian Monographs (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center, 2009). 
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which the total amount could be far beyond the capacity of the government to pay off. 
As a solution to the repatriates’ claims, the government offered a small amount of 
monetary compensation to repatriates in 1957 and 1967. The government also decided 
in 1968 to grant public pensions for repatriate public servants if they continued to work 
in the postwar public sector. 7  It was not until 20 years after the war that the 
compensation negotiations were concluded. Repatriates were unable to recover the 
assets or equivalent values. However, it seems that repatriates accepted the reality that 
it would not be possible to obtain full compensation, and the voices demanding 
compensation faded out after 1967. 
As the repatriates were assimilated into society, memories of the repatriation 
among the general public started to diminish, although the repatriates would not have 
forgotten their experiences. In postwar Japan, repatriates who had been associated 
with wartime public corporations or the wartime public sector appear not to have 
openly spoken of their experiences,8 fearing being labelled as the empire’s agents. 
Despite the fact that this was a major group within the total repatriate population, their 
experiences have therefore been unknown to the Japanese general public. The majority 
of other civilian repatriates did not openly share their experiences either, other than in 
casual conversations with their family members, neighbours, colleagues or 
acquaintances. Therefore, these repatriates’ stories have largely faded from public 
consciousness.   
On the contrary, experiences of repatriate farmers have caught the general 
public’s attention. This might have been spurred since 1981, as Japanese war orphans, 
who had been left in Manchuria during repatriation, 9  began to return following 
                                                
7 Mantetsukai, Zaidan Hōjin Mantetsukai 60 Nen No Ayumi, 44.  
8 Amano, Mantetsu Wo Shirutameno 12 Shō, 4. 
9  Asahi Shimbun, "Chūgoku Zanryū Nihonjin Koji," in Kotobank (Tokyo: Asahi Shimbun). 
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arrangements with the Japanese government. The government used the national 
broadcasting company (NHK) and newspapers to search for the orphans’ family 
members. The orphans were interviewed and often showed old pictures or drawings 
which depicted their memories of their wartime family lives, all of which gave the 
Japanese general public a strong impression. A few other repatriate farmers also 
published their memoirs, their tragic stories often having been featured in novels, 
television programmes and newspaper articles.  
The gap between the silence of repatriate public servants or employees of 
public and private corporations, and the often heard stories of victims might have led 
to the recreation of images of ‘the repatriates’ which significantly emphasise the tragic 
experiences of the latter group. In these stories, the Japanese civilians’ harsh and unfair 
treatments of local people, or the Japanese people’s arrogance as masters of the empire, 
have rarely appeared. Consequently, although details of the repatriation problems have 
been largely forgotten among the Japanese people, the imagery of the repatriates as 
victims of the war have been recreated and perpetuated among the Japanese general 
public.  
Another implication of the repatriation problem is related to the way in which 
the repatriates were resettled and how stability was achieved. As we examined in this 
thesis, the resettlement of repatriates was largely supported by the presence of 
traditional sectors (agriculture and the tertiary sector) as well as the public and semi-
public sectors. All these sectors had a capacity to absorb a large number of repatriates 
                                                
https://kotobank.jp/word/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E6%AE%8B%E7%95%99%E6%97%A5%E6
%9C%AC%E4%BA%BA%E5%AD%A4%E5%85%90-884599. Accessed on 14 August 2016. Ministry 
of Health Labour and Welfare, "Chūgoku Zanryū Nihonjin Koji Kankei Tōkei," (Tokyo: Ministry of 
Health Labour and Welfare, 2013). http://www.mhlw.go.jp/file/04-Houdouhappyou-12102000-
Shakaiengokyoku-Engo-Chuugokuzanryuhoujinshienshitsu/0000025551.pdf. The Japanese 
government defines Japanese war orphans as those who were approximately 13 years old or 
younger in August 1945 and had Japanese parents. The government estimates the total number 
of Japanese war orphans returned from China or living in China to be 2,818 as of 2013.  
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either temporarily or permanently. Throughout the postwar period, the labour intensive 
nature of these sectors largely remained. In theory, unproductive sectors gradually 
discharge redundant workers to more rapidly growing sectors, usually in industry. In 
Japan as well, a shift of labour force from agriculture to industry took place and 
accelerated after the mid-1950s. In the case of the public sector, there was also a large-
scale downsizing in 1949 with the introduction of the Act for the Total Number of 
Civil Servants10 under the direction of the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers. 
However, in many organisations, a redundant workforce remained. As we saw in this 
thesis, semi-public associations such as agricultural cooperatives also became 
important destinations for some repatriates. These organisations have remained quite 
unproductive, with a lack of transparency around their reliance on government 
subsidies. This issue of the trade-off between these sectors’ capacity to absorb excess 
population at the expense of productivity growth would be worth investigating further, 
relating as it does to the fundamental characteristics of the Japanese postwar economy 
and its generally low levels of productivity in agriculture, as well as in the public, 
semi-public and the tertiary sectors. 
Regarding the repatriates’ postwar economic activities, it is also tempting to 
argue that some repatriates played crucial roles in Japan’s postwar trade and economic 
diplomacy. It is certainly true that there were some influential people who were active 
in Japan’s economic relations with other countries. Tatsunosuke Takasaki is one 
example. He was a businessman who went to Manchuria and became the president of 
the Manchurian Industrial Development Company in 1945. He returned to Japan in 
                                                
10 The House of Representatives, Gyōsei Kikan Shokuin Teisu Hō (Tokyo1949).This act became 
effective on 31 May 1949 and required that the number of the JNR staff members should be 
reduced to lower than 510,000 by 1st October in the same year.  
http://www.shugiin.go.jp/internet/itdb_housei.nsf/html/houritsu/00519490531126.htm. 
Accessed on 1 March 2016. 
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1947 and became the first president of the Electric Power Development Company 
(Dengen Kaihatsu) when it was established in 1952. He later became chief of the 
Economic Planning Agency (July 1955 to December 1956), Minister of International 
Trade and Industry (June 1958 to June 1959) and Director-General of the Science and 
Technology Agency (January to June 1959). In 1962, he dealt with the negotiation 
with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) to establish a semi-official trade deal 
called the LT Trade Agreement,11 named after Liào Chéngzhì (a politician of the PRC, 
who was responsible for foreign affairs) and Takasaki. Another famous example is 
Yutaka Kubota. Kubota was involved in the construction of the Sup'ung Dam in Yalu 
River located between Korea and Manchuria in 1937 as a head of the consulting firm 
Kubota Kōgyō, under Nichitsu. In postwar Tokyo, he established the construction firm 
Nippon Kōei, which employed a large number of civilian repatriates. The company 
was involved in numerous major reparation projects in Southeast Asia and Korea, 
including the Baluchaung Hydropower Dam in Myanmar, Japan’s first reparation 
project started in 1954.12 Kubota continued to be an important businessman in Japan’s 
reparation and ODA projects and influenced the country’s economic diplomacy. 
Takasaki and Kubota are examples of repatriates who had tried to reconnect postwar 
East and Southeast Asia and Japan.  
However, many repatriates seem to have spent the rest of their lives in Japan, 
and, other than those involved in foreign businesses or the small number who decided 
to re-migrate to Latin America or other destinations,13 it seems likely that just a small 
                                                
11 "Nitchū LT Bōeki Oboegaki,"  (Beijing: Institute for Advanced Studies on Asia, Tokyo University, 
1962). http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/documents/texts/docs/19621109.O1J.html.  
Accessed on 1 March 2016. 
12 Nippon Kōei, "Sōgyōsha Kubota Yutaka," Nippon Kōei. 
https://www.n-koei.co.jp/profile/history/founder/. Accessed on 10 August 2016. Kajima 
Corporation, Kajima No Kiseki (Tokyo: Kajima Corporation).  
http://www.kajima.co.jp/gallery/kiseki/kiseki12/index-j.html. Accessed on 10 August 2016. 
13 Hiroko Nakayama, "Nihon No Kaigai Ijuū No Sōshutsukeitai Ni Kansuru Ichikōsatsu," Hōsei 
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number would go on to play a significant role in foreign affairs. In the early postwar 
period, some repatriates hoped to restore trade relations with China. However, with 
the Cold War rapidly intensifying and a lack of diplomatic relations with China, these 
attempts failed. 14  In addition, Japan’s foreign relations were administered by the 
Occupation Authorities and large scale trade started after the Korean War broke out in 
June 1950 in which the U.S. increased purchasing from Japan, 15  and economic 
relations with most Asian countries were restored in the mid-1950s. By this time, many 
repatriates who had wished to do business with Asian countries might have been too 
old to start new projects. Moreover, in the development of the Cold War, the focus on 
Japan’s foreign affairs shifted from Asia to the United States. Lori Watt explains that 
while some returnees had ‘hoped to serve as liaisons between Japan and Asia in an 
effort to build new relationships…with diplomacy, trade, and travel between Japan 
and Asia proscribed by the Occupation…, [their] experience in Asia was obsolete’.16  
In the late 1970s and 1980s, when diplomatic relations between China and 
Japan were restored, a group of repatriate Japanese engineers participated in a 
technological cooperation with China. Bringing expertise in infrastructure building, 
constructing factories and power plants, and electrical engineering, they were 
welcomed by China as a means of technological transfer.17 The repatriate engineers 
                                                
University Repository  (2014): 130. For example, from a village called Taishō in Kōchi prefecture, 
a group of farmers (the exact number is unknown) who had returned from Manchuria re-migrated 
to Paraguay in 1957.    
14 Naotaka Matsukata, "Separating Trade and Politics: The Restoration of Japan's China Trade, 
1945-1958" (Harvard University 1996). 
15 Kazuyoshi Oku, "Senji-Sengo Fukkōki No Nihon Bōeki," Kansai Daigaku Shōgaku Ronshū 56, 
no. 3 (2011): 27-33. http://kuir.jm.kansai-u.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/10112/6020/1/KU-1100-
20111225-02.pdf. Accessed on 1 March 2016. 
16 Watt, When Empire Comes Home: Repatriation and Reintegration in Postwar Japan, 7-8. 
17 Hirai Fumiko, Hirai Tamaki, 6-7. Tōhō Kagakugijutsu Kyōryokukai, "Kaiin Meibo," (Tokyo1988). 
The list of corporate members included Idemitsu Kōsan which former president Keisuke Idemitsu 
(1966-1972) had worked for the South Manchuria Railway. In addition, 150 individual members 
are listed in this booklet. 
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also appreciated the opportunity to return to China after several decades. The 
motivations of repatriate engineers to participate in the projects appear to have been 
mixed, but there was a desire to redress Japan’s past and many participants were 
willing to contribute to the development of China. We should not overemphasise the 
engineers’ role as only a limited number of individuals participated in the joint projects, 
and it seems their involvement only lasted until around the early 1990s. However, this 
was one way in which repatriates were able to interact with China.  
More than 70 years have passed since the end of the war. By examining the 
repatriates’ transitions, this thesis highlighted postwar adjustment processes which 
have usually been overlooked. The most interesting and perhaps unexpected finding 
in is that a large part of repatriates’ postwar resettlement was supported by Japan’s 
economic structure, employment in the public and semi-public sectors, and the 
repatriates’ skills. After their initial struggle, the majority of repatriates managed to 
settle. This pattern of their settlement offers a reasonable explanation why a large 
number of repatriates were able to be absorbed into postwar Japan and why the 
memories of the Japanese repatriation were largely forgotten, aside from selected 







Table 1:The number of Japanese migrants (1881-1942) 1 
 1881 1895 1910 1925 1938 1942 
Korea 3,417 12,303 171,543 424,740 N/A 753,000 
China 1,217 670 25,452 65,482 95,508 N/A 
Manchuria N/A N/A 17,474 17,845 418,315 1,097,000 
Kwantung Leased 
Territory 
N/A N/A 62,338 184,894 N/A 222,652 
Taiwan N/A N/A 98,048 189,630 N/A 385,000 
Sakhalin N/A N/A 28,721 183,742 N/A 398,838 
Other regions 1,457 30,580 167,133 361,740 501,188 N/A 
*Other regions include European countries, Americas, Hawaii and the Mandated Territories 



























                                                
1 Wakatsuki, Sengo Hikiage No Kiroku 15-16. 
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Table 2: Number of individuals who migrated to Manchuria as ‘reclamation farmers’2 
Ranking Prefecture Total Ranking Prefecture Total 
1 Nagano 37,859 25 Ehime 4,525 
2 Yamagata 17,177 26 Hyōgo 4,400 
3 Kumamoto 12,680 27 Saitama 4,368 
4 Fukushima 12,673 28 Saga 4,300 
5 Nīgata 12,641 29 Tochigi 4,231 
6 Miyagi 12,419 30 Osaka 4,155 
7 Gifu 12,090 31 Mie 4,062 
8 Hiroshima 11,172 32 Tottori 3,626 
9 Tokyo 11,111 33 Ibaraki 3,573 
10 Kōchi 10,082 34 Miyazaki 3,392 
11 Akita 9,452 35 Kyoto 3,370 
12 Shizuoka 9,206 36 Tokushima 3,325 
13 Gunma 8,775 37 Wakayama 3,149 
14 Aomori 8,365 38 Hokkaido 3,129 
15 Kagawa 7,885 39 Fukuoka 3,114 
16 Ishikawa 7,271 40 Shimane 3,025 
17 Yamaguchi 6,508 41 Okinawa 2,994 
18 Iwate 6,436 42 Ōita 2,571 
19 Okayama 5,786 43 Aichi 2,358 
20 Kagoshima 5,700 44 Nagasaki 2,151 
21 Nara 5,243 45 Chiba 2,148 
22 Toyama 5,200 46 Kanagawa 1,588 
23 Fukui 5,136 47 Shiga 1,447 




                                                





Table 3: Period of migration to each region (number of individuals in each prefectural 
database): Ibaraki prefecture3 (See Figure 4-1) 
 Up to 1931 1932-1940 1941-1945 Total 
Other regions 3 5 8 16 
Sakhalin 11 3 1 15 
Taiwan 19 15 4 38 
Korea 34 25 8 67 
China 8 68 19 95 
Manchuria 27 187 55 269 




Table 4: Period of migration to each region (number of individuals in each prefectural 
database): Hiroshima prefecture 4(See Figure 4-2) 
 Up to 1931 1932-1940 1941-1945 Total 
Other regions 12 5 5 22 
Sakhalin 4 0 0 4 
Taiwan 43 12 6 61 
Korea 101 53 14 168 
China 23 62 30 115 
Manchuria 67 132 52 251 




                                                
3 Ministry of Health and Welfare, "Zaigai Jijitsu Chōsahyō (Japanese Government Survey into 







Table 5: Period of migration to each region (number of individuals in each prefectural 
database): Kanagawa prefecture 5(See Figure 4-3) 
 Up to 1931 1932-1940 1941-1945 Total 
Other regions 14 17 13 44 
Sakhalin 7 2 1 10 
Taiwan 44 10 4 58 
Korea 40 24 16 80 
China 30 115 32 177 
Manchuria 48 171 52 271 


































Table 6: The SMR’s largest subsidiaries and related companies in March 19456 
Name of company 








North China Railway 
(Kahoku Kōtsū) 




11.3% 45,000,000  
International Transport 
(Kokusai Un’yu) 




50.0% 14,500,000  
Manchuria Artificial 
Petroleum (Manshū Jinzō 
Sekiyu) 




46.8% 10,340,000  
Daidō Coal Mining  
(Daidō Tankō) 
5.0% 10,000,000  
Dalian Dock  
(Dairen Senkyō) 
100.0 % 10,000,000  
Dalian Steamship Line 
Company (Dairen Kisen) 
100.0 % 22,530.000 
Tōhō Kaiun (Tōhō 
Marine Transport) 
                                                
6 Heisa Kikan Seiri Iinkai, Heisa Kikan to Sono Tokushu Seisan, 399. This list includes the companies 
for which the SMR had a 100% control and related companies where book values are more than 
3 million yen. 
7 All three companies listed in this column are still in business as of March 2016. Tōhō Kaiun was 
merged with several other marine transport companies and currently under the NS United Kaiun. 
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Dalian Urban Transport 
Company  
(Dairen Toshi Kōtsū) 
100.0 % 22,500,000  
Fūkin Mining  
(Fūkin Kōgyōsho) 
100.0 % 15,000,000  
Manchuria Real Estate 
(Manshū Fudōsan) 










(Manshū Eiga Kyōkai) 
50.0 % 3,187,500  
Japan Paraffin Wax 
Company (Nippon Seirō) 
100.0 % 3,000,000 






100.0 % 2,250,000  
Dalian Ceramic  
(Dairen Yōgyō) 
100.0 % 2,100,000  
Fukushō-China Industries 
(Fukushō Kakō, details 
unknown) 
100.0 % 1,800,000  
Manchuria Mining 
(Manshū Kōgyō) 
100.0 % 1,450,000  
Dalian Agricultural 
Company (Dairen Nōji) 
100.0 % 1,000,000  
North Manchuria Fishery 
Company  
(Hokuman Suisan) 
100.0 % 600,000  
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List of interviews 
· A daughter of the South Manchuria Railway repatriate on 12 October 2012  
· Shōshichi Tabuse (a former SMR employee) on 21st October 2012 
· Yūji Tomi (a former SMR employee) on 25 October 2012 
· Hiroyuki Amano (Senior Executive of Mantetsukai, SMR’s postwar 
organisation) on 31st October 2012 and 1 June 2015 
· Telephone interview with a staff member of the Japan Finance Corporation 
(Nihon Seisaku Kin’yū Kōko), which was established in 2008, absorbing the 
National Life Finance Corporation (formerly the Japan Finance Corporation), 
on 13th August 2013 
· Mr Yoneyama, Mr Toshiyuki Yoshikawa, and Mr Junzō Tomita (members of 
the postwar organization of the Manchuria Railway Company, Manshū 
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